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BACKGROUND CHECKS
Public Employment: Background Investigations
SB 1097 (Boatwright), Chapter 135, Statutes of 1993, as set forth in Government Code section
1031.1, declared the Legislature’s intent that law enforcement have access to pertinent
information about peace officer applicants in order to ensure that qualified individuals with good
moral character are selected. (Bardin v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
494, 501.) To that end, it required an employer to disclose employment information relating to a
current or former employee who is an applicant for a peace officer position, and who is not
currently employed as a peace officer, upon request of a law enforcement agency, if certain
conditions are met. In the absence of fraud or malice, no employer is subject to any civil liability
for any relevant cause of action by virtue of releasing employment information required pursuant
to this section.
SB 1097 did not extend the disclosure requirements and protection from civil liability to
applicants for a position other than a sworn peace officer within a law enforcement agency.
However, law enforcement agencies employ persons in sensitive roles (e.g. evidence retention,
dispatch, etc.) that are not sworn peace officer positions.
AB 1339 (Cunningham), Chapter 89, extends an employer’s disclosure requirements,
and protection from civil liability for compliance, to applicants for a position other than a
sworn peace officer within a law enforcement agency. Specifically, this new law: requires
an employer to disclose employment information relating to a current or former employee
who has applied for a position other than a sworn peace officer within a law enforcement
agency.
Summary Criminal Histories
Penal Code Section 11105 allows for a number of specified entities to receive state summary
criminal history information from the Department of Justice (DOJ). The criminal history of
individuals provided by DOJ includes dates of arrests, arresting agencies, booking numbers,
charges, and dispositions. For over 20 years, the disposition information provided to the
receiving entities included sentencing information. In March of 2016, the DOJ, however, made
in an internal decision that Penal Code Section 11105 does not explicitly provide them with the
authority to release sentencing information as part of the state summary criminal history. As a
result, DOJ has not provided these entities with sentencing information since March, 2016.
SB 420 (Monning), Chapter 333, requires the DOJ to include sentencing information in
the state summary criminal history, if present in the department's records at the time of
response, whenever state summary criminal history is provided to specified entities.
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CHILD ABUSE
Non-Economic Losses: Child Sexual Abuse
Under current law, a defendant may be ordered to pay restitution for non-economic losses for
psychological harm caused, for violations of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14, Penal
Code section 288. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)
Since the restitution statute specifically lists only Penal Code section 288 in reference to
noneconomic losses, there is a split of authority as to whether the victim of a crime of continuous
sexual abuse of a child, section 288.5, is also entitled to restitution for non-economic losses.
Several appellate courts have held that permitting noneconomic restitution for convictions under
section 288 but not for convictions under section 288.5 would lead to an absurd result. (See
People v. McCarthy (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1096; People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
795, and People v. Martinez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 298.) It makes little sense for a child under
the age of 14 but older than 10 years of age to be awarded non-economic damages when they are
the victim of child sexual assault, but not to award non-economic damages to a child aged 10 or
younger who is the victim of the same conduct. Nor does it make sense to award non-economic
damages to a child who is the victim of two sexual assaults but not if they are victimized three or
more times. The pertinent restitution statute must be amended to include the overlooked crimes.

SB 756 (Stern), Chapter 101, authorizes non-economic restitution in cases where a
person is convicted of continuous sexual child abuse or sexual acts with a child 10
years of age or younger. Specifically, this new law: Adds the crimes of continuous
sexual abuse of a child and sexual acts with a child 10 years of age or younger to the
statute authorizing non-economic restitution for lewd and lascivious acts against a
child under the age of 14.
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
CURES Database: Health Information Technology System
According to recent reports by the Center for Disease Control regarding America’s opioid
epidemic, almost 2 million Americans abused or were dependent on prescription opioids in 2014.
In 2015, more than 15,000 people died from overdoses involving prescription opioids. Today,
nearly half of all U.S. opioid overdose deaths involve a prescription opioid and, due to the large
population that abuses prescription opioids, over 1,000 people are treated in emergency
departments for misusing prescription opioids every day.
In order to address the prevalence of prescribed opioid abuses, the California Department of
Justice (DOJ) implemented and maintains the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and
Evaluation System Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (CURES PDMP), a searchable
database, so that practitioners have increased access to information regarding a patient’s
prescription history. However, because current law does not provide authority for the CURES
PDMP to integrate with health information technology systems, health care practitioners face
several additional burdens including, but not limited to, a delay in accessing potentially vital
information for rapid treatment, increased opportunities for patients to abuse practitioner
services, and decreased peer-to-peer benefits between health information technology providers.
During the process of decommissioning the original CURES database and transitioning to
CURES 2.0, the current operating system, the DOJ expressed the need to address these concerns
through integration.
AB 40 (Santiago), Chapter 607, requires the DOJ to make electronic prescription drug
records contained in its CURES PDMP accessible through integration with a health
information technology (IT) system no later than October 1, 2018, if that system meets
certain information security and patient privacy requirements. Specifically, this new law:
•

Authorizes a health care practitioner, pharmacist, and any person acting on behalf of a
health care practitioner or pharmacist to submit a query to the CURES database
through a Health IT system if the entity operating the system has entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the Department of Justice (DOJ) addressing the
technical specifications of the system to ensure the security of the data and certifies
that:
o The entity will not use or disclose CURES data for any purpose other than
delivering the data to an approved health care practitioner or pharmacist or
performing data processing activities that may be necessary to enable the
delivery unless authorized by, and pursuant to, state and federal privacy and
security laws and regulations;
o The Health IT system will authenticate the identity of an authorized health
care practitioner or pharmacist initiating CURES queries and submit the date,
3

time, first and last name of the patient, date of birth of the patient, and
identification of the CURES user at the time of a query to CURES;
o The Health IT system meets applicable patient privacy and information
security requirements of state and federal law.
•

Requires DOJ, by October 1, 2018, to develop a programming interface or other
method of system integration to allow Health IT systems to retrieve information in
CURES on behalf of an authorized health care practitioner or pharmacist.

•

Prohibits DOJ from accessing patient-identifiable information in an entity’s Health IT
system.

•

Requires and entity operating a Health IT system that is attempting to establish an
integration with CURES to pay a reasonable system maintenance fee.

•

States that this bill is urgent, and necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, or safety in order to enable the DOJ to ensure that information in
the CURES database will be made available to prescribing physicians, so they may
prevent the dangerous abuse of prescription drugs and to safeguard the health and
safety of the people of this state.

•

Authorizes DOJ to prohibit integration or terminate a Health IT system’s ability to
retrieve information from CURES if the Health IT system or the entity operating it
does not comply with specified requirements.

Pretrial Diversion: Drug-Possession Offenses
Under existing law, a defendant charged with violations of certain specified drug may be eligible
to participate in a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) if he or she meets specified criteria. (Pen.
Code, §§ 1000 et seq.) With DEJ, a defendant must enter a guilty plea and entry of judgment on
the defendant's guilty plea is deferred pending successful completion of a program or other
conditions. If a defendant placed in a DEJ program fails to complete the program or comply
with conditions imposed, the court may resume criminal proceedings and the defendant, having
already pleaded guilty, would be sentenced. If the defendant successfully completes DEJ, the
arrest shall be deemed to never have occurred and the defendant may indicate in response to any
question concerning his or her prior criminal record that he or she was not arrested or granted
pretrial diversion for the offense.
Diversion on the other hand suspends the criminal proceedings without requiring the defendant
to enter a plea. Diversion also requires the defendant to successfully complete a program and
other conditions imposed by the court. Unlike DEJ however, if a defendant does not
successfully complete the diversion program, criminal proceedings resume but the defendant,
having not entered a plea, may still proceed to trial or enter a plea. If diversion is successfully
completed, the criminal charges are dismissed and the defendant may, with certain exceptions,
legally answer that he or she has never been arrested or charged for the diverted offense.
4

In order to avoid adverse immigration consequences, diversion of an offense is preferable to DEJ
because the defendant is not required to plead guilty in order to participate in the program.
Having a conviction for possession of controlled substances, even if dismissed, could trigger
deportation proceedings or prevent a person from becoming a U.S. citizen. (Paredes-Urrestarazu
v. U.S. INS (9th Cir. 1994) 36 F3d. 801.)
AB 208 (Eggman), Chapter 778, converts the existing deferred entry of judgment
program for specified drug-possession offenses into a pretrial drug diversion program.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Changes the existing deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program for specified drug
offenses into a pretrial drug diversion program.

•

Establishes the following eligibility requirements for the pretrial drug diversion
program:
o The defendant must not have a prior conviction for a drug offense within five
years other than those offenses which may be diverted;
o The charged offense did not involve violence or a threat of violence;
o There is no evidence of a contemporaneous violation relating to narcotics or
restricted dangerous drugs other than those offenses which may be diverted;
and;
o The defendant must have no prior felony conviction within the past five years.

•

Retains provisions in current DEJ law that is consistent with pretrial diversion.

•

Requires eligible defendants to be advised of the procedures for pretrial diversion,
including that the defendant will be waiving the right to a speedy preliminary hearing,
speedy trial, and to a trial by jury; that if the defendant does not perform satisfactorily
in the program, the prosecuting attorney, probation department, or court may make a
motion to terminate pretrial diversion and schedule the matter for further proceedings;
and an explanation of criminal record retention and disposition resulting from
participation in the pretrial diversion program and the defendant's rights relative to
answering questions about his or her arrest and pretrial diversion following successful
completion of the program.

•

Provides that a defendant's participation in pretrial diversion does not constitute a
conviction or an admission of guilt for any purpose.

•

Sets the length of the pretrial diversion program from between 12 months to 18
months, but allows the court to extend that time for good cause.
5

•

Provides that the prosecutor, the court, or the probation department may move to
terminate diversion if the defendant is performing unsatisfactorily, or he or she has
been convicted of a felony or an offense reflecting propensity for violence.

•

Provides that if pretrial diversion is terminated, either due to unsatisfactory
performance or because of specified convictions, then the court shall schedule the
matter for further proceedings.

•

Provides for dismissal of charges if the defendant completes pretrial diversion, and
deems arrest for the charges never to have occurred.

•

Allows a person participating in a pretrial diversion program to use medications to
treat substance use disorders under the direction of a licensed health care practitioner
if the participant allows release of his or her medical records to the court for the
limited purpose of determining whether he or she is using the medications under the
direction of a licensed health care practitioner and is complying with the rules of the
pretrial diversion program.

Alcohol and Marijuana: Penalties
From 2007 to 2014, the number of nighttime weekend drivers in the U.S. with marijuana in their
system increased nearly 50%. In 2012, the California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) released a
study of weekend nighttime drivers that found more California drivers tested positive for
marijuana than alcohol. Over the last 10 years the Department of Motor Vehicles data is
available, the two most recent years show that for the first time, drugged drivers and drug
combined with alcohol drivers are killing more Californians than alcohol impaired drivers. The
AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety’s Washington Study found that the percentage of drivers
involved in fatal crashes who recently used marijuana more than doubled between 2013 and
2014.
SB 65 (Hill), Chapter 232, prohibits the smoking or ingestion of marijuana while
driving, or the smoking or ingestion of marijuana or the drinking of an alcoholic beverage
while riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle, and makes a violation punishable as an
infraction.
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Sentence Enhancements: Prior Convictions
The existing three-year enhancement for prior drug-crime convictions was enacted by AB
2320 (Condit), Chapter 1398, Statutes of 1985. AB 2320 included un-codified legislative
intent “to punish more severely persons who are in the regular business of trafficking in,
or production of, narcotics and those persons who deal in large quantities of narcotics as
opposed to individuals who have a less serious, occasional, or relatively minor role in this
activity.” AB 2320, called “The Dealer Statute,” was modeled on particularly harsh
federal drug crime laws. The sponsor argued that it was necessary to eliminate an
incentive for persons “to traffic [in drugs] in California where sentences are significantly
lighter than in federal law.” The federal laws to which the sponsor referred were those
enacted in the expansion of the war against drugs during the Reagan administration.
These laws included reduced judicial discretion through mandatory minimum sentences.
It has been argued that the current policy of sentencing people with nonviolent drug
convictions to long periods of incarceration is an expensive failure that does not reduce
the availability of drugs in our communities. Instead, it cripples state and local budgets
that should prioritize drug prevention and treatment, education, and employment as our
best policies against drug sales and drug use. Sentencing enhancements do not prevent or
reduce drug sales. Indeed, research finds that the length of sentences does not provide any
deterrent or significant incapacitation effect; in other words, longer sentences for drug
offenses do not reduce recidivism, nor do they affect drug availability. Most people who
commit crimes are either unaware of penalties or do not think they will be caught (See
Russell, Sarah F, “Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug
Convictions in Federal Sentencing,” 43 UC Davis L. Rev. 1135 2010.)
SB 180 (Mitchell), Chapter 677, limits the current three-year enhancement for a prior
conviction related to the sale or possession for sale of specified controlled substances to
convictions for a controlled substance offense where a minor was used or employed in
the commission of the offense.

7

CORRECTIONS
Inmates: Reentry Services
Less than two thirds of California’s adult male population is nonwhite or Latino (60 percent), but
these groups make up three of every four men in prison: Latinos are 42 percent, Blacks are 29
percent, and other races are 6 percent. Among adult men in 2013, Blacks were incarcerated at a
rate of 4,367 per 100,000, compared to 922 for Latinos, 488 for non-Latino whites, and 34 for
Asians.
About half of men in prison are fathers of minor children and 42 percent of fathers lived with
their children at the time of their arrest. Incarceration of fathers destabilizes and harms their
families in many ways. Two-thirds of incarcerated parents are nonviolent offenders; however,
contact between them and their families is severely restricted, and there are very few policies in
place that protect and advocate for the rights of their children. Children with incarcerated
parents are three times more likely to suffer from developmental or behavioral problems, along
with mental health problems such as depression.
There is a need to address the social and systemic barriers that incarcerated and previously
incarcerated men and woman face through facilitating healthy relationships with their families.
Addressing the barriers faced by re-entry from prison not only supports the well-being of the
individual and their families but also the strengthening of their communities.
AB 683 (E. Garcia), Chapter 45, authorizes the Counties of Alameda, Imperial, Los
Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, Santa Clara, and San Joaquin to implement reentry pilot
programs for inmates during or after their incarceration in a county jail. Specifically, this
new law:
•

Makes legislative findings and declaration, and declares legislative intent.

•

Allows the Counties of Alameda, Imperial, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, Santa
Clara, and San Joaquin to implement pilot programs to provide reentry services and
support to persons who are, or who are scheduled to be, released from a county jail.

•

Requires that each pilot program established pursuant to this section to include, at a
minimum, all of the following components:
o Support services for recipients who are parents;
o A mentorship program that employs a culturally relevant, population-specific
approach that has been employed by nonprofit organizations, such as the
National Compadres Network and the Brotherhood of Elders;
o The establishment of a collaborative body of training and technical advisers;
8

o The establishment of a Youth Advisory Council to help inform and guide
program leaders;
o Leadership opportunities, particularly for youth;
o Services to address mental health issues, including mental health issues
relating to sexual exploitation, racial and ethnic disparities, and trauma;
o An advisory committee in each county to oversee the establishment and
implementation of the pilot program in the county;
o Each service provider has a proven track record of providing meaningful,
culturally based programming, including the support of gender specific and
gender fluid approaches;
o Each service provider offers services that support culturally based family
strengthening, character development, and community mobilization; and,
o Each service provider offers services before and after the recipient’s release
from a county jail.
o Requires that each county that elects to implement a pilot program shall
conduct a study and submit a report to the Legislature on or before January 1,
2023, that includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of the pilot program.
Inmates: Psychiatric Medication
In California alone, over 100,000 people received mental health treatment in county jails in
2014-2015, according to the Department of Health Care Services. The department also
acknowledges that this number is likely underreported because contractors providing mental
health services in jails did not always report data to the state on services provided.
According to the National Association of Counties, 64 percent of the jail population nationwide
has a mental illness. A 2009 study found that 15 percent of male inmates and 31 percent of
female inmates are dealing with a severe mental illness.
Involuntary medication in jails can help reduce harm in extreme cases of danger to the inmate,
other inmates or staff, as well as treat an inmate’s grave disability. Existing law provides
procedures for involuntary medication which specifically apply to the portion of the county jail
population that has been sentenced, but county jails also house individuals who are detained in
jail while they face criminal charges.
AB 720 (Eggman), Chapter 347, applies the existing framework for involuntary
medication of a person in county jail after being sentenced on a criminal conviction, to
other inmates in county jail including those awaiting arraignment, trial, or sentencing, but
limits the time period for an involuntary medication order for county jail inmates
awaiting arraignment, trial, or sentencing to six months and provides a sunset date of
9

January 1, 2022. Specifically, this new law:
•

Defines “inmate” for purposes of this law as a person confined in the county jail,
including, but not limited to, a person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail, a
person housed in a county jail during or awaiting trial proceedings, a person who has
been booked into a county jail and is awaiting arraignment, transfer, or release.

•

States that if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with
psychiatric medication, but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be
involuntarily treated with the medication if the inmate is a danger to self or others, or
is gravely disabled, and specified procedures involving a hearing and independent
review are followed.

•

States that an order for involuntary medication of an inmate who is awaiting
arraignment, trial, or sentencing, shall be valid for no more than 180 days.

•

States that a court may review, modify, or terminate an involuntary medication order
for an inmate awaiting trial, where there is a showing that the involuntary medication
is interfering with the inmate’s due process rights in the criminal proceeding.

•

Requires the jail to make a documented attempt to locate an available bed for the
inmate in a community-based treatment facility in lieu of seeking to administer
involuntary medication on a non-emergency basis.

•

Specifies that in the case of an inmate who is awaiting arraignment, trial, or
sentencing, the court shall review the order for involuntary medication at intervals of
not more than 60 days to determine whether the grounds for the order remain.

•

Clarifies that this law does not prohibit the court from suspending the criminal
prosecution until the court determines that the involuntarily medicating the defendant
will not interfere with his or her ability to meaningfully participate in the criminal
proceedings.

•

Establishes a sunset date of January 1, 2022.

Juveniles: Restraints
Every day young people in California who are detained in secure confinement are placed in
restraints, including handcuffs, belly belts, and leg shackles, to be transported outside of the
juvenile hall – for example, to a court appearance or doctor’s appointment. Young people may
spend hours in restraints as they wait to appear in court or to see a doctor. Once in court, they
may remain restrained, impeding their ability to participate in their court hearing. This practice
is harmful especially young people suffering from the effects of trauma and mental illness. It is
also contrary to the juvenile court’s goal of providing individualized rehabilitative services to
young people and is unnecessary to protect young people or ensure public safety.
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The indiscriminate use of restraints is not necessary to preserve public safety. Only about 10% of
juvenile arrests are for violent felonies. The indiscriminate use of shackling makes little sense,
given that the risk the young people pose to public safety is minimal and the potential harm to
them is significant.
AB 878 (Gipson), Chapter 660, limits the use of restraints to transport a minor from a
juvenile detention facility and clarifies when restraints may be used in juvenile court.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that restraints may be used when a minor is being transported outside of a
local juvenile detention facility only upon a determination made by the probation
department, in consultation with the transporting agency, that restraints are necessary
to prevent physical harm to the juvenile or another person or due to a substantial risk
of flight.

•

Requires that the least restrictive form of restraint be used consistent with the
legitimate security needs of each minor if a determination is made that mechanical
restraints are necessary.

•

Requires a county probation department which chooses to use restraints other than
handcuffs to establish procedures for documenting their use, including the reasons for
use of those restraints.

•

Provides that the above restrictions on restraints do not apply to restraints used by
medical care providers in the course of medical treatment or transportation.

•

Provides that restraints may only be used during a juvenile court proceeding if the
court determines that the individual minor’s behavior in custody or in court
establishes a manifest need to use restraints to prevent physical harm to the juvenile
or another person or due to a substantial risk of flight.

•

Provides that it is the prosecution’s burden to demonstrate the need to use restraints
on a minor during a juvenile court proceeding.

•

Requires that the least restrictive form of restraint be used and the reasons for the use
of restraints be documented on the record if the court makes a determination that
mechanical restraints are necessary.
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Voting Rights: Inmates and Formerly Incarcerated
Civic participation can be a critical aspect of re-entry and has been linked to reducing recidivism.
However, many in California’s criminal justice system are not accurately apprised of their voting
rights and correct voting information is not readily accessible. To add to this confusion, almost
every state handles voting rights for incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals
differently. This results in many individuals being deprived of their fundamental rights to vote
on issues and candidates that directly impact their lives.
AB 1344 (Weber), Chapter 796, requires the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) and county probation departments to provide specified voting
rights information to persons under their jurisdiction upon request of such person.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires CDCR to do all of the following for each parolee under the jurisdiction of
the department upon the completion of his or her parole:
o Establish and maintain on the departments Internet Web site a hyperlink to the
Internet Web site at which information provided by the Secretary of State
regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history may be found;
o Post in each parole office a notice that contains the Internet Web site address
at which information provided by the Secretary of State regarding voting
rights for persons with a criminal history may be found; and,
o Upon request of the parolee, advise the parolee of information provided by the
Secretary of State regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history.

•

Mandates each county probation department to do all of the following for each person
under the department's jurisdiction:
o Establish and maintain on the departments Internet Web site a hyperlink to the
Internet Web site at which information provided by the Secretary of State
regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history may be found;
o Post in each parole office a notice that contains the Internet Web site address
at which information provided by the Secretary of State regarding voting
rights for persons with a criminal history may be found; and,
o Upon request of a probationer, advise the probationer of information provided
by the Secretary of State regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal
history, who are under the department's supervision.
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Elderly Parole Program
The number of elderly prisoners in California state prisons will continue to increase
exponentially if measures are not implemented and codified to ensure parole hearings.
According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), as of
February 2017, there were over 31,000 inmates 50 years of age or older.
Costs associated with geriatric medical needs begin to accumulate at 50 years of age, given that
there is an overwhelming consensus that the age of 50 constitutes a point when prisoners are
considered elderly. In 2010, the LAO estimated from other state projections that incarcerating
elderly offenders costs two to three times more than for the general prison population. In 2010,
the average cost of incarcerating an inmate was approximately $51,000.
There is a lower risk of recidivism among elderly prisoners, according to CDCR statistics. In
2015, CDCR reported that only 31.1 percent of persons who were 60 years of age and older,
returned to prison after three years from being released from prison compared to the state
average of 44.6 percent for all formerly incarcerated individuals. Recidivism rates for persons 50
to 54, inclusive, years of age and 55 to 59, inclusive, years of age after one year from being
released from prison were 39.4 and 34.6 percent, respectively.
AB 1448 (Weber), Chapter 676, codifies the Elderly Parole Program, to be administered
by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH). Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires a prisoner to be considered for parole under the Elderly Parole Program if he
or she meets both of the following conditions:
o The prisoner is 60 years of age or older; and,
o The prisoner has served a minimum of 25 years of continued incarceration on
his or her current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate
sentence.

•

Provides that when considering the release of a prisoner by the panel or board sitting
en banc, the board shall give special consideration to whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the elderly prisoner's risk of
future violence.

•

States that when scheduling a parole suitability hearing or when considering a request
for an advance hearing, the board shall consider whether the prisoner meets the above
age and continuous incarceration requirement.

•

Provides that if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under the Elderly Parole
Program, the board shall release the individual on parole, as specified.

•

Prohibits a prisoner from being paroled who has been sentenced under the "Three
Strikes" Law, who has been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
13

parole or death, and a person who has been convicted of the first degree murder of a
peace officer or a former peace officer.
•

States that this bill does not alter the rights of victims at parole hearings.

•

States that an individual eligible for an elderly parole hearing shall meet with the
parole board as specified by existing law.

•

Specifies that if parole is not granted at an elderly parole hearing, the parole board
shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing as specified by existing law.

•

Specifies that "elderly eligible parole date" is the date on which an inmate who
qualifies as an elderly offender is eligible for release from prison.

Inmates: Petition for Name or Gender Change
Existing law allows a person to petition the court for a judgment to recognize a change of gender.
The petition must include an affidavit of a physician attesting that the person has undergone
clinically appropriate treatment for the purpose of gender transition. Generally, the court is
required to grant the petition if the court determines that the physician’s affidavit shows that the
person has undergone clinically appropriate treatment for the purpose of gender transition.
Under existing law, an incarcerated transgender person seeking a name and gender change court
order must first obtain approval from the warden of their facility and then the approval of the
Division of Adult Institutions Regional Administrator as well as a Corrections Case Manager
before filing a petition with the court. This process almost always results in either a denial or
with no response from corrections officials.
Transgender people face extreme difficulties when they reenter society when their gender
presentation does not match their identification documents, including employment, housing,
healthcare and government subsidies. A significant number of transgender people have reported
verbal harassment, denial of benefits or services, being asked to leave, or being assaulted after
presenting identification documents that do not match their gender identity.
Transgender people who are incarcerated should have the same right as anyone else to legally
change their name or gender and to be recognized for who they are.
SB 310 (Atkins), Chapter 856, establishes the right of inmates under the jurisdiction of
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) or serving a
sentence in a county jail to petition the court to obtain a name or gender marker change.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides a person under the jurisdiction of CDCR or sentenced to county jail has the
right to petition the court to obtain a name change or gender change provided under
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existing law.
•

Requires a person under the jurisdiction of CDCR or sentenced to county jail to
provide a copy of the petition for a name change to the respective department, in a
manner prescribed by the department, at the time the petition is filed.

•

Requires that in all documentation of a person under the jurisdiction of CDCR or a
county jail, the new name of a person who obtains a name change shall be used, and
prior names shall be listed as an alias.

•

Makes several legislative findings and makes technical and conforming changes.

•

Delays the operative date of its provisions to September 1, 2018.

Custodial Officers: Less Lethal Force
While Penal Code Section 831 gives local law enforcement agencies the authority to employ
custodial officers, who generally work at the jail and provide inmate custodial services, the law
precludes these officers from possessing firearms in the course of their duties.
"Some sheriff offices would like to deploy certain officers in custodial facilities with the
appropriate tools to address specific situations. For example, a jail may have an emergency
response team that responds to critical incidents and emergency situations. A sheriff may wish
to deploy this team with less lethal weapons that fire plastic, rubber, or other less lethal
projectiles, but these weapons are technically firearms, and may not be used by custodial officers
as defined in Penal Code Section 831.
SB 324 (Roth), Chapter 73, authorizes a custodial officer to use a firearm that is a "less
lethal weapon" in the official performance of his or her duty, at the discretion of the
sheriff or chief of police or his or her designee, if the custodial officer is trained in its use
and complies with the policy of on the use of less lethal force as set forth by the sheriff or
chief of police.
Exonerated Inmates: Transitional Services
AB 672 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 403, Statutes of 2015, also known as “Obie’s law,” ensured
that wrongfully convicted people could get access to services which were at the time only
available to parolees. Existing law requires the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to
provide transitional services to those who have been exonerated.
However, the standard for establishing innocence changed with the passage of SB 1134 (Leno),
Chapter 785, Statutes of 2016. Thus, there is a need to update the standard for eligibility for
services to wrongfully convicted people so that they can receive those services consistent with
that change in the law.
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SB 336 (Anderson), Chapter 728, expands the definition of "exonerated," for the
purpose of eligibility for assistance with transitional services upon release from prison, to
include a person who has been granted a writ of habeas corpus based on the fact that new
evidence exists that more likely than not would have altered the outcome of the trial
resulting in dismissal of the charges, or a determination has been made that the person
should be released on bail or own recognizance pending appeal or pending retrial.
Inmates: Veteran’s Benefits
A large number of incarcerated military veterans are fully eligible for a wide range of benefits as
a result of their service prior to their incarceration. The California Association of County
Veterans Service Officers (CACVSO) is an organization of professional veterans advocates. In
California, CVSO plays a role in the veteran’s advocacy system and is often the initial contact in
the community for veterans’ services. AB 2263 (Bradford), Chapter 652, Statutes of 2014,
authorized a veterans service organization to volunteer to serve as a veterans service advocate at
each facility that is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR). However, in many counties where state prisons are located, CVSOs are overworked in
serving the many and varied needs of their local veteran populations and consequently may have
difficulty servicing the incarcerated veteran population in a timely manner.
SB 776 (Newman), Chapter 599, requires CDCR to have one employee, for every five state
prisons, who is trained by the Department of Veterans Affairs (CalVet) to assist incarcerated
veterans in applying for and receiving any federal veterans benefits for which they may be
eligible. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires CDCR to provide one employee, other than a correctional officer or other
custodial employee, for every five state prisons, who is trained and accredited by
CalVet and who shall assist incarcerated veterans in applying for and receiving any
federal veterans’ benefits for which they may be eligible.

•

Requires the employee to forward any claim he or she develops for federal veterans’
benefits for an incarcerated veteran to the local county veterans service office for the
following actions:
o Quality control review;
o Inputting the claim into the federal claims processing system; and
o Inputting the claim into the VetPro software system used by the CalVet and
local county veterans service offices, or any replacement software system that
is intended to perform the same function.
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COURT HEARINGS
Pretrial Diversion: Drug-Possession Offenses
Under existing law, a defendant charged with violations of certain specified drug may be eligible
to participate in a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) if he or she meets specified criteria. (Pen.
Code, §§ 1000 et seq.) With DEJ, a defendant must enter a guilty plea and entry of judgment on
the defendant's guilty plea is deferred pending successful completion of a program or other
conditions. If a defendant placed in a DEJ program fails to complete the program or comply
with conditions imposed, the court may resume criminal proceedings and the defendant, having
already pleaded guilty, would be sentenced. If the defendant successfully completes DEJ, the
arrest shall be deemed to never have occurred and the defendant may indicate in response to any
question concerning his or her prior criminal record that he or she was not arrested or granted
pretrial diversion for the offense.
Diversion on the other hand suspends the criminal proceedings without requiring the defendant
to enter a plea. Diversion also requires the defendant to successfully complete a program and
other conditions imposed by the court. Unlike DEJ however, if a defendant does not
successfully complete the diversion program, criminal proceedings resume but the defendant,
having not entered a plea, may still proceed to trial or enter a plea. If diversion is successfully
completed, the criminal charges are dismissed and the defendant may, with certain exceptions,
legally answer that he or she has never been arrested or charged for the diverted offense.
In order to avoid adverse immigration consequences, diversion of an offense is preferable to DEJ
because the defendant is not required to plead guilty in order to participate in the program.
Having a conviction for possession of controlled substances, even if dismissed, could trigger
deportation proceedings or prevent a person from becoming a U.S. citizen. (Paredes-Urrestarazu
v. U.S. INS (9th Cir. 1994) 36 F3d. 801.)
AB 208 (Eggman), Chapter 778, converts the existing deferred entry of judgment
program for specified drug-possession offenses into a pretrial drug diversion program.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Changes the existing deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program for specified drug
offenses into a pretrial drug diversion program.

•

Establishes the following eligibility requirements for the pretrial drug diversion
program:
o The defendant must not have a prior conviction for a drug offense within five
years other than those offenses which may be diverted;
o The charged offense did not involve violence or a threat of violence;
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o There is no evidence of a contemporaneous violation relating to narcotics or
restricted dangerous drugs other than those offenses which may be diverted;
and;
o The defendant must have no prior felony conviction within the past five years.
•

Retains provisions in current DEJ law that are consistent with pretrial diversion.

•

Requires eligible defendants to be advised of the procedures for pretrial diversion,
including that the defendant will be waiving the right to a speedy preliminary hearing,
speedy trial, and to a trial by jury; that if the defendant does not perform satisfactorily
in the program, the prosecuting attorney, probation department, or court may make a
motion to terminate pretrial diversion and schedule the matter for further proceedings;
and an explanation of criminal record retention and disposition resulting from
participation in the pretrial diversion program and the defendant's rights relative to
answering questions about his or her arrest and pretrial diversion following successful
completion of the program.

•

Provides that a defendant's participation in pretrial diversion does not constitute a
conviction or an admission of guilt for any purpose.

•

Sets the length of the pretrial diversion program from between 12 months to 18
months, but allows the court to extend that time for good cause.

•

Provides that the prosecutor, the court, or the probation department may move to
terminate diversion if the defendant is performing unsatisfactorily, or he or she has
been convicted of a felony or an offense reflecting propensity for violence.

•

Provides that if pretrial diversion is terminated, either due to unsatisfactory
performance or because of specified convictions, then the court shall schedule the
matter for further proceedings.

•

Provides for dismissal of charges if the defendant completes pretrial diversion, and
deems arrest for the charges never to have occurred.

•

Allows a person participating in a pretrial diversion program to use medications to
treat substance use disorders under the direction of a licensed health care practitioner
if the participant allows release of his or her medical records to the court for the
limited purpose of determining whether he or she is using the medications under the
direction of a licensed health care practitioner and is complying with the rules of the
pretrial diversion program.
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Sexually Violent Predators: County Placement
Under existing law, a person who has been judicially determined to be a sexually violent
predator (SVP) who has successfully completed treatment, and is to be conditionally released,
shall be released in the county of domicile unless both of the following conditions are met: (1)
The court finds that extraordinary circumstances require placement outside the county of
residence; and, (2) The designated county of placement was given prior notice and an
opportunity to comment on the proposed placement in the county.
AB 255 (Gallagher), Chapter 39, provides that when designating the county of
placement for an SVP, who is to be conditionally released, the courts must consider
connections to the community, Specifically, if and how long the person has previously
resided or been employed in the county, and if the person has next of kin in the county.
Witnesses: Support Dogs
An effective tool to help prevent psychological harm to a child victim/witness or vulnerable
person victim/witness is the use of therapy or facility dogs (commonly referred to as comfort
dogs). Having a courthouse dog is another step in the process to assist victims and address the
need for more compassion in the legal system.
In People v. Chenault (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s
authority to permit the use of support dogs for certain witnesses. The court recognized that while
Penal Code section 868.5, expressly allows the presence of one or two support persons for a
witness in certain circumstances, it does not apply to therapy dogs. (Id. at pp. 1513-1514.)
However, under Evidence Code section 765, the trial court has broad control over the
interrogation of witnesses, which includes the authority to allow the presence of a
therapy/support dog during a witness's testimony. Therefore the court had the authority to permit
use of the support dog under that statute. (Id. at p. 1514.)
Although case law recognizes the court’s authority to permit use of a support dog, this practice is
not codified in statute.
AB 411 (Bloom), Chapter 290, authorizes the use of a support dog during the testimony
of specified victims and child witnesses. Specifically, this new law:
•

Allows the following persons, if requested by either party in a criminal or juvenile
hearing, to be afforded the opportunity to have a therapy or facility dog accompany
him or her while testifying in court, subject to the approval of the court:
o A child witness in a court proceeding involving any serious felony, as
specified; and
o A victim who is entitled to support persons under other penal code provisions.
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•

Requires the party seeking to utilize the therapy or facility dog to file a motioning
with the court which includes all of the following:
o The training or credentials of the therapy or facility dog;
o The training of the therapy or facility dog handler; and,
o Facts justifying that the presence of the therapy or facility dog may reduce
anxiety or otherwise be helpful to the witness while testifying.

•

Allows the court to deny a motion to utilize a therapy or facility dog if the court finds
that the use of a therapy or facility dog would cause undue prejudice to the defendant
or would be unduly disruptive to the court proceeding.

•

Requires the court to take appropriate measures to make the presence of the therapy
or facility dog as unobtrusive and non-disruptive as possible, including requiring a
dog to be accompanied by a handler in the courtroom at all times.

•

Requires the court, upon request, to present appropriate jury instructions designed to
prevent prejudice for or against any party.

•

States that nothing in this law shall prevent the court from removing or excluding a
therapy or facility dog from the courtroom to maintain order or to ensure the fair
presentation of evidence.

•

Declares legislative intent to codify the holding in People v. Chenault (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1503 with respect to allowing an individual witness to have a support
dog accompany him or her when testifying in proceedings.

•

States that nothing in this law limits the use of a service dog, as specified, by a person
with a disability.

•

Defines certain terms for purposes of this law.

Gun Violence Restraining Orders: Records Retention
In 2014, the Legislature enacted AB 1014 (Skinner), Chapter 872, which authorized courts to
issue gun violence restraining orders to remove firearms from individuals who are at-risk of
committing acts of violence against themselves or others. While it was modeled after other
restraining order laws, AB 1014 did not specify the period during which records were required to
be retained. Under existing law, court records of other similar restraining orders (e.g., civil
harassment, domestic violence, elder and dependent adult abuse) are retained for the duration of
the restraining order and for any renewals, and then permanently thereafter, like judgments.
AB 1443 (Levine), Chapter 172, provides that a record involving a gun violence
restraining order case be retained for the duration of the restraining order and during any
renewals. Thereafter, the records are to be retained permanently, like judgments.
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Violent Felonies: Video Recordings
With the widespread use of social media, a troubling trend has emerged. Some individuals are
committing violent crimes for the purposes of videotaping and sharing on social media. One
example is the crime committed against Jordan Peisner, a Los Angeles teenager who was
assaulted outside a fast food restaurant by one teenager while another recorded the incident and
posted it to Snapchat.
AB 1542 (Dababneh), Chapter 668, allows the court to consider the recording of a
commission of a violent felony as a factor in aggravation for sentencing purposes.
Specifically, this new law: states that in any case where a defendant has been convicted
of a violent felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code, the court
may consider as a factor in aggravation that the defendant willfully recorded a video of
the commission of the violent felony with the intent to encourage or facilitate the offense.
Sentence Enhancements: Prior Convictions
The existing three-year enhancement for prior drug-crime convictions was enacted by AB
2320 (Condit), Chapter 1398, Statutes of 1985. AB 2320 included un-codified legislative
intent “to punish more severely persons who are in the regular business of trafficking in,
or production of, narcotics and those persons who deal in large quantities of narcotics as
opposed to individuals who have a less serious, occasional, or relatively minor role in this
activity.” AB 2320, called “The Dealer Statute,” was modeled on particularly harsh
federal drug crime laws. The sponsor argued that it was necessary to eliminate an
incentive for persons “to traffic [in drugs] in California where sentences are significantly
lighter than in federal law.” The federal laws to which the sponsor referred were those
enacted in the expansion of the war against drugs during the Reagan administration.
These laws included reduced judicial discretion through mandatory minimum sentences.
It has been argued that the current policy of sentencing people with nonviolent drug
convictions to long periods of incarceration is an expensive failure that does not reduce
the availability of drugs in our communities. Instead, it cripples state and local budgets
that should prioritize drug prevention and treatment, education, and employment as our
best policies against drug sales and drug use. Sentencing enhancements do not prevent or
reduce drug sales. Indeed, research finds that the length of sentences does not provide any
deterrent or significant incapacitation effect; in other words, longer sentences for drug
offenses do not reduce recidivism, nor do they affect drug availability. Most people who
commit crimes are either unaware of penalties or do not think they will be caught (See
Russell, Sarah F, “Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug
Convictions in Federal Sentencing,” 43 UC Davis L. Rev. 1135 2010.)
SB 180 (Mitchell), Chapter 677, limits the current three-year enhancement for a prior
conviction related to the sale or possession for sale of specified controlled substances to
convictions for a controlled substance offense where a minor was used or employed in
the commission of the offense.
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Veteran's Treatment Courts: Assessment and Survey
Veterans’ court is a problem-solving court intended to serve veterans who are involved with the
justice system and whose court cases are affected by issues such as addiction, mental illness, and
co-occurring disorders. These courts promote sobriety, recovery, and stability through a
coordinated response involving cooperation and collaboration with prosecutors, defense lawyers,
probation departments, county veterans service offices, the California Department of Veterans
Affairs, health-care networks, employment and housing agencies and groups, volunteer mentors
who are usually also veterans, and family support organizations. There is a need to provide
greater access to these courts so all Veterans can get the treatment they need.
SB 339 (Roth), Chapter 595, requires the Judicial Council to conduct a study of veterans
and veteran's treatment courts. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires the Judicial Council, if funding is provided, to conduct a study of veterans and
veteran's treatment courts that includes all of the following:
o A statewide assessment of the veteran's treatment courts currently in operation that
includes the number of veterans participating in the program, services available, and
program outcomes, including successful completion or program terminations. The
assessment shall evaluate the impact of a sample of veterans treatments courts on
participant outcomes, including, not limited to, program recidivism, mental health,
homelessness, employment social stability, and substance abuse;
o A survey of counties that do not operate veteran's treatment courts that identifies
barriers to program implementation and assesses the need for veteran's treatment
courts in those jurisdictions based on the veterans involved in the local criminal
justice system. The survey shall identify alternative resources that may be available to
veterans, such as community courts or other collaborative justice courts; and,
o On or before June 1, 2020, report to the Legislature on the results of the study,
including recommendations regarding the expansion of veteran's treatment courts or
services to counties without veteran's treatment courts and shall explore the feasibility
of designing regional model veterans treatment courts through the use of service
coordination or technological resources.

•

Establishes a sunset date of January 1, 2021.

Incompetence to Stand Trial: Conservatorship
Currently mentally ill defendants who cannot be restored to competency, and who do not qualify
for conservatorships, are released from competency restoration programs. Under existing law, a
conservatorship is allowed in circumstances where an information (post preliminary hearing) or
indictment (post grand jury) is pending against the defendant containing specified criminal
charges, and the defendant was not returned to competency within the requisite time frame.
Under existing law, a conservatorship is not allowed if defendant is facing a complaint
22

(preliminary hearing has not yet been conducted).
SB 684 (Bates), Chapter 246, allows the initiation of a conservatorship for involuntary
commitment when a criminal defendant is charged with specified felonies and the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Specifically, this new law:
•

Expands existing law to allows a conservatorship to be established when a defendant
has been found incompetent to stand trial, if the defendant has been charged by
complaint, if the following conditions are met:
o The complaint charges a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a
serious threat to the physical well-being of another person;
o A judge has made a finding of probable cause the defendant has committed
the list of felonies, specified above, and the complaint has not been dismissed;
o As a result of a mental health disorder, the defendant is unable to understand
the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him or her and to
assist counsel in the conduct of his or her defense in a rational manner;
o The defendant has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial; and
o The person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.

•

Establishes a procedure, to be approved by the court, for a prosecuting attorney, at
any time before or after a defendant is determined incompetent to stand trial, to
request a determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the
offense or offenses alleged in the complaint, solely for the purpose of meeting the
criteria for gravely disabled to be eligible for a conservatorship.

Grants the defendant a preliminary hearing after restoration of competency. Allows for the
initiation of a conservatorship upon a criminal complaint if there has been a finding of probable
cause on the complaint.
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Sentencing: County of Incarceration and Supervision
In 2011, Criminal Justice Realignment (Realignment) made significant changes in the statutes
governing felony sentencing (Stats. 2011, chaps. 15 (AB 109), 39 (AB 117), 136, 1st Ex. Sess.,
chap. 12). In relevant part, Realignment allows lower level felons to serve their sentences in
county jail instead of state prison. Also, under Realignment, where a felon is sentenced to county
jail, the court must suspend execution of a concluding portion of the sentence, “[u]nless the court
finds that, in the interests of justice, it is not appropriate in a particular case.” (Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (h)(5)(A).) During the period of suspended execution, “known as mandatory supervision”
the felon is supervised by the county probation officer. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)
When a defendant receives felony sentences in multiple jurisdictions (counties), the law provides
a process for the second or subsequent court to impose a single aggregate term. Prior to
Realignment, the aggregate term was served in a state prison operated by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Thus, the county from which any portion of the
aggregate sentence originated was of no consequence. Under Realignment, low level felons
generally serve their sentences and are supervised at the county level. Realignment legislation
does not address the issue of sentences from multiple jurisdictions. “The issue will become
significant because now counties must carry the cost of local incarceration with only minimal
contribution from the state, and jail space is frequently very limited.” (Couzens et al., Sentencing
Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2016) Ch. 11, § 11:35.)
SB 670 (Jackson), Chapter 287, specifies that the court rendering a second or
subsequent county-jail felony judgment determines the county or counties of
incarceration and supervision. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that when imposing judgment on a county-jail felony concurrent or
consecutive to a judgment on a county-jail felony in another county or counties, the
court rendering the second or subsequent judgment determines the county or counties
of incarceration and supervision of the defendant.

•

Requires the Judicial Council to adopt rules providing criteria for the consideration of
the judge when determining the county or counties of incarceration and supervision.
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CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Military Fraud: Stolen Valor Act
California currently requires an elected officer forfeit his or her office upon conviction of a crime
pursuant to either the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005 or the California Stolen Valor Act.
However, the United States Supreme Court struck down the Federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005
stating that the action of claiming military service is protected under free speech. (See United
States v. Alvarez (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2556 [183 L.Ed.2d 547].) Therefore, the Federal Stolen
Valor act of 2005 was found to be unconstitutional. Congress then passed the Federal Stolen
Valor Act of 2013 with a focus on intent to make profit, obtain money, property, or obtaining
something with/of tangible benefit or value.
There is now a need to conform state law to the updated federal law.
AB 153 (Chavez), Chapter 576, modifies the language of the California Stolen Valor
Act to conform to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013. Specifically, this new law:
•

Punishes as a misdemeanor offense conduct that is fraudulent, with respect to false
representation as a war veteran or as a veteran or member of the Armed Forces, with
the intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit, as defined.

•

Defines tangible benefit as "financial remuneration, an effect on the outcome of a
criminal or civil court proceeding, or any benefit relating to service in the military
that is provided by a federal, state, or local governmental entity."

•

Expands the crime related to misrepresentation to include a person who fraudulently
represents him or herself as a veteran or member of the California National Guard,
the State Military Reserve, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or
any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States with the intent
to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.

•

Punishes as a misdemeanor offense a person who misrepresents him or herself as a
member or veteran of specified armed forces in connection with certain acts, such as,
among other things, the forgery or use of falsified military documentation, or for
purposes of employment or promoting a business, charity, or other endeavor, as
prescribed.

•

Require elected officers, as specified, to forfeit their office upon the conviction of a
crime pursuant to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013 or the California Stolen Valor
Act that involves a fraudulent claim, made with the intent to obtain money, property,
or other tangible benefit, as defined, that the person is a veteran or a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States, as prescribed in those acts.
25

Public Agencies: Unlawful Interference
According to California Association of Clerks and Election Officials, there have been complaints
at some County Clerk offices regarding aggressive solicitors harassing individuals there to
conduct business. For example, in San Bernardino County, more than a dozen complaints were
filed between 2014 and 2015 regarding solicitors outside the Hall of Records posing as county
employees, arguing with citizens and following them into the building to enlist their business in
filing fictitious business names and articles of incorporation. In Los Angeles County, solicitors
have been confrontational and used aggressive tactics to acquire business from individuals who
were there to conduct business with the County Clerk’s office. Some of solicitors have been
known to approach individuals as they get out of their vehicles on their way to the clerk’s office
in an attempt to get those filers to use an agent to file their documents. In some instances, these
solicitors have knowingly misled individuals by stating that they are required to use an agent to
file a fictitious business name.
Current state law under California Penal Code Section 602.1 only punishes acts that are
considered “obstructing” or “intimidating” to persons attempting to carry on business at a public
agency. This creates a void in the penal code that permits illegitimate solicitors to be exempt
from the enforcement of said punishments.
AB 660 (Rubio), Chapter 381, expands the crime of trespass on the property of a public
agency. Specifically, this new law: makes it an infraction, punishable by a fine of up to
$400, to intentionally interfere with any lawful business carried on by the employees of a
public agency open to the public by knowingly making a material misrepresentation of
the law to those attempting to transact business with the agency and refusing to leave, as
specified.
First Degree Murder: Peace Officers
Under current law, an unlawful killing (a killing without legal justification or excuse) of a peace
officer that is willful, deliberate, and premeditated is first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187189, 195-196.)
AB 1459 (Quirk-Silva), Chapter 214, restates existing law regarding first degree
murder of a peace officer for purposes of the gravity of the offense and support of the
survivors. Specifically, this new law:
•

Declares the finding of the Legislature that all unlawful killings that are willful,
deliberate, and premediated and in which the victim was a peace officer, as defined in
statute, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace
officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, are considered first degree
murder for purposes of the gravity of the offense and the support of survivors.

•

States that this provision is declarative of existing law.
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•

Makes uncodified legislative findings and declarations.

Infectious and Communicable Diseases: Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Crimes and Penalties
Beginning nearly thirty years ago, several laws were passed in California that criminalized
behaviors of people living with HIV or added penalties to existing crimes for those with HIV.
These laws were based on fear and the limited medical science of the time. In 1988, when most
of these laws were passed, there were no effective treatments for HIV and discrimination
towards people living with HIV was extremely high. In the decades since these laws were
passed, societal and medical understanding of HIV has greatly improved, and there are now
effective treatments that lengthen and improve the quality of life for people living with HIV.
Scientific advances should inform our laws, the manner in which we address our public health
response to HIV/AIDS, and our thinking with respect to the equally shared responsibility
between partners for maintaining sexual health.
SB 239 (Wiener), Chapter 537, reforms criminal penalties related to AIDS and HIV
which specify harsher punishment than that which applies to other communicable
diseases. Specifically, this new law:
•

Repeals existing provisions which make it a felony to expose another to HIV and a
misdemeanor to expose another to other contagious, infectious, or communicable
diseases.

•

Creates a new misdemeanor offense, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail
for up to six months, for intentional transmission of an infectious or communicable
disease where all of the following apply:
o The defendant knows that he or she or a third party is afflicted with an
infectious or communicable disease;
o The defendant acts with the specific intent to transmit or cause an afflicted
third party to transmit that disease to another person;
o The defendant or the afflicted third party engages in conduct that poses a
substantial risk of transmission to that person;
o The defendant or the third party transmits the infectious or communicable
disease to the other person; and,
o If exposure occurs through interaction with the defendant and not a third
party, the person exposed to the disease during voluntary interaction with the
defendant did not know that the defendant was afflicted with the disease. A
person’s interaction with the defendant is not involuntary solely on the basis
of his or her lack of knowledge that the defendant was afflicted with the
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disease.
•

States that an attempt to intentionally transmit an infectious or communicable
disease is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than 90 days.

•

Creates a new misdemeanor offense, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for
up to six months, for willful exposure of another to an infectious or communicable
disease where a health officer, or the health officer’s designee, acting under
circumstances that make securing a quarantine or health officer order infeasible, has
instructed the defendant not to engage in particularized conduct that poses a
substantial risk of transmission of an infectious or communicable disease, and the
defendant engages in that conduct within 96 hours of the instruction. A health officer,
or the health officer’s designee, may issue a maximum of two instructions to a
defendant that may result in a violation of this provision.

•

Specifies that the new misdemeanor offenses do not apply to a person who donates an
organ or tissue for transplantation or research purposes, or a person who donates
breast milk to a medical center or breast milk bank that receives breast milk for
purposes of distribution.

•

Provides that before sentencing, a defendant shall be assessed for placement in one or
more community-based programs that provide counseling, supervision, education,
and reasonable redress to the victim or victims. Repeals existing provisions related to
the AIDS education programs.

•

Imposes various requirements upon the court in order to prevent the public disclosure
of the identifying characteristics, as defined, of the complaining witness and the
defendant.

•

Requires a court, upon a finding of probable cause that an individual has violated this
new law, to order the production of the individual’s medical records or the attendance
of a person with relevant knowledge thereof, so long as the return of the medical
records or attendance of the person pursuant to the subpoena is submitted initially to
the court for an in-camera inspection. Only upon a finding by the court that the
medical records or proffered testimony are relevant to the pleading offense shall the
information produced pursuant to the court’s order be disclosed to the prosecuting
entity and be admissible, if otherwise permitted by law.

•

Repeals the statute making it a felony to commit prostitution or solicitation if the
person has a prior conviction for a specified sex offense and a positive AIDS test. A
prior conviction for a violation of this repealed provision is invalid and vacated. All
charges alleging a violation of this repealed provision are dismissed and all arrests
based on a violation of this repealed provision are deemed to never have occurred.
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•

Provides that a person who is serving a sentence for the repealed felony
prostitution/solicitation statute may petition for a recall or dismissal of the sentence
before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case.

•

Repeals the felony provision related to donating blood, tissue or semen by a person
who has been diagnosed with AIDS or HIV.

Extortion: Sexual Conduct
As perpetrators have found new ways to target their victims, we must make sure that California
law keeps up with these new forms of extortion that can directly victimize young adults. Faced
with the fear of having their private images shared on the Internet or sent to family or friends,
victims—often teens and young women—are forced to comply with the perpetrators' demands. It
is simply that, because of ambiguity in California law, perpetrators of sextortion can currently be
charged with a lesser crime and victims do not receive the justice that they deserve.
SB 500 (Leyva), Chapter 518, expands the crime of extortion to include not only the
obtaining of property, but also the obtaining of other consideration, including sexual
conduct or images of intimate body parts. Specifically, this new law:
•

Redefines "extortion" as "the obtaining of property or other consideration from
another, with his or her consent."

•

Defines "consideration" as “anything of value, including sexual conduct, or an image
of an intimate body part, as specified.”

•

Provides that notwithstanding the definition of extortion, a person under 18 years of
age who has obtained consideration consisting of sexual conduct or an image of an
intimate body part is not guilty of extortion.

•

Makes conforming cross references to other extortion statutes.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Consolidated Sex Offenses: Jurisdiction
The Legislature has created several exceptions to the rule that the territorial jurisdiction
of the case is where the offense occurred. Under existing law, these exceptions include
specified sex offenses occurring in different counties. If all the district attorneys in the
counties with jurisdiction agree, the offenses may be consolidated into a single trial. This
protects repeat victims from the need to make multiple court appearances to testify
against the same offender.
Because the sex offenses currently excepted are of the same class, the court has held they may be
properly joined. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1113.) Under existing law, this
exception does not include specified sex offenses with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen.
Code, § 288.7). Arguably, these offenses belong to the same class of sex offenses currently
excepted from the general venue rule.
•

AB 368 (Muratsuchi), Chapter 379, permits the consolidation of specified sex
offenses with a child 10 years of age or younger occurring in different counties into a
single trial if all district attorneys in the counties with jurisdiction agree. Specifically,
this new law adds the offenses of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or
sexual penetration with a child 10 years or younger to the list of specified sex
offenses exempt from the rule that the territorial jurisdiction of the case is where the
offense occurred.

Juveniles: Sealing of Records
Under existing law, minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court proceedings may petition the
court to have their records sealed unless they were found to have committed certain serious
offenses. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) However, juvenile court jurisdiction must have lapsed
five years previously, or the person must be at least 18 years old. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781,
subd. (a)(1)(A).)
SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014, provided a process for automatic juvenile record
sealing (i.e. without a petition from the minor) in cases involving satisfactorily-completed
informal supervision or probation, except in cases involving specified serious or violent offenses
where the juvenile was 14 years or older at the time of the offense and the offense was not
dismissed or reduced to a non-serious or non-violent offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786.)
The sealing of delinquency records is an important factor in reducing recidivism and opening
doors to jobs and education for many of California youth.
AB 529 (Stone), Chapter 685, requires the sealing of juvenile records relating to
dismissed or unsustained juvenile court petitions and relating to diversion and
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supervision programs, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that if a person who has been alleged to be a ward of the juvenile court has
his or her petition dismissed by the court, whether on the motion of the prosecution or
on the court’s own motion, or if the petition is not sustained by the court after an
adjudication hearing, the court must order sealed all records pertaining to the
dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law
enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice.

•

Requires the court to send a copy of the order to each agency and official named in
the order, direct the agency or official to seal its records, and specify a date by which
the sealed records must be destroyed.

•

Requires each agency and official named in the order to seal the records in its custody
as directed by the order, advise the court of its compliance, and, after advising the
court, seal the copy of the court’s order that was received.

•

Requires the court to provide notice to the person and the person’s counsel that it has
ordered the petition dismissed and the records sealed. The notice must advise the
person of his or her right to nondisclosure of the arrest and proceedings, as specified.

•

Provides that when a record has been sealed by the court based on a dismissed
petition, as specified, the prosecutor, within six months of the date of dismissal, may
petition the court to access, inspect, or utilize the sealed record for the limited purpose
of refiling the dismissed petition based on new circumstances, and requires the court
to determine whether the new circumstance alleged by the prosecutor provides
sufficient justification for accessing, inspecting, or utilizing the sealed record in order
to refile the dismissed petition.

•

Requires the probation department to seal the arrest and other records in its custody
relating to a juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in a diversion or supervision
program upon satisfactory completion of the program of diversion or supervision to
which a juvenile is referred by the probation officer or the prosecutor in lieu of the
filing of a petition to adjudge the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a
program of informal supervision.

•

Requires the probation department to notify a public or private agency operating a
diversion program to which the juvenile has been referred under these circumstances
to seal records in the program operator’s custody relating to the arrest or referral and
the participation of the juvenile in the diversion or supervision program, and the
operator of the program shall then promptly seal the records in its custody relating to
the juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in the program.

•

Provides that upon sealing of the records under this section, the arrest or offense
giving rise to the person’s participation in the program shall be deemed not to have
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occurred and the individual may respond accordingly to any inquiry, application, or
process in which disclosure of this information is requested or sought.
•

Requires the probation department to notify the participant in the supervision or
diversion program in writing that his or her record has been sealed pursuant to the
provisions of this section based on his or her satisfactory completion of the program.
If the record is not sealed, the probation department shall notify the participant in
writing of the reason or reasons for not sealing the record.

•

Defines “satisfactory completion” of the program of supervision or diversion, and
requires the probation department to make a determination of satisfactory or
unsatisfactory completion within 60 days of completion of the program by the
juvenile, or if the juvenile does not complete the program, within 60 days of
determining that the program has not been completed by the juvenile.

•

Allows a person who receives notice from the probation department that he or she has
not satisfactorily completed the diversion program and that the record has not been
sealed to petition for review of the decision, as specified.

•

Authorizes a probation department to access sealed records for the limited purpose of
determining whether the minor has previously participated in a program of
supervision. Specifies that the information contained in the sealed record and
accessed by the probation department remains in all other respects confidential and
prohibits its dissemination to any other person or agency. Provides that access to, or
inspection of, a sealed record shall not be deemed an unsealing of the record nor
require notice to any other agency.

Search Warrants: Misdemeanor Disorderly Conduct/Invasion of Privacy
In Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S.
[134 S.Ct. 2473], the United States Supreme Court
held that law enforcement officers generally must secure a warrant before searching digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. (Id. at p. 2495.)
The Legislature subsequently enacted SB 178 (Leno), Chapter 651, Statutes of 2015, the
California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA). CalECPA is a comprehensive
digital privacy law which took effect on January 1, 2016 (§ 1546 et seq.). It “limits the ability of
California law enforcement to obtain information directly from a smartphone or similar device,
or to track them. Law enforcement must either obtain a warrant or get the consent of the person
possessing the electronic device.” (Daniels, California Updates Privacy Rights with the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Nov. 17, 2015) JDSupra.)
Current law lists limited circumstances authorizing a search warrant for evidence that tends to
show a violation of a misdemeanor crime. For example, a search warrant can be issued on the
grounds that property is possessed with the intent to use it as a means of committing a public
offense. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (a)(3).) Arguably, under this provision, it may be difficult to
obtain digital evidence of misdemeanor crimes that have already been committed with the use of
an electronic device unless there is also probable cause to believe that the device is possessed
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with the intent to use it to commit a public offense in the future.
AB 539 (Acosta), Chapter 342, expands the grounds for issuance of a search warrant to
include evidence of a misdemeanor violation of disorderly conduct involving invasion of
privacy, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a search warrant may be issued when the property or things to be seized
consists of evidence that tends to show a violation of any of the following disorderly
conduct laws occurred or is occurring:
o Actions involving the use of any instrumentality to view the interior of
specified rooms, in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of individuals inside;
o Use of specified devices to videotape, film, photograph, or record by
electronic means an identifiable person either under or through their clothing,
for purposes of viewing the body or undergarments, without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify
the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of
that other person, under circumstances in which the other person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; or
o Use of specified devices to videotape, film, photograph, or record by
electronic means an identifiable person in a state of full or partial undress, for
the purpose of viewing the body or undergarments, without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, in the interior of specified rooms in which
that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to
invade the privacy of that other person.

Release on Own Recognizance: Prior Failures To Appear
Current law requires a hearing in open court before a person arrested for certain offenses, and
who has previously failed to appear in court three or more times within three years, may be
granted own recognizance (OR) release. The inflexibility of this law can hinder pretrial release
programs that operate during non-court hours. During non-court hours, an appropriate candidate
for placement into a court-approved pretrial release program is held in jail awaiting the
mandatory hearing in court. Under current law, the arrestee may also be released from an
overcrowded jail without supervision.
AB 789 (Rubio), Chapter 554, allows a court to approve, without a hearing, own
recognizance release pursuant to a pretrial release program for specified arrestees with
three or more prior failures to appear (FTAs). Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that except for specified offenses, a person who is arrested for a felony
offense, and who has three or more prior FTAs within the past three years, may be
released on OR without a hearing if it is pursuant to a court-operated or court33

approved pretrial release program.
•

Adds domestic violence offenses and offenses in which the defendant is alleged to
have caused great bodily injury to the specified offenses for which a hearing must be
held prior to releasing a person with three or more prior FTAs on OR.

•

Deletes the prohibition against OR release without a hearing for arrestees of theft
offenses with three or more prior FTAs and limits the prohibition as to burglary
offenses to residential burglary.

•

Specifies that this provision does not change the statutory requirement to hold a
hearing in open court before the magistrate or judge in cases in which the person is
arrested for a serious or violent felony (other than residential burglary), specified
witness intimidation offenses, specified domestic violence offenses, or specified
violations of a protective order.

•

States that this provision does not alter or diminish the rights conferred under Marsy's
Law, the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008.

Grand Juries: Peace Officers
To help make judicial proceedings more transparent and accountable, SB 227 (Mitchell) Chapter
175, Statutes of 2015, prohibited a grand jury inquiry into an offense that involves a shooting or
use of excessive force by a peace officer resulting in the death of a person being detained or
arrested by the peace officer. (See Pen. Code, § 917.) Earlier this year, however, the Third
District Court of Appeal found this law unconstitutional. (People v. ex rel. Pierson v. Superior
Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 402.) In so holding, the court noted: “The Legislature is not
powerless to remedy the problem it has identified. It may submit a constitutional amendment to
the electorate to remove the grand jury’s power to indict in cases involving a peace officer’s use
of lethal force. It could also take the less cumbersome route of simply reforming the procedural
rules of secrecy in such cases, which are not themselves constitutionally derived or necessary to
the grand jury's functioning…. (Id. at p. 414, emphasis added.)
AB 1024 is in line with the Court of Appeal’s suggested remedy of “reform[ing] the procedural
rules of secrecy in such cases.” (People v. ex rel. Pierson v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th
at p. 414.) Existing law provides for the transcript of a grand jury proceeding to be made public
only if there is an indictment. (Pen. Code, § 938, subds. (a) & (b).) There is no comparable
requirement under existing law when the grand jury does not return an indictment.
AB 1024 (Kiley), Chapter 204, requires a court to disclose all or a part of an indictment
proceeding transcript, excluding the grand jury’s private deliberations and voting, when
the grand jury decides not to return an indictment for an offense that involves a peace
officer shooting or use of excessive force that results in the death of a detainee or
arrestee. Specifically, this new law:
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•

Requires the court that impaneled a grand jury to disclose all or a part of the
indictment proceeding, excluding the grand jury’s private deliberations and voting, to
a party who moves for disclosure, under the following circumstances:
o The grand jury inquiries into a peace officer-involved shooting or use of
excessive force that resulted in the death of a person being detained or
arrested by the peace officer;
o The grand jury decides not to return an indictment;
o The district attorney, a legal representative of the deceased person, or a legal
representative of the news media or public applies for disclosure of the
indictment proceeding;
o The district attorney and the affected witness involved are given notice and an
opportunity to be heard; and,
o Unless, following an in camera hearing, the court expressly finds that there
exists an overriding interest that outweighs the right of public access to the
record, the overriding interest supports sealing the record, a substantial
probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is
not sealed, the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored, and no less restrictive
means exist to achieve the overriding interest.

Convictions: Expungement
AB 651 (Bradford), Chapter 787, Statutes of 2013, allows a court to grant expungement relief for
a conviction of a petitioner sentenced to county jail pursuant to criminal justice realignment if
specified conditions are satisfied. However, expungement is not available for those individuals
convicted of the same crimes before the enactment of realignment. Thus, expungement is
available to some persons but not others who have committed the same offense based on the date
of conviction and place of incarceration.
As a matter of fairness, and to avoid equal protection challenges, the opportunity to obtain
expungement should be extended for the same offenses for which a person is currently entitled to
petition for expungement after realignment.
AB 1115 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 207, allows defendants sentenced to state prison for
a felony, that if committed after enactment of the 2011 Realignment legislation would
have been eligible for county jail sentencing, to obtain expungement relief. Specifically,
this new law:
•

Makes convictions for realigned felony offenses, but which were committed prior to
the enactment of Realignment, eligible for expungement.
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•

Applies to petitioners seeking to dismiss a conviction for a non-serious, nonviolent, or
nonsexual offense for which he or she would have been sentenced to county jail
pursuant to criminal justice realignment, but was sentenced to state prison because he
or she was sentenced before the implementation of realignment.

•

Provides that the court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may grant the
expungement relief only after the lapse of two years following the petitioner's
completion of the sentence, provided that the petitioner is not under supervised
release or is not serving a sentence for, on probation for, or charged with the
commission of any offense.

•

Allows the petitioner to make the application and the change of plea in person, or
through an attorney, or a probation officer authorized in writing.

•

Provides that in any subsequent prosecution of the petitioner for any offense, a
conviction dismissed pursuant to the relief provided for by this bill shall have the
same effect as if it had not been dismissed.

•

Provides that a conviction dismissed by the relief provided for by this bill does not
relieve the petitioner of the obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any
direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public office, for any
state or local license, or for contracting with the California State Lottery Commission.

•

Provides that the expungement relief of a conviction does not permit a person to own,
possess, or have in his or her custody or control any firearm or prevent his or her
conviction for such ownership or possession.

•

Provides that the expungement relief does not permit a person prohibited from
holding public office as a result of the dismissed conviction to hold public office.

•

Allows the court to charge up to $150 for a petition for expungement to cover actual
costs. However, the court must consider the petitioner's ability to pay.

•

Prevents the court from granting the expungement relief unless the prosecuting
attorney has been given 15 days' notice of the petition.

•

Provides that if the prosecutor fails to appear and object to the petition for dismissal,
then the prosecutor may not move to set aside or otherwise appeal the granting of
relief.

Juveniles: Sealing of Records
On March 7, 2000, California voters approved Proposition 21, known as the Gang Violence and
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act. According to the Legislative Analyst, the purpose of Proposition
21 was to change the treatment of juvenile offenders, particularly youths engaged in gang-related
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criminal activity or who had committed other serious offenses. Among other things, Proposition
21 prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving certain serious or violent offenses –
offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) (aka the “707(b)
list”).
Under existing law, minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court proceedings may petition the
court to have their records sealed unless they were found to have committed a serious or violent
offense on the 707(b) list when he or she was 14 years or older. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) In
2014, the legislature enacted a process for court-initiated sealing upon probation completion.
This process also does not apply in cases involving a serious or violent offense on the 707(b) list,
unless the finding on that offense was dismissed or reduced to a lesser offense not on the list.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786.)
In In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196, the appellate court concluded the prohibition to
record sealing under the petition process applies even if the adjudicated offense on the 707(b) list
is later reduced to a misdemeanor, and even if the court concludes the juvenile is otherwise
rehabilitated. (In re G.Y., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201, 1204.)
A ban on the ability to have the record of a past offense sealed can be a lifetime obstacle to good
employment, housing, military service, higher education, and more.
SB 312 (Skinner), Chapter 679, authorizes the court to order the sealing of records for
certain serious or violent offenses committed when a juvenile was 14 years of age or
older, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Modifies the lifetime ban on sealing a juvenile offense record involving a specified
serious or violent offense committed when the individual was 14 years of age or
older, and replaces it with language permitting the person to petition for record
sealing (i.e., sealing by petition) under the following circumstances:
o The person was committed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, has attained the age of 21 years
of age, and has completed his or her period of probation supervision after
release from the Division; and
o The person was not committed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, has attained the age of 18 years
of age, and has completed any period of probation supervision related to that
offense imposed by the court.

•

Provides that a record that has been sealed pursuant to the sealing by petition process
may be accessed, inspected, or utilized in a subsequent proceeding in the following
circumstances:
o By the prosecuting attorney, as necessary, to make appropriate charging
decisions or to initiate a prosecution in criminal court involving a subsequent
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felony offense, or by the prosecuting attorney or court to determine the
appropriate sentencing for a subsequent felony offense;
o By the prosecuting attorney, as necessary, to initiate a juvenile court
proceeding to determine whether a minor shall be transferred from the
juvenile court to a criminal court to be tried as an adult, and by the juvenile
court to make that determination;
o By the prosecuting attorney, the probation department, or the juvenile court
upon a subsequent finding by the juvenile court that the minor has committed
a felony offense, for the purpose of determining an appropriate disposition of
the case; and
o By the prosecuting attorney, or a court of criminal jurisdiction, for the purpose
of proving a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction, and determining
the appropriate sentence.
•

Provides that a record relating to a specified serious or violent offense committed
after attaining 14 years of age that has been sealed pursuant to this provision may be
accessed, inspected, or utilized by the prosecuting attorney in order to meet statutory
or constitutional obligations to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to the
defense in a criminal case.

•

Requires that the information accessed, as set forth above, otherwise remain
confidential and not be further disseminated.

•

Provides that the waiting periods and access provisions of the sealing by petition
process, as stated above, do not apply if the specified serious or violent felony offense
committed after the person attained 14 years of age was dismissed or reduced to a
misdemeanor by the court.

•

Provides that a record related to a specified serious or violent offense that was
committed after attaining 14 years of age and requires registration as a sex offender is
not eligible for sealing by petition.

•

Provides that a specified serious or violent offense that was committed after a person
attained 14 years of age and that was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor is
eligible for court ordered record sealing after satisfactory completion of informal
supervision or probation (i.e., court-initiated sealing).

Arrests: Sealing
Under existing law, a factually innocent person arrested for or charged with a crime may be able
to have the records sealed by obtaining a declaration of factual innocence pursuant to Penal Code
section 851.8, subdivision (b). In contrast to the onerous process of establishing factual
innocence, when a person successfully completes a prefiling diversion program or a pretrial drug
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diversion or deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) program, the judge may order the sealing of the
arrest and related court records. (Pen. Code, §§ 851.87, 851.90, subd. (a).) Similar relief is
available to seal the arrest record of a person who completes a prefiling diversion program. (Pen.
Code, § 851.87.) There is no similar relief for a person who is arrested and the charges are never
filed or are dismissed.
SB 393 (Lara), Chapter 680, provides a process for a person to petition a court to seal
records of an arrest that did not result in a conviction, as defined, with specified
exceptions. Specifically, this new law:
•

Allows a person who has suffered an arrest that did not result in a conviction to
petition the court to have his or her arrest and related records sealed.

•

Specifies the circumstances under which an arrest did not result in a conviction for
purposes of sealing.

•

Provides that a person is not eligible to have their records sealed in any of the
following circumstances:
o He or she may still be charged with any of the offenses upon which the arrest
was based;
o Any of the arrest charges or any of the charges in the accusatory pleading
based on the arrest is a charge of murder or any other offense for which there
is no statute of limitations, except when the person has been acquitted or
found factually innocent of the charges; or
o The petitioner intentionally evaded law enforcement efforts to prosecute the
arrest, including by absconding from the jurisdiction in which the arrest took
place, or, by engaging in identity fraud for which he or she was subsequently
charged. The existence of bench warrants or failures to appear that were
adjudicated before the case was closed with no conviction do not establish
intentional evasion.

•

Sets forth what a petition to seal an arrest must contain and provides that the court
may deny a petition for failing to meet those requirements.

•

Provides that the Judicial Council shall furnish forms to be used by a person to have
his or her arrest sealed, as specified.

•

Provides that the petitioner, the prosecuting attorney, and the arresting agency may
submit evidence to the court at a hearing on the petition and that the petitioner would
have the initial burden of proof to establish eligibility.

•

Entitles a petitioner to have such an arrest sealed as a matter of right with specified
exceptions. A petitioner must establish that sealing the arrest would serve the
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interests of justice when the offense upon which the arrest is based or any of the
resulting charges is one of the following:
o Domestic violence, if the petitioner's record demonstrates a pattern of
domestic violence arrests, convictions, or both;
o Child abuse, if the petitioner's record demonstrates a pattern of child abuse
arrests, convictions, or both; or,
o Elder abuse, if the petitioner's record demonstrates a pattern of elder abuse
arrests, convictions, or both.
•

Provides that a court could consider any relevant factors in determining whether the
interests of justice would be served by sealing an arrest including: hardship to the
petitioner, evidence of the petitioner's good character, evidence regarding the arrest,
and the petitioner's record of convictions.

•

Specifies the actions the court shall take if it grants a petition to seal an arrest that did
not result in a conviction, which includes issuing a written ruling and order and
providing it to the person whose arrest was sealed, the prosecuting attorney, and the
law enforcement agency that made the arrest. The order shall state implications and
limitations of the sealing, as specified, including that the arrest is deemed not to have
occurred and the petitioner is released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the arrest. However, a criminal justice agency may still access and use the
arrest record under the uniform sealing process, as stated below. An arrest sealed
under this provision may also be pleaded and proved in any subsequent prosecution
of the petitioner as if it had not been sealed. The sealing does not relieve the
petitioner of the obligation to disclose the arrest, if otherwise required by law, in
response to a direct question contained in a questionnaire or application for public
office, for employment as a peace officer, for licensure by any state or local agency,
or for contracting with the California State Lottery Commission. The sealing does
not affect specified prohibitions on firearm access. The court must furnish a
disposition report to the Department of Justice (DOJ), as specified, stating that relief
was granted under this provision.

•

Creates a uniform process to be followed when arrest records are sealed under any of
several statutes, as specified.

•

Specifies that a criminal justice agency may continue to access and use, in the regular
course of its duties, a sealed arrest record and information relating to a sealed arrest.

•

Provides that unless specifically authorized, a person or entity, other than a criminal
justice agency or the person whose arrest was sealed, who disseminates information
relating to a sealed arrest is subject to a civil penalty of not less than $500 and not
more than $2,500 per violation.
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•

Deletes the two-year wait period for filing a petition to seal arrest records after
completing a pretrial diversion program.

•

Prohibits DOJ from disclosing, as part of state summary criminal history information
furnished to specified entities, information concerning an arrest that did not result in a
conviction and was sealed under this provision.

Concealment of Accidental Death: Statute of Limitations
According to the author, “Erica Alonso, a resident of Laguna Hills, went missing on February
15, 2015. Her body was later found a few months later on April 27, 2015 in a dry creek bed near
Ortega Highway and Hot Springs Canyon Road near San Juan Capistrano. Erica’s death was not
a homicide. However, someone with her moved the body to hide the fact that she had died. For
this reason, Erica’s family and friends had no way to locate her, resulting in additional trauma to
the family and community at large.
Generally, the statute of limitations for misdemeanor offenses requires commencement of
prosecution within one year (Pen. Code, § 802) and within three years for felony offenses (Pen.
Code. § 801). There are specified exceptions that provide for a longer statute of limitations, or a
tolling of the time that the statute starts to run from when the crime is discovered. (See e.g. Pen.
Code, §§ 802 and 803).
Under current law, a person who witnesses an accidental death and actively conceals or attempts
to conceal it cannot be charged after one year. Arguably, when an accidental death is concealed
either the body of the deceased or the perpetrator may not be discovered within this time frame.
SB 610 (Nguyen), Chapter 74, extends the statute of limitations for the crime of
concealing an accidental death. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a charge for concealment of an accidental death may be filed be up to
one year after a suspect is initially identified by law enforcement, but no more than
four years after the commission of the offense.

•

Names this provision “Erica’s Law.”

Sentencing: County of Incarceration and Supervision
In 2011, Criminal Justice Realignment (Realignment) made significant changes in the statutes
governing felony sentencing (Stats. 2011, chaps. 15 (AB 109), 39 (AB 117), 136, 1st Ex. Sess.,
chap. 12). In relevant part, Realignment allows lower level felons to serve their sentences in
county jail instead of state prison. Also, under Realignment, where a felon is sentenced to county
jail, the court must suspend execution of a concluding portion of the sentence, “[u]nless the court
finds that, in the interests of justice, it is not appropriate in a particular case.” (Pen. Code, § 1170,
subd. (h)(5)(A).) During the period of suspended execution, “known as mandatory supervision”
the felon is supervised by the county probation officer. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)
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When a defendant receives felony sentences in multiple jurisdictions (counties), the law provides
a process for the second or subsequent court to impose a single aggregate term. Prior to
Realignment, the aggregate term was served in a state prison operated by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Thus, the county from which any portion of the
aggregate sentence originated was of no consequence. Under Realignment, low level felons
generally serve their sentences and are supervised at the county level. Realignment legislation
does not address the issue of sentences from multiple jurisdictions. “The issue will become
significant because now counties must carry the cost of local incarceration with only minimal
contribution from the state, and jail space is frequently very limited.” (Couzens et al., Sentencing
Cal. Crimes (The Rutter Group 2016) Ch. 11, § 11:35.)
SB 670 (Jackson), Chapter 287, specifies that the court rendering a second or
subsequent county-jail felony judgment determines the county or counties of
incarceration and supervision. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that when imposing judgment on a county-jail felony concurrent or
consecutive to a judgment on a county-jail felony in another county or counties, the
court rendering the second or subsequent judgment determines the county or counties
of incarceration and supervision of the defendant.

•

Requires the Judicial Council to adopt rules providing criteria for the consideration of
the judge when determining the county or counties of incarceration and supervision.
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DNA
Sex Assault Evidence: Reporting
A recent report by the California State Auditor found that law enforcement agencies rarely
document reasons for not analyzing sexual assault evidence kits. Specifically, the report found
that "[i]n 45 cases . . . reviewed in which investigators at the three agencies we visited did not
request a kit analysis, the investigators rarely documented their decisions. As a result, we often
could not determine with certainty why investigators decided that kit analysis was not needed.
Upon a more in-depth review of the individual cases, the report found that analysis of the kits
would not have been likely to further the investigation of those cases. Even though the individual
reasons for not testing the kits was found to be reasonable, the report still stressed the need for
more information about why agencies decide to send some kits but not others. It would benefit
not only investigators, but the public as well, because requiring investigators to document their
reasons for not requesting kit analysis would assist agencies in responding to the public concern
about unanalyzed kits. Doing so would allow for internal review and would increase
accountability to the public.
AB 41 (Chiu), Chapter 694, requires local law enforcement agencies to periodically
update the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Tracking (SAFE-T) database on the
disposition of all sexual assault evidence kits in their custody. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires law enforcement agencies to report information regarding rape kit evidence,
within 120 days of the collection of the kit, to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
through a database established by the DOJ. Specifies that information shall include,
among other things:
o The number of kits collected;
o If biological evidence samples were submitted to a DNA laboratory for
analysis; and if a probative DNA profile was generated; and,
o If evidence was not submitted to a DNA laboratory for processing, the reason
or reasons for not submitting evidence from the kit to a DNA laboratory for
processing.

•

Requires a public DNA laboratory, or a law enforcement agency contracting with a
private laboratory, to provide a reason for not testing a sample every 120 days the
sample is untested, except as specified.

•

Provides that upon expiration of a sexual assault case's statute of limitations, or if a
law enforcement agency elects not to analyze the DNA or intends to destroy or
dispose of the crime scene evidence pursuant to existing law, the agency shall state in
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writing the reason the kit collected as part of the case's investigation was not
analyzed.
•

Imposes these requirements for kits collected on or after January 1, 2018.

•

Requires that the DOJ file a report to the Legislature on an annual basis summarizing
the information in its database.

•

Prohibits law enforcement agencies or laboratories from being compelled to provide
any contents of the database in a civil or criminal case, except as required by a law
enforcement agency's duty to produce exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a
criminal case.

•

Provides that money to pay for this bill should first come from funds received from
the federal Office on Violence Against Women before appropriating money from the
general fund.
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Eavesdropping
California is one of only 11 states that does not allow a domestic violence survivor to use
recorded evidence of her abuse in a courtroom unless the abuser gives consent to being recorded.
California law does allow a survivor to introduce recordings of confidential communications
related to any felony involving violence against the person (Penal Code § 633.5). However
many crimes involving domestic violence, such as assault or battery are classified as
misdemeanors, and relevant recordings of this otherwise reliable evidence is inadmissible in
court.
AB 413 (Eggman), Chapter 191, allows a party to a confidential communication to
record the conversation for the purpose of obtaining information reasonably believed to
relate to the crime of domestic violence.
Domestic Violence Reporting: Strangulation and Suffocation
The California Department of Justice collects data on domestic-violence related calls for
assistance directly from local law enforcement agencies. Domestic violence calls that involved
the use, or threat to use, of a firearm, knife or cutting instrument or other dangerous weapon are
reported according to the type of weapon used regardless of the outcome or injury. There is also
a separate category for the use of a personal weapon such as hands, fists, or feet if it is
considered an aggravated assault under Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) guidelines. An
aggravated assault is an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting
severe or aggravated bodily injury, such as broken bones, internal injuries, or cuts requiring
stitches. Currently, there is no data collected on domestic violence calls involving strangulation
or suffocation.
SB 40 (Roth), Chapter 331, requires law enforcement agencies and the Attorney
General to include the number of domestic violence incidents involving strangulation or
suffocation in their existing reporting requirements. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires written notice to be furnished to victims at the scene informing the victim
that strangulation may cause internal injuries and encouraging the victim to seek
medical attention.

•

Requires each law enforcement agency to document whether the incident involved
strangulation or suffocation in its recording of domestic violence-related calls.

•

Requires each law enforcement agency to include the number of domestic violence
calls involving strangulation or suffocation in its monthly report to the Attorney
General.
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•

Requires the Attorney General to include the number of domestic violence calls
involving strangulation or suffocation in its report to the Governor, the Legislature,
and the public.

•

Requires each law enforcement agency to include in its report of a domestic violence
incident a notation of whether there were indications that the incident involved
strangulation or suffocation which includes whether any witness or victim reported
any incident of strangulation or suffocation, whether any victim reported symptoms
of strangulation or suffocation, or whether the officer observed any signs of
strangulation or suffocation.

Evidentiary Privileges: Domestic Violence Counselor-Victim Privilege
In 1986 the Legislature created an evidentiary privilege between victims and domestic violence
counselors. (SB 2040 (Morgan), Chapter 854, Statutes of 1986). The purpose of the privilege
was to encourage full and free disclosure between a victim and counselor in domestic violence
situations. Victims who are aware that the counselor cannot guarantee confidentiality may not
use the service.
Thus, under existing law, a domestic violence victim, whether or not a party to an action, has a
privilege to refuse to personally disclose, and to prevent a domestic violence counselor from
disclosing, a confidential communication between the victim and the counselor. (Evid. Code, §
1037.5.) A ‘domestic violence counselor” is defined as a person who is employed by a domestic
violence victim service organization, whether financially compensated or not, for the purpose of
rendering advice or assistance to victims of domestic violence and who has specified training.
(Evid. Code, § 1037.1, subd. (a).) Additionally, the “domestic violence victim service
organization” must be “nongovernmental.” (Evid. Code, § 1037.1, subd. (b).)
In a similar context, the sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, there is a broader definition
for organizations that qualify for the sexual assault counselor-victim privilege. The definition of
a sexual assault counselor does not require that either the office or the organization where the
counselor is employed be “non-governmental.” Therefore, sexual assault counselors employed
by a public college or university are entitled to hold the privilege and the confidentiality of their
communications with victims of sexual assault that are made in the course of the relationship and
in confidence, are protected.
It is inconsistent for the communications between a college student who is the victim of a sexual
assault and a counselor to be protected, but for the communications between a college student
who is the victim of domestic violence and the same counselor not to be protected. Consistency
for campus-based counseling services is needed.
SB 331 (Jackson), Chapter 178, expands the definition of a “domestic violence victim
services organization” for purposes of the domestic violence victim-counselor evidentiary
privilege. Specifically, this new law: Adds organizations that operate on the campus of a
public or private college or university with the primary mission to provide services to
victims of domestic violence to the definition of “domestic violence victim service
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organization” in current law so that communications between a victim and counselor at
such an organization are covered by the privilege.
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DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
Alcohol and Marijuana: Penalties
From 2007 to 2014, the number of nighttime weekend drivers in the U.S. with marijuana in their
system increased nearly 50%. In 2012, the California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) released a
study of weekend nighttime drivers that found more California drivers tested positive for
marijuana than alcohol. Over the last 10 years the Department of Motor Vehicles data is
available, the two most recent years show that for the first time, drugged drivers and drug
combined with alcohol drivers are killing more Californians than alcohol impaired drivers. The
AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety’s Washington Study found that the percentage of drivers
involved in fatal crashes who recently used marijuana more than doubled between 2013 and
2014.
SB 65 (Hill), Chapter 232, prohibits the smoking or ingestion of marijuana while
driving, or the smoking or ingestion of marijuana or the drinking of an alcoholic beverage
while riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle, and makes a violation punishable as an
infraction.
Military Pretrial Diversion: Driving Under the Influence
SB 1227 (Hancock), Chapter 658, Statutes of 2013, created a military diversion program for
current or former members of the military who are charged with a misdemeanor and who may be
suffering from service-related trauma, substance abuse, or mental health issues. The Vehicle
Code prohibits diversion for anyone charged with a driving under the influence of drugs and/or
alcohol (DUI) offense (Veh. Code, § 23640). The military diversion statute did not mention this
rule (Pen. Code, § 1001.80).
In grappling with these two statutes, the state courts of appeal issued conflicting opinions as to
whether the Vehicle Code prohibits military diversion for defendants charged with DUI. (People
v. VanVleck (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 355, rev. gtd. Nov. 16, 2016, S237219; Hopkins v. Superior
Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1275, rev. gtd. Nov. 16, 2016, S237734.)
SB 725 (Jackson), Chapter 179, specifies that a trial court can grant military pretrial
diversion on a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
(DUI). Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a trial court can grant diversion on a misdemeanor charge of DUI or of
DUI causing injury, to a veteran or current member of the military who is suffering
from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of his or her military service.

•

States that participation in the military diversion program does not limit the
Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) ability to take administrative sanctions
against the person’s driver’s license.
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EVIDENCE
Eavesdropping
California is one of only 11 states that does not allow a domestic violence survivor to use
recorded evidence of her abuse in a courtroom unless the abuser gives consent to being recorded.
California law does allow a survivor to introduce recordings of confidential communications
related to any felony involving violence against the person (Penal Code § 633.5). However
many crimes involving domestic violence, such as assault or battery are classified as
misdemeanors, and relevant recordings of this otherwise reliable evidence is inadmissible in
court.
AB 413 (Eggman), Chapter 191, allows a party to a confidential communication to
record the conversation for the purpose of obtaining information reasonably believed to
relate to the crime of domestic violence.
Character Evidence: Prior Human Trafficking Offense
The Legislature has enacted narrow exceptions to the general rule prohibiting propensity
evidence. In 1996, Evidence Code section 1108 was added to allow introduction of evidence of
other acts of sexual misconduct in a prosecution for a sex offense. (Evid. Code, § 1108; AB 882
(Rogan), Chapter 439, Statutes of 1996.) In 1996, the Legislature added a similar provision to
allow the admission of evidence that the defendant committed other acts of domestic violence in
domestic violence cases. (See Evid. Code, § 1109; SB 1876 (Solis), Chapter 261, Statutes of
1996.) The Legislature has similarly enacted laws allowing propensity evidence of abuse of an
elder or dependent person (AB 2063 (Zettel), Chapter 517, Statutes of 2000) or child abuse (AB
114 (Cohn), Chapter 464, Statutes of 2005). (See Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(2) & (3).)
Arguably, the challenges with prosecuting sex trafficking offenses are similar to the challenges
with prosecuting the other crimes that are already exceptions to this rule: sexual offenses, crimes
of domestic violence, elder and dependent abuse, and child abuse.
SB 230 (Atkins), Chapter 805, expands the definition of “sexual offense” to include
specified offenses related to human trafficking for purposes of the Evidence Code
exception which provides that evidence of another sexual offense is not inadmissible to
prove conduct in a current sexual offense action.
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Exhibits
Existing law provides a process by which a party may obtain a certified photographic record of
an exhibit before a trial court storing the exhibit destroys or otherwise disposes of it. The
certified photographic record is admissible as evidence. Current law does not provide for a
digital record of an exhibit to be taken.
SB 238 (Hertzberg), Chapter 566, authorizes, in addition to a photographic record, a
digital record of an exhibit to be taken, as specified, and retained by the clerk of the court.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires a duplicate of the photographic or digital record to be delivered to the clerk
for certification and deletes the requirement that the clerk be provided with a negative
of a photograph.

•

Defines “photographic” for these purposes as a photographic image of the exhibit or
its equivalent stored in any form.

•

Defines “duplicate” for these purposes as a counterpart produced by a mechanical,
photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that
accurately reproduces the original.

•

Provides that a certified digital record of an exhibit shall not be deemed inadmissible.

Evidentiary Privileges: Domestic Violence Counselor-Victim Privilege
In 1986 the Legislature created an evidentiary privilege between victims and domestic violence
counselors. (SB 2040 (Morgan), Chapter 854, Statutes of 1986). The purpose of the privilege
was to encourage full and free disclosure between a victim and counselor in domestic violence
situations. Victims who are aware that the counselor cannot guarantee confidentiality may not
use the service.
Thus, under existing law, a domestic violence victim, whether or not a party to an action, has a
privilege to refuse to personally disclose, and to prevent a domestic violence counselor from
disclosing, a confidential communication between the victim and the counselor. (Evid. Code, §
1037.5.) A ‘domestic violence counselor” is defined as a person who is employed by a domestic
violence victim service organization, whether financially compensated or not, for the purpose of
rendering advice or assistance to victims of domestic violence and who has specified training.
(Evid. Code, § 1037.1, subd. (a).) Additionally, the “domestic violence victim service
organization” must be “nongovernmental.” (Evid. Code, § 1037.1, subd. (b).)
In a similar context, the sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, there is a broader definition
for organizations that qualify for the sexual assault counselor-victim privilege. The definition of
a sexual assault counselor does not require that either the office or the organization where the
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counselor is employed be “non-governmental.” Therefore, sexual assault counselors employed
by a public college or university are entitled to hold the privilege and the confidentiality of their
communications with victims of sexual assault that are made in the course of the relationship and
in confidence, are protected.
It is inconsistent for the communications between a college student who is the victim of a sexual
assault and a counselor to be protected, but for the communications between a college student
who is the victim of domestic violence and the same counselor not to be protected. Consistency
for campus-based counseling services is needed.
SB 331 (Jackson), Chapter 178, expands the definition of a “domestic violence victim
services organization” for purposes of the domestic violence victim-counselor evidentiary
privilege. Specifically, this new law: Adds organizations that operate on the campus of a
public or private college or university with the primary mission to provide services to
victims of domestic violence to the definition of “domestic violence victim service
organization” in current law so that communications between a victim and counselor at
such an organization are covered by the privilege.
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FINES AND FEES
Juveniles: Administrative Fees
Criminal fines, fees, and assessments have climbed steadily in recent decades. Government
entities tasked with collecting this debt have realized diminishing returns from collection efforts.
Government resources can be wasted in futile collection attempts.
A recent study by the Policy Advocacy Clinic at University of California Berkeley School of
Law has found that imposing administrative fees to families with youth in the juvenile justice
system is harmful, unlawful, and costly. Current California law allows counties to charge
administrative fees, which can quickly add up to thousands of dollars, an incredible burden to
families with youth in the juvenile justice system. In fact, such criminal justice debt undermines
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and leads to increased recidivism.
Furthermore, most youth in the juvenile system come from poor families who cannot afford to
pay fees, and counties ultimately obtain minimal returns despite the high fiscal and societal costs
associated with collecting fees.
SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, limits the authority of local agencies to assess and
collect specified fees against persons subject to the juvenile delinquency system.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that the authority of a county financial-evaluation officer to make financial
evaluations, including evaluations of parental liability, for specified costs and to
reduce, cancel, or remit those costs does not apply to minors who are placed on prepetition informal supervision, who are the subject of a delinquency petition, or who
are placed on probation. The authority to make financial evaluations remains for dual
status children for purposes of the dependency jurisdiction only.

•

Limits the recovery of administrative fees to be paid by home-detention participants
to persons over 21 years of age and under the jurisdiction of the criminal court.

•

Limits the recovery of fees to be paid by probationers for drug testing to those
persons over 21 years of age and under the jurisdiction of the criminal court,
regardless of whether the program is publicly or privately operated.

•

Eliminates liability of a minor or his or her parents or guardians for the following
costs associated with the filing of a juvenile delinquency petition in the juvenile
court:
o Costs incurred for transporting, feeding, and sheltering a minor held in
temporary custody in a law enforcement facility.
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o Costs associated with any service program the minor may be required to
participate in;
o Costs of support for a minor detained in a juvenile facility;
o Costs of probation supervision, home supervision, or electronic supervision;
o Costs of food, shelter, and care of a minor who remains in the custody of
probation or detained in a juvenile facility after the parent or guardian receives
notice of release;
o Costs of support of minors placed in out-of-home placements other than
county institutions; and,
o Costs of care, support, and maintenance when a minor is voluntarily placed in
out-of-home care and the minor receives specified aid.
•

Provides that a minor who is ordered to pay restitution for damaging or discarding an
electronic monitor is entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing without requesting one.

•

Provides that the expense for the support and maintenance of a juvenile delinquency
ward shall be paid entirely from the county treasury.

•

Repeals the registration fee of up to $50 for appointment of legal counsel for minors.

•

Limits the recovery of fees associated with services provided during diversion to
those services provided directly to the minor's family, but not the services rendered to
the minor.

•

Limits the recovery of fees for appointed legal representation to those services
provided directly to the parents of a minor involved in a juvenile dependency
proceeding. Attorney fees for legal services for the minor are not recoverable.

•

Provides that when a minor is designated as a dual status child, specified fees apply
for purposes of the dependency jurisdiction only but not for purposes of the
delinquency jurisdiction.

Attorney Fees: Authority to Impose
Under existing law, a low-income, homeless, or impoverished person who is accused of a crime
that he or she did not commit can still be ordered to pay the court for the costs of a courtappointed attorney. The impact of this law subjects an individual who was falsely arrested,
wrongly imprisoned, wrongly prosecuted, and ultimately exonerated, to pay an “accusation tax”
penalty of thousands of dollars for asserting his or her constitutional right to an attorney.
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SB 355 (Mitchell), Chapter 62, eliminates the fee for court-appointed counsel in cases
which do not result in a conviction for a felony or a misdemeanor. Specifically, this new
law:
•

States that the fee for court-appointed counsel only applies in cases which do result in
a conviction for a felony or a misdemeanor.

•

Authorizes the court, in cases which result in a conviction, to order the defendant to
appear before a county officer to make a determination of whether or not he or she
must pay all or a portion of the fees associated with court-appointed counsel.
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FIREARMS
Open Carry: Unincorporated Areas
Existing law makes it is a misdemeanor to openly carry an unloaded firearm that is not a
handgun in an incorporated area of a city or city and county, but the same is not true in an
unincorporated area of a county. This creates a dangerous loophole that allows a person to
openly carry a rifle or an assault weapon in these areas.
AB 7 (Gipson), Chapter 734, makes it a misdemeanor to carry an unloaded firearm
other than a handgun in a public place or upon a public street in an area where the
discharge of a firearm is prohibited in an unincorporated area of a county.
Firearms: Gun Free Zones
Under existing law, any person who possesses a firearm in a place that the person knows, or
reasonably should know, is a school zone, unless it is with the written permission of the school
district superintendent, or equivalent school authority is guilty of a crime.
A safe learning environment is essential for our children to be successful in the classroom.
Classrooms are laboratories of learning. They provide opportunities to discover art, music,
history and mathematics to prepare oneself for college or a career. That's not possible if a school
district allows armed civilians to carry firearms on California school campuses.
AB 424 (McCarty), Chapter 779, deletes the authority of a school district
superintendent, his or her designee, or equivalent school authority to provide written
permission for a person to possess a firearm within a school zone, and, also, exempts
sanctioned shooting sports or activities from the prohibition.
Firearms: Peace Officer Standards and Training Courses
Existing law generally requires that a firearms transaction be conducted through a licensed
firearms dealer and prohibits the transfer unless the person has been issued a firearms license.
As amended by the Safety for All Act of 2016, approved by voters as Proposition 63 at the
November 8, 2016, statewide general election, generally prohibits the possession of large
capacity magazines regardless of the date the magazine was required.
Sworn peace officers are exempt from the above provisions, however individuals who are
enrolled in a training program to become sworn peace officers (cadets) are not necessarily
exempt. This is problematic because it does not allow cadets to receive adequate training.
Currently, cadets lawfully may not train with large-capacity magazines and other firearms that
they may be expected to use as officers.
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AB 693 (Irwin), Chapter 783, exempts persons enrolled in the course of basic training
prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) from
specified prohibitions related to firearms, ammunition, and large-capacity magazines, and
exempts an instructor of the course, or a POST staff member from the ammunition
purchase requirements relating to the purchase of ammunition through a licensed
ammunition vendor.
Ban on Possession of Firearms: Hate Crimes
Under existing law, individuals convicted of violent misdemeanors and misdemeanors that
involve the use or threatened use of a firearm, are generally prohibited from possessing or
acquiring firearms for 10 years after conviction, unless they successfully petition a court to
restore their firearm eligibility. However, this prohibition does not apply to those convicted of a
misdemeanor hate crime. Unbelievably, those who commit violent misdemeanors may keep
their gun if the offense is, instead, charged as a hate crime.
At least six states (Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon)
have enacted laws to prohibit violent hate crime misdemeanants from possessing and acquiring
firearms. As a leader in enacting laws to prevent gun violence, it is time California joins these
states.
AB 785 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 784, adds two hate crimes to the list of misdemeanors
that result in a ban on the right to possess a firearm for 10 years. Specifically, this new
law:
•

Adds the misdemeanor to interfere by force or threat of force with another person's
free exercise of any constitutional right or privilege because of the other person's
actual or perceived race, religion, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual
orientation to the list of offenses that result in a ban on the right to possess a firearm
for ten years.

•

Adds the misdemeanor to knowingly deface, damage, or destroy the property of
another person, for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with the exercise of any
of those constitutional rights because of those specified characteristics to the list of
misdemeanors that can result in a ban on the right to possess a firearm for ten years.

Gun Violence Restraining Orders: Records Retention
In 2014, the Legislature enacted AB 1014 (Skinner), Chapter 872, which authorized courts to
issue gun violence restraining orders to remove firearms from individuals who are at-risk of
committing acts of violence against themselves or others. While it was modeled after other
restraining order laws, AB 1014 did not specify the period during which records were required to
be retained. Under existing law, court records of other similar restraining orders (e.g., civil
harassment, domestic violence, elder and dependent adult abuse) are retained for the duration of
the restraining order and for any renewals, and then permanently thereafter, like judgments.
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AB 1443 (Levine), Chapter 172, provides that a record involving a gun violence
restraining order case be retained for the duration of the restraining order and during any
renewals. Thereafter, the records are to be retained permanently, like judgments.
Firearms: Warnings
Existing California firearm laws are complex and have different effectiveness dates, scopes, and
penalties. Many purchasers and firearm range and store owners are uncertain on how to comply.
Consumer education at the point of sale and when taking the Firearms Safety Certificate (FSC)
test helps ensure firearms are properly stored and the owners better understand the laws they are
expected to follow. Existing law already requires notices and disclosures to be posted at the
point of sale and information be provided to a firearm purchaser when they obtain an FSC.
AB 1525 (Baker), Chapter 825, updates warnings on packaging, instructional manuals,
pamphlets, and signs posted at retailers relating to the risks of firearms to reflect recent
updates in California law related to firearms. Specifically, this new law:
•

Adds information to specified warnings related to the following firearms regulations:
o Requirements to handle firearms responsibly and to securely store firearms to
prevent access by children or other prohibited persons;
o Warnings of fines or imprisonment for failure to comply with specified
regulations;
o Information about the associated Attorney General's Web site; and
o Warnings that a child may not be able to distinguish a firearm from a toy.

•

Updates warnings relating to the risks of firearms and the laws regulating firearms for
the packaging of firearms, the descriptive materials that accompany firearms, and the
instructional manual developed by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

•

Updates, as of January 1, 2019, the warnings included at the premises of licensed
firearms dealers.

•

Requires, as of January 1, 2019, specified warnings be given to persons who take the
firearms safety certificate examination and requires the applicant to acknowledge
receipt of the warning prior to the issuance of the firearm safety certificate.
Requires, as of January 1, 2019, that the DOJ update the testing materials for the
handgun safety certificate once every five years and requires the DOJ to update the
related Web site regularly to reflect current laws and regulations.
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Securing Handguns: Vehicles
Under existing law, every person that leaves a handgun in a vehicle must lock the handgun in a
locked container and place the container out of plain view, or lock the handgun in a locked
container that is permanently affixed to the vehicle's interior and not in plain view.
SB 497 (Portantino), Chapter 809, allows a peace officer when leaving a handgun in an
unattended vehicle to lock the handgun in the center console, as specified. Specifically,
this new law:
•

Provides that a peace officer, when leaving a handgun in an unattended vehicle not
equipped with a trunk, may lock the handgun out of plain view within the center
utility console of that motor vehicle with a padlock, keylock, combination lock, or
other similar locking device.

•

Defines "peace officer" to mean “a sworn California peace officer or a sworn federal
law enforcement officer, who is authorized to carry a firearm in the course and scope
of that officer's duties, while that officer is on duty or off duty.”

•

Defines "trunk" to mean “the fully enclosed and locked main storage or luggage
compartment of a vehicle that is not accessible from the passenger compartment. A
trunk does not include the rear of a hatchback, station wagon, or sport utility vehicle,
any compartment that has a window, or a toolbox or utility box attached to the bed of
a pickup truck.”

•

Defines "plain view" to include “any area of a vehicle that is visible by peering
through the windows of the vehicle, including windows that are tinted, or without
illumination.
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Firearm Violence Research Center: Gun Violence Restraining Orders
Last year, the Legislature appropriated funds to establish the University of California’s Firearm
Violence Research Center to conduct research related to firearm violence and its prevention.
Currently, the UC Firearm Violence Research Center does not have access to information
regarding gun violence restraining orders (GRVO’s). Existing law does allow academic
researchers to access some criminal history records. However, since the GVROs are civil court
orders and not criminal offender records, existing law does not allow researchers to access the
GVRO information. Without access to the GVRO records, researchers will not be able to
monitor its effectiveness or make suggestions on how to improve the program and overall gun
violence prevention measures
SB 536 (Pan), Chapter 810, requires the state Department of Justice (DOJ) to make information
related to GVRO's that is maintained in the California Restraining Order and Protective Order
System or any similar database maintained by the department available to researchers affiliated
with the University of California, or, at the discretion of DOJ, any other entity that is concerned
with the study and prevention of violence, for academic and research purposes.
Firearms: Enhancements
“In 1997, the Legislature passed the “Use a Gun and You’re Done” law that significantly
increased sentencing enhancements for possessing a gun at the time of committing a specified
felony, such as robbery, homicide, or certain sex crimes. Under the law, if someone uses a gun
while committing one of the identified crimes, their sentence is extended by 10 years, 20 years,
or 25 years-to-life, depending on how the gun was used. Often the enhancement for gun use is
longer than the sentence for the crime itself. For example, in the case of second-degree robbery,
a person could serve a maximum of five years for the robbery and an extra 10 years for
brandishing a gun during the robbery, even if the gun was unloaded or otherwise inoperable.
Someone convicted of first-degree murder would be sentenced to at least 50 years-to-life if a gun
was used, whereas if the murder was carried out using another method – such as strangulation –
the sentence would be half the length (25 years-to-life). A judge has no discretion in applying
this enhancement; if a gun was used, a judge must apply it.” (California Budget and Policy
Center (2015) Sentencing in California: Moving Toward a Smarter, More Cost-Effective
Approach.)
Deterrence was a driving factor behind this legislation: “The Legislature finds and declares that
substantially longer prison sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms in the
commission of their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to deter violent crime.” (AB 4
(Bordonaro), Chapter 503, Statutes of 1997.)
In a 2014 report, the National Research Council concluded that the incremental deterrent effect
of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at best. “Because recidivism rates decline
markedly with age, lengthy prison sentences, unless they specifically target very high-rate or
extremely dangerous offenders, are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by
incapacitation.” (National Research Council (2014) The Growth of Incarceration in the United
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States: Exploring Causes and Consequences, p. 5.)
In a 2014 report, the Little Hoover Commission addressed the disconnect between science and
sentencing – that is, putting away offenders for increasingly longer periods of time, with no
evidence that lengthy incarceration, for many, brings any additional public safety benefit.
(http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/219/Report219.pdf.) The report also explains how California’s
sentencing structure and enhancements contributed to a 20-year state prison building boom,
specifically remarking on the “significant sentencing enhancements” of the 10-20-life firearm
law.
SB 620 (Bradford), Chapter 682, allows a court, in the interest of justice, to strike or
dismiss a firearm enhancement which otherwise adds a state prison term of three, four, or
10 years, or five, six, or 10 years, depending on the firearm, or a state prison term of 10
years, 20 years, or 25-years-to-life depending on the underlying offense and manner of
use. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that the court may, in the interest of justice and at the time of sentencing,
strike or dismiss a sentence enhancement for use of a firearm, assault weapon, or
machine gun while committing or attempting to commit a felony.

•

Provides that the court may, in the interest of justice and at the time of sentencing,
strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement for the use, discharge, or discharge causing
great bodily injury (GBI) or death while committing or attempting to commit a
specified felony.
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GANGS
Criminal Gangs: Shared Gang Databases
In August of 2016, the California State Auditor released findings of an investigation into the
workings and impact of the CalGang Database and the other shared gang databases that feed into
it across the state. The audit revealed many concerns. A review of the entries into the database
found that only 13% of the entries into the system had adequate support for entry. Additionally,
the audit found that the CalGang database received no state oversight and the CalGang Executive
Board and the California Gang Node Advisory Committee oversee the database's function
independently from state oversight and without transparency or meaningful opportunities for
public input. Law enforcement agencies the audit reviewed were not complying with state law
requiring informing juveniles and parents of gang designations.
AB 90 (Weber), Chapter 695, shifts responsibilities for shared gang databases from the
CalGang Executive Board to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and sets policies,
procedures, and oversight for the future use of shared gang databases. Specifically, this
new bill:
•

Shifts the responsibility for administering and overseeing the shared gang
database to DOJ, and provides that commencing January 1, 2018 the CalGang
Executive Board will no longer administer or oversee the CalGang database or the
shared gang databases that participate in the CalGang database.

•

Requires the creation of regulations to provide for periodic audits by law
enforcement agencies and DOJ staff to ensure accuracy, reliability, and proper use
of any shared gang database.

•

Requires that the DOJ create regulations regarding the use, operation, and
oversight of any shared gang database.

•

Requires the DOJ to establish a technical advisory committee on the uses of the
shared gang databases.

•

Imposes a moratorium on the use of the CalGang database until the Attorney
General certifies that specified information has been purged from it.

Restraining Orders: Gang Cases and Witnesses
The court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding where it finds good cause
belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is
reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2.) Protective orders issued under this statute are
valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
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When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue post-conviction
protective orders in specified cases, including domestic violence, elder abuse, and sex offenses.
With one exception, these protective orders can be issued only on the victim’s behalf. Currently,
most witnesses to crimes must go through the task of opening a civil case to receive a protective
order.
AB 264 (Low), Chapter 270, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for
up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court's authority to issue post-conviction
restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes. Specifically, this new law:
•

Extends the court's authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to
10 years in cases involving gang activity.

•

Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient
witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order
if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been
harassed.

•

Defines harassment as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner."

62

HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Character Evidence: Prior Human Trafficking Offense
The Legislature has enacted narrow exceptions to the general rule prohibiting propensity
evidence. In 1996, Evidence Code section 1108 was added to allow introduction of evidence of
other acts of sexual misconduct in a prosecution for a sex offense. (Evid. Code, § 1108; AB 882
(Rogan), Chapter 439, Statutes of 1996.) In 1996, the Legislature added a similar provision to
allow the admission of evidence that the defendant committed other acts of domestic violence in
domestic violence cases. (See Evid. Code, § 1109; SB 1876 (Solis), Chapter 261, Statutes of
1996.) The Legislature has similarly enacted laws allowing propensity evidence of abuse of an
elder or dependent person (AB 2063 (Zettel), Chapter 517, Statutes of 2000) or child abuse (AB
114 (Cohn), Chapter 464, Statutes of 2005). (See Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(2) & (3).)
Arguably, the challenges with prosecuting sex trafficking offenses are similar to the challenges
with prosecuting the other crimes that are already exceptions to this rule: sexual offenses, crimes
of domestic violence, elder and dependent abuse, and child abuse.
SB 230 (Atkins), Chapter 805, expands the definition of “sexual offense” to include
specified offenses related to human trafficking for purposes of the Evidence Code
exception which provides that evidence of another sexual offense is not inadmissible to
prove conduct in a current sexual offense action.
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IMMIGRATION
Victims and Witnesses: Immigration Violations
Existing law protects victims and witnesses of hate crimes from being detained for immigration
violations or being turned over to federal immigration enforcement.
Since the inauguration of the current presidential administration, the federal government's recent
sentiment on immigration laws have generated the possibility of deportation for suspected
undocumented immigrants. Forthcoming changes in federal law are likely to deter such
individuals who reside in California from assisting peace officers with evidence that is
potentially helpful to an investigation.
It is in the best interest of the state to establish firm connections with those in the community and
to protect the public from crime and violence by encouraging all persons – victims, witnesses or
anyone who provides evidence to assist in a criminal investigation – to cooperate with state and
local law enforcement and not be penalized on account of their immigration status.
AB 493 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 194, prohibits law enforcement from detaining a
crime victim or witness solely for an actual or suspected immigration violation.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Declares that it is the public policy of the state to protect the public from crime and
violence by encouraging all victims and witness to crimes, or who could otherwise
give evidence in a criminal investigation, to cooperate with the criminal justice
system and not to penalize those persons for such cooperation or for being crime
victims.

•

Prohibits a peace officer from detaining a person who is a witness or victim to a crime
exclusively for any actual or suspected immigration violation when that person is not
charged with, or convicted of, committing any crime under state law.

•

Allows law enforcement to turn over an individual to immigration authorities
pursuant to a judicial warrant.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers
As California and the rest of the nation enter into a new reality of aggressive and, at times,
deceitful actions undertaken to enforce immigration actions, California must take any and all
necessary actions to disassociate the actions of federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and Border Protection officers with those of licensed state and local peace officers.
AB 1440 (Kalra), Chapter 116, clarifies that United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Border Protection officers are not California peace officers.
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Law Enforcement: Sharing Data
On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed a pair of executive orders on immigration. The
orders direct stepped up immigration enforcement on people in the country without
documentation and the cities that don’t readily hand them over for deportation.
A study by the University of Illinois – Chicago surveyed Latino immigrants in Cook (Chicago),
Harris (Houston), Los Angeles, and Maricopa (Phoenix) counties on their perception of local law
enforcement when there’s involvement in immigration enforcement. The study found that
Latinos are less likely to contact police officers if they have been the victim of a crime because
they fear that police officers will use this interaction as an opportunity to inquire into their
immigration status or that of people they know. Latinos are also less likely to voluntarily offer
information about crimes, and are less likely to report a crime because they are afraid the police
will ask them or people they know about their immigration status;
SB 54 (De Leon), Chapter 495, limits the involvement of state and local law
enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. Specifically, the new law:
•

States that law enforcement agencies shall not do any of the following:
o Use agency or department money or personnel to investigate, interrogate,
detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
o Place peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employ
peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal
deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement.
o Use immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters
relating to individuals in agency or department custody.
o Transfer an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a
judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or if the
individual meets specified criteria regarding their past offenses.
o Provide office space exclusive dedicated for immigration authorities for
use within a law enforcement facility.
o Contract with the federal government for the use of California law
enforcement agency facilities to house federal detainees, except as
specified by existing law.

•

Specifies that this law does not prevent any California law enforcement agency
from doing any of the following that does not otherwise violate any local law or
policy of the jurisdiction in which the agency is operating:
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o Investigating or enforcing violations of federal law for illegal reentry after
removal subsequent to conviction of an aggravated felony. Transfers are
only allowed as otherwise provided by this law.
o Responding to a request from federal immigration authorities for
information about a specific person's criminal history, including previous
criminal arrests, convictions, and similar criminal history information
accessed through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System (CLETS), where otherwise permitted by state law;
o Participating in a joint law enforcement task force, so long as the primary
purpose of the task force is not immigration enforcement and such
participation does not violate local law or policy which applies to the law
enforcement agency.
o Making inquiries into information necessary to certify an individual who
has been identified as a potential crime or trafficking victim for a T or U
Visa, as specified, or to comply with specified federal laws regarding sale
of firearms to non-citizens; or
o Giving immigration authorities access to interview an individual in law
enforcement custody, in compliance with specified existing law.
•

Provides law enforcement discretion to respond to notification or transfer requests
from immigration authorities if the person meets specified criteria regarding prior
convictions.

•

States that if a California law enforcement agency chooses to participate in a joint
law enforcement task force, for which it has agreed to dedicate resources on an
ongoing basis, it shall submit a report annually to the Department of Justice, as
specified by the Attorney General.

•

States that this law does not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official
from sending to, or receiving from, federal immigration authorities, information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an
individual pursuant to specified federal law.
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JUVENILES
Juveniles: Sealing of Records
Under existing law, minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court proceedings may petition the
court to have their records sealed unless they were found to have committed certain serious
offenses. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) However, juvenile court jurisdiction must have lapsed
five years previously, or the person must be at least 18 years old. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781,
subd. (a)(1)(A).)
SB 1038 (Leno), Chapter 249, Statutes of 2014, provided a process for automatic juvenile record
sealing (i.e. without a petition from the minor) in cases involving satisfactorily-completed
informal supervision or probation, except in cases involving specified serious or violent offenses
where the juvenile was 14 years or older at the time of the offense and the offense was not
dismissed or reduced to a non-serious or non-violent offense. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786.)
The sealing of delinquency records is an important factor in reducing recidivism and opening
doors to jobs and education for many of California youth.
AB 529 (Stone), Chapter 685, requires the sealing of juvenile records relating to
dismissed or unsustained juvenile court petitions and relating to diversion and
supervision programs, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that if a person who has been alleged to be a ward of the juvenile court has
his or her petition dismissed by the court, whether on the motion of the prosecution or
on the court’s own motion, or if the petition is not sustained by the court after an
adjudication hearing, the court must order sealed all records pertaining to the
dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law
enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice.

•

Requires the court to send a copy of the order to each agency and official named in
the order, direct the agency or official to seal its records, and specify a date by which
the sealed records must be destroyed.

•

Requires each agency and official named in the order to seal the records in its custody
as directed by the order, advise the court of its compliance, and, after advising the
court, seal the copy of the court’s order that was received.

•

Requires the court to provide notice to the person and the person’s counsel that it has
ordered the petition dismissed and the records sealed. The notice must advise the
person of his or her right to nondisclosure of the arrest and proceedings, as specified.

•

Provides that when a record has been sealed by the court based on a dismissed
petition, as specified, the prosecutor, within six months of the date of dismissal, may
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petition the court to access, inspect, or utilize the sealed record for the limited purpose
of refiling the dismissed petition based on new circumstances, and requires the court
to determine whether the new circumstance alleged by the prosecutor provides
sufficient justification for accessing, inspecting, or utilizing the sealed record in order
to refile the dismissed petition.
•

Requires the probation department to seal the arrest and other records in its custody
relating to a juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in a diversion or supervision
program upon satisfactory completion of the program of diversion or supervision to
which a juvenile is referred by the probation officer or the prosecutor in lieu of the
filing of a petition to adjudge the juvenile a ward of the juvenile court, including a
program of informal supervision.

•

Requires the probation department to notify a public or private agency operating a
diversion program to which the juvenile has been referred under these circumstances
to seal records in the program operator’s custody relating to the arrest or referral and
the participation of the juvenile in the diversion or supervision program, and the
operator of the program shall then promptly seal the records in its custody relating to
the juvenile’s arrest or referral and participation in the program.

•

Provides that upon sealing of the records under this section, the arrest or offense
giving rise to the person’s participation in the program shall be deemed not to have
occurred and the individual may respond accordingly to any inquiry, application, or
process in which disclosure of this information is requested or sought.

•

Requires the probation department to notify the participant in the supervision or
diversion program in writing that his or her record has been sealed pursuant to the
provisions of this section based on his or her satisfactory completion of the program.
If the record is not sealed, the probation department shall notify the participant in
writing of the reason or reasons for not sealing the record.

•

Defines “satisfactory completion” of the program of supervision or diversion, and
requires the probation department to make a determination of satisfactory or
unsatisfactory completion within 60 days of completion of the program by the
juvenile, or if the juvenile does not complete the program, within 60 days of
determining that the program has not been completed by the juvenile.

•

Allows a person who receives notice from the probation department that he or she has
not satisfactorily completed the diversion program and that the record has not been
sealed to petition for review of the decision, as specified.

•

Authorizes a probation department to access sealed records under these provisions for
the limited purpose of determining whether the minor has previously participated in a
program of supervision. Specifies that the information contained in the sealed record
and accessed by the probation department remains in all other respects confidential
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and prohibits its dissemination to any other person or agency. Provides that access to,
or inspection of, a sealed record shall not be deemed an unsealing of the record nor
require notice to any other agency.
Juveniles: Restraints
Every day young people in California who are detained in secure confinement are placed in
restraints, including handcuffs, belly belts, and leg shackles, to be transported outside of the
juvenile hall – for example, to a court appearance or doctor’s appointment. Young people may
spend hours in restraints as they wait to appear in court or to see a doctor. Once in court, they
may remain restrained, impeding their ability to participate in their court hearing. This practice
is harmful especially young people suffering from the effects of trauma and mental illness. It is
also contrary to the juvenile court’s goal of providing individualized rehabilitative services to
young people and is unnecessary to protect young people or ensure public safety.
The indiscriminate use of restraints is not necessary to preserve public safety. Only about 10% of
juvenile arrests are for violent felonies. The indiscriminate use of shackling makes little sense,
given that the risk the young people pose to public safety is minimal and the potential harm to
them is significant.
AB 878 (Gipson), Chapter 660, limits the use of restraints to transport a minor from a
juvenile detention facility and clarifies when restraints may be used in juvenile court.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that restraints may be used when a minor is being transported outside of a
local juvenile detention facility only upon a determination made by the probation
department, in consultation with the transporting agency, that restraints are necessary
to prevent physical harm to the juvenile or another person or due to a substantial risk
of flight.

•

Requires that the least restrictive form of restraint be used consistent with the
legitimate security needs of each minor if a determination is made that mechanical
restraints are necessary.

•

Requires a county probation department which chooses to use restraints other than
handcuffs to establish procedures for documenting their use, including the reasons for
use of those restraints.

•

Provides that the above restrictions on restraints do not apply to restraints used by
medical care providers in the course of medical treatment or transportation.

•

Provides that restraints may only be used during a juvenile court proceeding if the
court determines that the individual minor’s behavior in custody or in court
establishes a manifest need to use restraints to prevent physical harm to the juvenile
or another person or due to a substantial risk of flight.
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•

Provides that it is the prosecution’s burden to demonstrate the need to use restraints
on a minor during a juvenile court proceeding.

•

Requires that the least restrictive form of restraint be used and the reasons for the use
of restraints be documented on the record if the court makes a determination that
mechanical restraints are necessary.

Parole: Youth Offender Parole Hearings
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth
who did not commit homicide to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 540 U.S. 48 [130 S.Ct. 2011] (Graham).) In Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller), the Court further decided that mandatory LWOP
sentences for minors under age 18 at the time of a homicide violate the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero), the
California Supreme Court ruled that sentencing a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense to
a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life
expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court in Caballero advised that defendants who were sentenced for crimes they committed
as juveniles could seek to modify life without parole or equivalent de facto sentences already
imposed by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. (People v. Caballero,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 269.) The Court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole eligibility
mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto life term for crimes committed as a juvenile.
SB 260 (Hancock), Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013, established a parole process for inmates who
were sentenced to lengthy prison terms for crimes committed when they were under the age of
18. (Pen. Code, § 3051.) SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471, Statutes of 2015, expanded those
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing to those whose committing offense occurred before
they reached the age of 23. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
However, research shows that cognitive brain development continues into the early 20s or later.
The parts of the brain that are still developing during this process affect judgment and decisionmaking, and are highly relevant to criminal behavior and culpability. (See Johnson, et al.,
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in
Adolescent Health Policy, Journal of Adolescent Health (Sept. 2009); National Institute of
Mental Health, The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction (2011).) “The development and
maturation of the prefrontal cortex occurs primarily during adolescence and is fully
accomplished at the age of 25 years. The development of the prefrontal cortex is very important
for complex behavioral performance, as this region of the brain helps accomplish executive brain
functions.” (Arain, et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain (2013).)
AB 1308 (Stone), Chapter 675, expands the youth offender parole process, a parole
process for persons sentenced to lengthy prison terms for crimes committed before
attaining 23 years of age, to include those who committed their crimes when they were 25
years of age or younger. Specifically, this new law:
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•

Expands those eligible for a youthful parole hearing to those whose committing
offense occurred when they were 25 years of age or younger.

•

Excludes from the youthful offender parole provisions an individual to whom this
section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to attaining 26 years of age,
commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of
the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.

•

Requires the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) to complete, by January 1, 2020, all
youth offender parole hearings for individuals who were sentenced to indeterminate
life terms who become entitled to have their parole suitability considered at a youth
offender parole hearing on the effective date of this law.

•

Requires BPH to complete all youth offender parole hearings for individuals who
were sentenced to determinate terms who become entitled to have their parole
suitability considered at a youth offender parole hearing on the effective date of this
law by January 1, 2022, and requires BPH, for these individuals, to conduct a
specified consultation before January 1, 2019.

Juveniles: Administrative Fees
Criminal fines, fees, and assessments have climbed steadily in recent decades. Government
entities tasked with collecting this debt have realized diminishing returns from collection efforts.
Government resources can be wasted in futile collection attempts.
A recent study by the Policy Advocacy Clinic at University of California Berkeley School of
Law has found that imposing administrative fees to families with youth in the juvenile justice
system is harmful, unlawful, and costly. Current California law allows counties to charge
administrative fees, which can quickly add up to thousands of dollars, an incredible burden to
families with youth in the juvenile justice system. In fact, such criminal justice debt undermines
the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and leads to increased recidivism.
Furthermore, most youth in the juvenile system come from poor families who cannot afford to
pay fees, and counties ultimately obtain minimal returns despite the high fiscal and societal costs
associated with collecting fees.
SB 190 (Mitchell), Chapter 678, limits the authority of local agencies to assess and
collect specified fees against persons subject to the juvenile delinquency system.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that the authority of a county financial-evaluation officer to make financial
evaluations, including evaluations of parental liability, for specified costs and to
reduce, cancel, or remit those costs does not apply to minors who are placed on prepetition informal supervision, who are the subject of a delinquency petition, or who
are placed on probation. The authority to make financial evaluations remains for dual
status children for purposes of the dependency jurisdiction only.
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•

Limits the recovery of administrative fees to be paid by home-detention participants
to persons over 21 years of age and under the jurisdiction of the criminal court.

•

Limits the recovery of fees to be paid by probationers for drug testing to those
persons over 21 years of age and under the jurisdiction of the criminal court,
regardless of whether the program is publicly or privately operated.

•

Eliminates liability of a minor or his or her parents or guardians for the following
costs associated with the filing of a juvenile delinquency petition in the juvenile
court:
o Costs incurred for transporting, feeding, and sheltering a minor held in
temporary custody in a law enforcement facility.
o Costs associated with any service program the minor may be required to
participate in;
o Costs of support for a minor detained in a juvenile facility;
o Costs of probation supervision, home supervision, or electronic supervision;
o Costs of food, shelter, and care of a minor who remains in the custody of
probation or detained in a juvenile facility after the parent or guardian receives
notice of release;
o Costs of support of minors placed in out-of-home placements other than
county institutions; and,
o Costs of care, support, and maintenance when a minor is voluntarily placed in
out-of-home care and the minor receives specified aid.

•

Provides that a minor who is ordered to pay restitution for damaging or discarding an
electronic monitor is entitled to an ability-to-pay hearing without requesting one.

•

Provides that the expense for the support and maintenance of a juvenile delinquency
ward shall be paid entirely from the county treasury.

•

Repeals the registration fee of up to $50 for appointment of legal counsel for minors.

•

Limits the recovery of fees associated with services provided during diversion to
those services provided directly to the minor's family, but not the services rendered to
the minor.

•

Limits the recovery of fees for appointed legal representation to those services
provided directly to the parents of a minor involved in a juvenile dependency
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proceeding. Attorney fees for legal services for the minor are not recoverable.
•

Provides that when a minor is designated as a dual status child, specified fees apply
for purposes of the dependency jurisdiction only but not for purposes of the
delinquency jurisdiction.

Juveniles: Sealing of Records
On March 7, 2000, California voters approved Proposition 21, known as the Gang Violence and
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act. According to the Legislative Analyst, the purpose of Proposition
21 was to change the treatment of juvenile offenders, particularly youths engaged in gang-related
criminal activity or who had committed other serious offenses. Among other things, Proposition
21 prohibited the sealing of juvenile records involving certain serious or violent offenses –
offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b) (aka the “707(b)
list”).
Under existing law, minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court proceedings may petition the
court to have their records sealed unless they were found to have committed a serious or violent
offense on the 707(b) list when he or she was 14 years or older. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 781.) In
2014, the legislature enacted a process for court-initiated sealing upon probation completion.
This process also does not apply in cases involving a serious or violent offense on the 707(b) list,
unless the finding on that offense was dismissed or reduced to a lesser offense not on the list.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786.)
In In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1196, the appellate court concluded the prohibition to
record sealing under the petition process applies even if the adjudicated offense on the 707(b) list
is later reduced to a misdemeanor, and even if the court concludes the juvenile is otherwise
rehabilitated. (In re G.Y., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201, 1204.)
A ban on the ability to have the record of a past offense sealed can be a lifetime obstacle to good
employment, housing, military service, higher education, and more.
SB 312 (Skinner), Chapter 679, authorizes the court to order the sealing of records for
certain serious or violent offenses committed when a juvenile was 14 years of age or
older, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Modifies the lifetime ban on sealing a juvenile offense record involving a specified
serious or violent offense committed when the individual was 14 years of age or
older, and replaces it with language permitting the person to petition for record
sealing (i.e., sealing by petition) under the following circumstances:
o The person was committed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, has attained the age of 21 years
of age, and has completed his or her period of probation supervision after
release from the Division; and
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o The person was not committed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, has attained the age of 18 years
of age, and has completed any period of probation supervision related to that
offense imposed by the court.
•

Provides that a record that has been sealed pursuant to the sealing by petition process
may be accessed, inspected, or utilized in a subsequent proceeding in the following
circumstances:
o By the prosecuting attorney, as necessary, to make appropriate charging
decisions or to initiate a prosecution in criminal court involving a subsequent
felony offense, or by the prosecuting attorney or court to determine the
appropriate sentencing for a subsequent felony offense;
o By the prosecuting attorney, as necessary, to initiate a juvenile court
proceeding to determine whether a minor shall be transferred from the
juvenile court to a criminal court to be tried as an adult, and by the juvenile
court to make that determination;
o By the prosecuting attorney, the probation department, or the juvenile court
upon a subsequent finding by the juvenile court that the minor has committed
a felony offense, for the purpose of determining an appropriate disposition of
the case; and
o By the prosecuting attorney, or a court of criminal jurisdiction, for the purpose
of proving a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction, and determining
the appropriate sentence.

•

Provides that a record relating to a specified serious or violent offense committed
after attaining 14 years of age that has been sealed pursuant to this provision may be
accessed, inspected, or utilized by the prosecuting attorney in order to meet statutory
or constitutional obligations to disclose favorable or exculpatory evidence to the
defense in a criminal case.

•

Requires that the information accessed, as set forth above, otherwise remain
confidential and not be further disseminated.

•

Provides that the waiting periods and access provisions do not apply if the specified
serious or violent felony offense committed after the person attained 14 years of age
was dismissed or reduced to a misdemeanor by the court.

•

Provides that a record related to a specified serious or violent offense that was
committed after attaining 14 years of age and requires registration as a sex offender is
not eligible for sealing by petition.

74

•

Provides that a specified serious or violent offense that was committed after a person
attained 14 years of age and that was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor is
eligible for court ordered record sealing after satisfactory completion of informal
supervision or probation (i.e., court-initiated sealing).

Parole: Youth Offender
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth
who did not commit homicide to a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 540 U.S. 48 [130 S.Ct. 2011] (Graham).) In Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller), the Court further held the Eighth Amendment
forbids a state from mandating the imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile homicide
offender. (Id. at p.
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2469].) Consistent with these decisions, in People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero), the California Supreme Court ruled that
sentencing a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense to a term of years with a parole
eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy – i.e., the
functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence – constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at p. 268.) While the court in Caballero pointed out that
juvenile offenders seeking to modify an LWOP or de facto LWOP term may file petitions for
writs of habeas corpus in the trial court, the Court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole
eligibility mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto LWOP for non-homicide crimes
committed as a juvenile. (People v. Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 5.)
In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s urging in Caballero, SB 260 (Hancock),
Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013, established a parole eligibility mechanism for individuals
sentenced to lengthy determinate or life terms for crimes committed when they were juveniles.
(Pen. Code, § 3051.) Under the youth offender parole process created by SB 260, the person has
an opportunity for a parole hearing after having served 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration
depending on their controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051.) SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471,
Statutes of 2015, expanded those eligible for a youth offender parole hearing to those whose
controlling offense occurred before they reached the age of 23. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
The youth offender parole provisions expressly exclude a defendant who has been sentenced to
LWOP. (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049, fn. 4.) SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of
2012, created a recall and resentencing process for juveniles sentenced to LWOP. (Pen. Code, §
1170, subd. (d)(2).) The recall and resentencing provision of SB 9 has been found to be an
inadequate remedy for a Miller violation. (In re Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1049-1052.)
SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, makes a person who was convicted of a controlling offense
that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which an
LWOP sentence has been imposed eligible for a youth offender parole hearing during his
or her 25th year of incarceration. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a defendant who was convicted of a controlling offense that was
committed before he or she had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is
LWOP shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year
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of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing unless previously released or
entitled to an earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory
provisions.
•

Clarifies that youth offender parole does not apply to those sentenced to LWOP for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.

•

Sets a deadline of July 1, 2020, for the Board of Parole Hearings to complete all
youth offender parole hearings for individuals who were sentenced to LWOP and
who are or will be entitled to have their parole suitability considered at a youth
offender parole hearing before July 1, 2020.

Juveniles: Custodial Interrogations
Currently in California, children—no matter how young— can waive their Miranda rights.
When law enforcement conducts a custodial interrogation, they are required to recite basic
constitutional rights to the individual, known as Miranda rights, and secure a waiver of those
rights before proceeding. The waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
Miranda waivers by juveniles present distinct issues. Recent advances in cognitive science
research have shown that the capacity of youth to grasp legal rights is less than that of an adult.
Although existing law assures counsel for youth accused of crimes, the law does not
require law enforcement and the courts to recognize that youth are different from adults. It
is critical to ensure a youth understands their rights before waiving them and courts should
have clear criteria for evaluating the validity of waivers.
Recently an appellate court held that a 10-year-old boy made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. When the police asked if he understood the right
to remain silent, he replied, "Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm." The
California Supreme Court declined to review the lower court’s decision. Several justices
disagreed, and in his dissenting statement Justice Liu suggested that the Legislature should
address the issue, stating that California law on juvenile waivers is a half-century old and,
"predates by several decades the growing body of scientific research that the [U.S.
Supreme Court] has repeatedly found relevant in assessing differences in mental
capabilities between children and adults."
SB 395 (Lara), Chapter 681, requires that a youth 15 years of age or younger
consult with counsel prior to a custodial interrogation and before waiving any
specified rights. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that prior to a custodial interrogation and before the waiver of any Miranda
rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall consult with legal counsel in person,
by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.

•

Requires the court, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth 15 years
of age or younger made during or after a custodial interrogation, to consider the effect
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of failure to comply with the consultation with legal counsel requirement.
•

Specifies that the provisions of this law do not apply to the admissibility of statements
of a youth 15 years of age or younger if both of the following criteria are met:
o The officer who questioned the suspect reasonably believed the information
he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from an imminent
threat; and,
o The officer’s questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably
necessary to obtain this information.

•

States that a probation officer is not required to comply with the legal consultation
requirement when taking a minor into temporary custody, advising the minor of his or
her constitutional rights, or investigating the circumstances for which the minor was
taken into custody, as specified.

•

Requires the Governor to convene a panel of at least seven experts, including all of
the following:
o A representative of the California Public Defenders Association;
o A representative of the California District Attorneys Association;
o A representative of a statewide association representing law enforcement;
o A representative of the judiciary;
o A member of the public possessing expertise and experience in any or all of
the following:
▪

The juvenile delinquency or dependency systems;

▪

Child development or special needs children; and,

▪

The representation of children in juvenile court.

o A member of the public who, as a youth, was involved in the criminal justice
system; and,
o A criminologist with experience in interpreting crime data.
•

States that the panel shall be convened no later than January 1, 2023, and shall review
the implementation of the requirement that a youth 15 years of age or younger be
allowed to consult with an attorney prior to a custodial interrogation, and examine the
effects and outcomes of the above requirement, including, but not limited to the
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appropriate age at which youth should be allowed to consult with counsel.
•

Requires the panel to provide information to the legislature and the Governor by
April 1, 2024, including, but not limited to, relevant data on the effects and outcomes
associated with the requirement that youth 15 years of age or younger be allowed to
consult with an attorney prior to a custodial interrogation.

•

Establishes a sunset date of January 1, 2025.

Juveniles: Honorable Discharge
In 2010, most of the authority for the discharge of juveniles was transferred from Division of
Juvenile Facilities (DJF) to local juvenile courts (AB 1628 (Committee on Budget), Chapter 729,
Statutes of 2010). Local juvenile courts now release juveniles from the control of the county
probation department except in the limited instances where the DJF maintains this responsibility.
Either the juvenile court or DJF can find the juvenile eligible for honorable, general or
dishonorable discharge, depending on their behavior while incarcerated.
Prior to DJF realignment, DJF could find the juvenile eligible for an honorable discharge,
releasing the juvenile from any penalties and disabilities resulting from their conviction. Upon
DJF making an honorable discharge determination, courts were required to automatically release
the juvenile from the penalties and disabilities resulting from their conviction. After juvenile
justice realignment, the court found the statutory scheme was missing a mechanism for local
probation departments or the courts to make an honorable discharge finding, although the court
admitted this was likely an inadvertent error by the Legislature.
SB 625 (Atkins), Chapter 683, re-establishes a mechanism for honorable discharges for
persons discharged from DJF, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Authorizes the Board of Juvenile Hearings (BJH) to make honorable discharge
determinations and to grant an honorable discharge to a person discharged from DJF
who has proven the ability to desist from criminal behavior and to initiate a successful
transition into adulthood.

•

Establishes initial criteria for BJH to consider when making honorable discharge
determinations.

•

Directs BJH to establish regulations setting forth more specific criteria for the award
of an honorable discharge.

•

Authorizes DJF to retain jurisdiction over a ward discharged by BJH for the sole
purpose of making an honorable discharge determination.

•

Establishes the process by which a person would petition for an honorable discharge.
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•

Specifies some of the penalties or disabilities from which a person would be released
after receiving an honorable discharge.

•

States that an honorable discharge does not affect a person's duty to register as a sex
offender, as specified.

•

Directs DJF, upon granting a person an honorable discharge, to notify the committing
court and the Department of Justice.
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MENTAL HEALTH
Inmates: Psychiatric Medication
In California alone, over 100,000 people received mental health treatment in county jails in
2014-2015, according to the Department of Health Care Services. The department also
acknowledges that this number is likely underreported because contractors providing mental
health services in jails did not always report data to the state on services provided.
According to the National Association of Counties, 64 percent of the jail population nationwide
has a mental illness. A 2009 study found that 15 percent of male inmates and 31 percent of
female inmates are dealing with a severe mental illness.
Involuntary medication in jails can help reduce harm in extreme cases of danger to the inmate,
other inmates or staff, as well as treat an inmate’s grave disability. Existing law provides
procedures for involuntary medication which specifically apply to the portion of the county jail
population that has been sentenced, but county jails also house individuals who are detained in
jail while they face criminal charges.
AB 720 (Eggman), Chapter 347, applies the existing framework for involuntary medication
of a person in county jail after being sentenced on a criminal conviction, to other inmates in
county jail including those awaiting arraignment, trial, or sentencing, but limits the time
period for an involuntary medication order for county jail inmates awaiting arraignment, trial,
or sentencing to six months and provides a sunset date of January 1, 2022. Specifically, this
new law:
•

Defines “inmate” for purposes of this law as a person confined in the county jail,
including, but not limited to, a person sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail, a
person housed in a county jail during or awaiting trial proceedings, a person who has
been booked into a county jail and is awaiting arraignment, transfer, or release.

•

States that if a psychiatrist determines that an inmate should be treated with
psychiatric medication, but the inmate does not consent, the inmate may be
involuntarily treated with the medication if the inmate is a danger to self or others, or
is gravely disabled, and specified procedures involving a hearing and independent
review are followed.

•

States that an order for involuntary medication of an inmate who is awaiting
arraignment, trial, or sentencing, shall be valid for no more than 180 days.

•

States that a court may review, modify, or terminate an involuntary medication order
for an inmate awaiting trial, where there is a showing that the involuntary medication
is interfering with the inmate’s due process rights in the criminal proceeding.

80

•

Requires the jail to make a documented attempt to locate an available bed for the
inmate in a community-based treatment facility in lieu of seeking to administer
involuntary medication on a non-emergency basis.

•

Specifies that in the case of an inmate who is awaiting arraignment, trial, or
sentencing, the court shall review the order for involuntary medication at intervals of
not more than 60 days to determine whether the grounds for the order remain.

•

Clarifies that this law does not prohibit the court from suspending the criminal
prosecution until the court determines that the involuntarily medicating the defendant
will not interfere with his or her ability to meaningfully participate in the criminal
proceedings.

•

Establishes a sunset date of January 1, 2022.

Arrests: Mental Health Evaluations
Under existing law, law enforcement may lack the legal authority to transport an individual
suffering from an acute mental health crisis to a mental health Urgent Care Center (UCC) in lieu
of arrest, absent the individual’s consent for treatment. UCCs can serve as an alternative to
county jail where persons suffering from mental health crisis can receive the help they need.
SB 238 (Hertzberg), Chapter 566, authorizes release of an arrested person who is
delivered to a specified facility for the purpose of mental health evaluation and treatment.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Authorizes a peace officer to release an arrested person from custody without taking
him or her before a judge if the person is delivered, after arrest, to a hospital or urgent
care facility for the purpose of mental health evaluation and treatment, and no further
criminal proceedings are desirable. Specifies that such an arrest shall not be deemed
an arrest, but a detention only.

•

Requires a person arrested and released pursuant to this provision to be issued a
certificate describing the action as a detention.

Incompetence to Stand Trial: Conservatorship
Currently mentally ill defendants who cannot be restored to competency, and who do not qualify
for conservatorships, are released from competency restoration programs. Under existing law, a
conservatorship is allowed in circumstances where an information (post preliminary hearing) or
indictment (post grand jury) is pending against the defendant containing specified criminal
charges, and the defendant was not returned to competency within the requisite time frame.
Under existing law, a conservatorship is not allowed if defendant is facing a complaint
(preliminary hearing has not yet been conducted).
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SB 684 (Bates), Chapter 246, allows the initiation of a conservatorship for involuntary
commitment when a criminal defendant is charged with specified felonies and the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Specifically, this new law:
•

Expands existing law to allows a conservatorship to be established when a defendant
has been found incompetent to stand trial, if the defendant has been charged by
complaint, if the following conditions are met:
o The complaint charges a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a
serious threat to the physical well-being of another person;
o A judge has made a finding of probable cause the defendant has committed
the list of felonies, specified above, and the complaint has not been dismissed;
o As a result of a mental health disorder, the defendant is unable to understand
the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him or her and to
assist counsel in the conduct of his or her defense in a rational manner;
o The defendant has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial; and
o The person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by
reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.

•

Establishes a procedure, to be approved by the court, for a prosecuting attorney, at
any time before or after a defendant is determined incompetent to stand trial, to
request a determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the
offense or offenses alleged in the complaint, solely for the purpose of meeting the
criteria for gravely disabled to be eligible for a conservatorship.

Grants the defendant a preliminary hearing after restoration of competency. Allows for the
initiation of a conservatorship upon a criminal complaint if there has been a finding of probable
cause on the complaint.
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PEACE OFFICERS
Public Officers
Historically, the Chief of Police at The Port of Los Angeles has assumed the authority of being
able to deputize port security officers. Security officers at The Port of Los Angeles and other
ports around the state should be reasonably able to protect themselves with batons in the event of
criminal activity. Currently, because port security officers operate independently of the local
sheriff or police department, they need this authority to be explicitly referenced in statute.
AB 585 (Gipson), Chapter 107, clarifies that a police-security officer, includes an
officer employed by a chief of a police division that is within a city department that
operates independently of the city police department.
Firearms: Peace Officer Standards and Training Courses
Existing law generally requires that a firearms transaction be conducted through a licensed
firearms dealer and prohibits the transfer unless the person has been issued a firearms license.
The Safety for All Act of 2016, approved by voters as Proposition 63 at the November 8, 2016,
statewide general election, generally prohibits the possession of large capacity magazines
regardless of the date the magazine was required.
Sworn peace officers are exempt from the above provisions, however individuals who are
enrolled in a training program to become sworn peace officers (cadets) are not necessarily
exempt. This is problematic because it does not allow cadets to receive adequate training.
Currently, cadets lawfully may not train with large-capacity magazines and other firearms that
they may be expected to use as officers.
AB 693 (Irwin), Chapter 783, exempts persons enrolled in the course of basic training
prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) from
specified prohibitions related to firearms, ammunition, and large-capacity magazines, and
exempts an instructor of the course, or a POST staff member from the ammunition
purchase requirements relating to the purchase of ammunition through a licensed
ammunition vendor.
Grand Juries: Peace Officers
To help make judicial proceedings more transparent and accountable, SB 227 (Mitchell) Chapter
175, Statutes of 2015, prohibited a grand jury inquiry into an offense that involves a shooting or
use of excessive force by a peace officer resulting in the death of a person being detained or
arrested by the peace officer. (See Pen. Code, § 917.) Earlier this year, however, the Third
District Court of Appeal found this law unconstitutional. (People v. ex rel. Pierson v. Superior
Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 402.) In so holding, the court noted: “The Legislature is not
powerless to remedy the problem it has identified. It may submit a constitutional amendment to
83

the electorate to remove the grand jury’s power to indict in cases involving a peace officer’s use
of lethal force. It could also take the less cumbersome route of simply reforming the procedural
rules of secrecy in such cases, which are not themselves constitutionally derived or necessary to
the grand jury's functioning…. (Id. at p. 414, emphasis added.)
AB 1024 is in line with the Court of Appeal’s suggested remedy of “reform[ing] the procedural
rules of secrecy in such cases.” (People v. ex rel. Pierson v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th
at p. 414.) Existing law provides for the transcript of a grand jury proceeding to be made public
only if there is an indictment. (Pen. Code, § 938, subds. (a) & (b).) There is no comparable
requirement under existing law when the grand jury does not return an indictment.
AB 1024 (Kiley), Chapter 204, requires a court to disclose all or a part of an indictment
proceeding transcript, excluding the grand jury’s private deliberations and voting, when
the grand jury decides not to return an indictment for an offense that involves a peace
officer shooting or use of excessive force that results in the death of a detainee or
arrestee. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires the court that impaneled a grand jury to disclose all or a part of the
indictment proceeding, excluding the grand jury’s private deliberations and voting, to
a party who moves for disclosure, under the following circumstances:
o The grand jury inquiries into a peace officer-involved shooting or use of
excessive force that resulted in the death of a person being detained or
arrested by the peace officer;
o The grand jury decides not to return an indictment;
o The district attorney, a legal representative of the deceased person, or a legal
representative of the news media or public applies for disclosure of the
indictment proceeding;
o The district attorney and the affected witness involved are given notice and an
opportunity to be heard; and,

Unless, following an in camera hearing, the court expressly finds that there exists an overriding
interest that outweighs the right of public access to the record, the overriding interest supports
sealing the record, a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if
the record is not sealed, the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored, and no less restrictive means
exist to achieve the overriding interest.
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers
As California and the rest of the nation enter into a new reality of aggressive and, at times,
deceitful actions undertaken to enforce immigration actions, California must take any and all
necessary actions to disassociate the actions of federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and Border Protection officers with those of licensed state and local peace officers.
AB 1440 (Kalra), Chapter 116, clarifies that United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Border Protection officers are not California peace officers.
First Degree Murder: Peace Officers
Under current law, an unlawful killing (a killing without legal justification or excuse) of a peace
officer that is willful, deliberate, and premeditated is first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187189, 195-196.)
AB 1459 (Quirk-Silva), Chapter 214, restates existing law regarding first degree
murder of a peace officer for purposes of the gravity of the offense and support of the
survivors. Specifically, this new law:
•

Declares the finding of the Legislature that all unlawful killings that are willful,
deliberate, and premediated and in which the victim was a peace officer, as defined in
statute, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace
officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, are considered first degree
murder for purposes of the gravity of the offense and the support of survivors.

•

States that this provision is declarative of existing law.

•

Makes uncodified legislative findings and declarations.

Law Enforcement: Racial Profiling
AB 953 (Weber), Chapter 466, Statutes of 2015, established the Racial Identity and Profiling Act
(RIPA) which required local law enforcement agencies to report specified information on stops
conducted by peace officers to the Attorney General's Office, and established the RIPA Advisory
Board.
AB 1518 (Weber), Chapter 328, delays for one year until January 1, 2018 the collection
of data and the implementation of regulations related to RIPA.
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Law Enforcement: Data Sharing
On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed a pair of executive orders on immigration. The
orders direct stepped up immigration enforcement on people in the country without
documentation and the cities that don’t readily hand them over for deportation.
A study by the University of Illinois – Chicago surveyed Latino immigrants in Cook (Chicago),
Harris (Houston), Los Angeles, and Maricopa (Phoenix) counties on their perception of local law
enforcement when there’s involvement in immigration enforcement. The study found that
Latinos are less likely to contact police officers if they have been the victim of a crime because
they fear that police officers will use this interaction as an opportunity to inquire into their
immigration status or that of people they know. Latinos are also less likely to voluntarily offer
information about crimes, and are less likely to report a crime because they are afraid the police
will ask them or people they know about their immigration status;
SB 54 (De Leon), Chapter 495, limits the involvement of state and local law
enforcement agencies in federal immigration enforcement. Specifically, the new law:
•

States that law enforcement agencies shall not do any of the following:
o Use agency or department money or personnel to investigate, interrogate,
detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes.
o Place peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employ
peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal
deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement.
o Use immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters
relating to individuals in agency or department custody.
o Transfer an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a
judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or if the
individual meets specified criteria regarding their past offenses.
o Provide office space exclusive dedicated for immigration authorities for
use within a law enforcement facility.
o Contract with the federal government for the use of California law
enforcement agency facilities to house federal detainees, except as
specified by existing law.

Custodial Officers: Less Lethal Force
While Penal Code Section 831 gives local law enforcement agencies the authority to employ
custodial officers, who generally work at the jail and provide inmate custodial services, the law
precludes these officers from possessing firearms in the course of their duties.
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Some sheriff offices would like to deploy certain officers in custodial facilities with the
appropriate tools to address specific situations. For example, a jail may have an emergency
response team that responds to critical incidents and emergency situations. A sheriff may wish
to deploy this team with less lethal weapons that fire plastic, rubber, or other less lethal
projectiles, but these weapons are technically firearms, and may not be used by custodial officers
as defined in Penal Code Section 831.
SB 324 (Roth), Chapter 73, authorizes a custodial officer to use a firearm that is a "less
lethal weapon" in the official performance of his or her duty, at the discretion of the
sheriff or chief of police or his or her designee, if the custodial officer is trained in its use
and complies with the policy of on the use of less lethal force as set forth by the sheriff or
chief of police.
Securing Handguns: Vehicles
Under existing law, every person that leaves a handgun in a vehicle must lock the handgun in a
locked container and place the container out of plain view, or lock the handgun in a locked
container that is permanently affixed to the vehicle's interior and not in plain view.
SB 497 (Portantino), Chapter 809, allows a peace officer when leaving a handgun in an
unattended vehicle to lock the handgun in the center console, as specified. Specifically, this
new law:
•

Provides that a peace officer, when leaving a handgun in an unattended vehicle not
equipped with a trunk, may lock the handgun out of plain view within the center utility
console of that motor vehicle with a padlock, keylock, combination lock, or other similar
locking device.

•

Defines "peace officer" to mean “a sworn California peace officer or a sworn federal law
enforcement officer, who is authorized to carry a firearm in the course and scope of that
officer's duties, while that officer is on duty or off duty.”

•

Defines "trunk" to mean “the fully enclosed and locked main storage or luggage
compartment of a vehicle that is not accessible from the passenger compartment. A trunk
does not include the rear of a hatchback, station wagon, or sport utility vehicle, any
compartment that has a window, or a toolbox or utility box attached to the bed of a
pickup truck.”

•

Defines "plain view" to include “any area of a vehicle that is visible by peering through
the windows of the vehicle, including windows that are tinted, or without illumination.
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RESTITUTION
Non-Economic Losses: Child Sexual Abuse
Under current law, a defendant may be ordered to pay restitution for non-economic losses for
psychological harm caused, for violations of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14, Penal
Code section 288. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).)
Since the restitution statute specifically lists only Penal Code section 288 in reference to
noneconomic losses, there is a split of authority as to whether the victim of a crime of continuous
sexual abuse of a child, section 288.5, is also entitled to restitution for non-economic losses.
Several appellate courts have held that permitting noneconomic restitution for convictions under
section 288 but not for convictions under section 288.5 would lead to an absurd result. (See
People v. McCarthy (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1096; People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
795, and People v. Martinez (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 298.) It makes little sense for a child under
the age of 14 but older than 10 years of age to be awarded non-economic damages when they are
the victim of child sexual assault, but not to award non-economic damages to a child aged 10 or
younger who is the victim of the same conduct. Nor does it make sense to award non-economic
damages to a child who is the victim of two sexual assaults but not if they are victimized three or
more times. The pertinent restitution statute must be amended to include the overlooked crimes.
SB 756 (Stern), Chapter 101, authorizes non-economic restitution in cases where a
person is convicted of continuous sexual child abuse or sexual acts with a child 10 years
of age or younger. Specifically, this new law: Adds the crimes of continuous sexual
abuse of a child and sexual acts with a child 10 years of age or younger to the statute
authorizing non-economic restitution for lewd and lascivious acts against a child under
the age of 14.
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SEARCH WARRANTS
Search Warrants: Misdemeanor Disorderly Conduct/Invasion of Privacy
In Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S.
[134 S.Ct. 2473], the United States Supreme Court
held that law enforcement officers generally must secure a warrant before searching digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. (Id. at p. 2495.)
The Legislature subsequently enacted the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(CalECPA). CalECPA is a comprehensive digital privacy law which took effect on January 1,
2016 (§ 1546 et seq.). It “limits the ability of California law enforcement to obtain information
directly from a smartphone or similar device, or to track them. Law enforcement must either
obtain a warrant or get the consent of the person possessing the electronic device.” (Daniels,
California Updates Privacy Rights with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2015).)
Current law enumerates limited circumstances authorizing a search warrant for evidence that
tends to show a violation of a misdemeanor crime. For example, under current law, a search
warrant can be issued on the grounds that property is possessed with the intent to use it as a
means of committing a public offense. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. (a)(3).) Arguably, under this
provision, it may be difficult to obtain digital evidence of misdemeanor crimes that have already
been committed with the use of an electronic device unless there is also probable cause to believe
that the device is possessed with the intent to use it to commit a public offense in the future.
AB 539 (Acosta), Chapter 342, expands the grounds for issuance of a search warrant to
include evidence of a misdemeanor violation of disorderly conduct involving invasion of
privacy, as specified. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a search warrant may be issued when the property or things to be seized
consists of evidence that tends to show a violation of any of the following disorderly
conduct laws occurred or is occurring:
o Actions involving the use of any instrumentality to view the interior of
specified rooms, in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of individuals inside;
o Use of specified devices to videotape, film, photograph, or record by
electronic means an identifiable person either under or through their clothing,
for purposes of viewing the body or undergarments, without the consent or
knowledge of that other person, with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify
the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of
that other person, under circumstances in which the other person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy; or
o Use of specified devices to videotape, film, photograph, or record by
electronic means an identifiable person in a state of full or partial undress, for
the purpose of viewing the body or undergarments, without the consent or
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knowledge of that other person, in the interior of specified rooms in which
that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to
invade the privacy of that other person.
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SEX OFFENSES
Sex Assault Evidence: Reporting
A recent report by the California State Auditor found that law enforcement agencies rarely
document reasons for not analyzing sexual assault evidence kits. Specifically, the report found
that "[i]n 45 cases . . . reviewed in which investigators at the three agencies we visited did not
request a kit analysis, the investigators rarely documented their decisions. As a result, we often
could not determine with certainty why investigators decided that kit analysis was not needed.
Upon a more in-depth review of the individual cases, the report found that analysis of the kits
would not have been likely to further the investigation of those cases. Even though the individual
reasons for not testing the kits was found to be reasonable, the report still stressed the need for
more information about why agencies decide to send some kits but not others. It would benefit
not only investigators, but the public as well, because requiring investigators to document their
reasons for not requesting kit analysis would assist agencies in responding to the public concern
about unanalyzed kits. Doing so would allow for internal review and would increase
accountability to the public.
AB 41 (Chiu), Chapter 694, requires local law enforcement agencies to periodically
update the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Tracking (SAFE-T) database on the
disposition of all sexual assault evidence kits in their custody. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires law enforcement agencies to report information regarding rape kit evidence,
within 120 days of the collection of the kit, to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
through a database established by the DOJ. Specifies that information shall include,
among other things:
o The number of kits collected;
o If biological evidence samples were submitted to a DNA laboratory for
analysis; and if a probative DNA profile was generated; and,
o If evidence was not submitted to a DNA laboratory for processing, the reason
or reasons for not submitting evidence from the kit to a DNA laboratory for
processing.

•

Requires a public DNA laboratory, or a law enforcement agency contracting with a
private laboratory, to provide a reason for not testing a sample every 120 days the
sample is untested, except as specified.

•

Provides that upon expiration of a sexual assault case's statute of limitations, or if a
law enforcement agency elects not to analyze the DNA or intends to destroy or
dispose of the crime scene evidence pursuant to existing law, the agency shall state in
writing the reason the kit collected as part of the case's investigation was not
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analyzed.
•

Imposes these requirements for kits collected on or after January 1, 2018.

•

Requires that the DOJ file a report to the Legislature on an annual basis summarizing
the information in its database.

•

Prohibits law enforcement agencies or laboratories from being compelled to provide
any contents of the database in a civil or criminal case, except as required by a law
enforcement agency's duty to produce exculpatory evidence to a defendant in a
criminal case.

•

Provides that money to pay for this bill should first come from funds received from
the federal Office on Violence Against Women before appropriating money from the
general fund.

Sex Offenders: Placement on Parole
Under existing law, an inmate who is released on parole shall not be returned to a location within
35 miles of the actual residence of a victim of, or a witness to, specified violent felonies or a
felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, if the victim or witness
has requested additional distance in the placement of the inmate on parole, and if Board of Parole
Hearings (BPH) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) finds
that there is a need to protect the life, safety, or well-being of a victim or witness.
AB 335 (Kiley), Chapter 523, expand the list of specified crimes which allows a victim
or witness to request that an inmate to be released on parole not be returned to a location
within 35 miles of the residence of the victim or witness if the BPH or the CDCR finds
that the placement is necessary to protect the victim or witness. Specifically this new
law:
•

Adds to the list of offenses where a victim or witness may request that an inmate may
not be returned to a location within 35 miles of the residence of the victim or witness
the following offenses:
o Sexual penetration by force or violence;
o Sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14 where the perpetrator is more
than 10 years older than the child;
o Rape of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a mental
disorder or physical disability;
o Rape where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic
substance, or any controlled substance;
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o Rape of an unconscious person;
o Sodomy of an unconscious person;
o Sodomy of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a mental
disorder or physical disability;
o Sodomy where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance;
o Oral copulation of an unconscious person;
o Oral copulation of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a
mental disorder or physical disability;
o Oral copulation where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance;
o Sexual penetration of an unconscious person; and,
o Sexual penetration where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating
or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance.
Consolidated Sex Offenses: Jurisdiction
The Legislature has created several exceptions to the rule that the territorial jurisdiction
of the case is where the offense occurred. Under existing law, these exceptions include
specified sex offenses occurring in different counties. If all the district attorneys in the
counties with jurisdiction agree, the offenses may be consolidated into a single trial. This
protects repeat victims from the need to make multiple court appearances to testify
against the same offender.
Because the sex offenses currently excepted are of the same class, the court has held they may be
properly joined. (People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1113.) Under existing law, this
exception does not include specified sex offenses with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen.
Code, § 288.7). Arguably, these offenses belong to the same class of sex offenses currently
excepted from the general venue rule.
AB 368 (Muratsuchi), Chapter 379, permits the consolidation of specified sex offenses
with a child 10 years of age or younger occurring in different counties into a single trial if
all district attorneys in the counties with jurisdiction agree. Specifically, this new law
adds the offenses of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration
with a child 10 years or younger to the list of specified sex offenses exempt from the rule
that the territorial jurisdiction of the case is where the offense occurred.
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Sex Offenses: Registration
Under existing law, most rape offenses require registration as a sex offender. However,
registration is not required for the offenses of rape by fraud and rape by authority of a public
official. These are similar to the offenses for which registration is already required.
AB 484 (Cunningham), Chapter 526, adds rape by fraud and rape by authority of a
public official to the list of offenses that requires registration as a sex offender.
Child Victims: Conditional Examinations
Children who are victims of sexual crimes may be ordered to testify in criminal cases against
their accuser. In taking testimony from a child, the court must take special care to protect the
child from harassment, embarrassment, or further trauma. Children are asked to be able to recall
events accurately, understand the difference between truth and lies, and understand the
importance of testifying truthfully. More psychological harm can be done to a child when the
child is required to testify in a room full of strangers and to recall traumatic events.
AB 993 (Baker), Chapter 320, authorizes the prosecution to apply for an order that the
victims at the preliminary hearing be video recorded and the video recording be
preserved when the defendant is charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child under
the age of 14 years of age, or charged with oral copulation, sexual penetration, rape or
sodomy of a child under 10 years of age.
Prostitution Offenses: Vehicle Impoundment
In 1993, Vehicle Code Section 22659.5 established a five-year pilot program which allowed a
local government to declare a vehicle used in the commission of a prostitution offense to be
declared a public nuisance if there was a criminal conviction for the conduct. AB 1332 (Gotch),
Chapter 485, Statutes of 1993, declared legislative intent as follows:
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares that under the Red Light Abatement Law every
building or place used for, among other unlawful purposes, prostitution is a nuisance which shall
be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered. It is recognized
that in many instances vehicles are used in the commission of acts of prostitution and that if
these vehicles were subject to the same procedures currently applicable to buildings and places,
the commission of prostitution in vehicles would be vastly curtailed. The Legislature, therefore,
intends to enact a five-year pilot program in order to ascertain whether declaring motor vehicles
a public nuisance when used in the commission of acts of prostitution would have a substantial
effect upon the reduction of prostitution in neighborhoods, thereby serving the local business
owners and citizens of our urban communities."
AB 14 (Fuentes), Chapter 210, Statutes of 2009, authorized a city or county to adopt an
ordinance declaring a vehicle to be a nuisance subject to an impoundment period of up to 30
days when the vehicle is involved in the commission of specified crimes related to prostitution, if
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the owner or operator of the vehicle had a prior conviction for the same offense within the past
three years.
AB 1206 (Bocanegra), Chapter 531, authorizes a two-year pilot program in the cities of
Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento to permit law enforcement to tow vehicles used
in the commission, or attempted commission of specified offenses related to prostitution,
without the requirement of a prior conviction with the past three years. Specifically, this
new law:
•

Authorizes the cities of Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento to conduct a 24month pilot program in which law enforcement may tow a vehicle, upon first-time
arrest if it is used in the commission, or attempted commission, of pimping,
pandering, or solicitation of prostitution.

•

Requires the city, if it elects to implement the pilot program, to take specified actions,
including, among others, offering a diversion program to prostitutes cited or arrested
in the course of the pilot program.

•

Authorizes impoundment only if the arrestee is the sole owner of the vehicle.

•

Requires that at the time of the arrest, that the person be notified that his or her
vehicle will be towed and given information on how the vehicle may be retrieved.

•

Allows the registered owner or his or her agent to retrieve the vehicle at any time.

•

Specifies that the registered owner or his or her agent is responsible for all towing and
storage fees related to the seizure of a vehicle.

•

Repeals these provisions on January 1, 2022.

Sexual Assault Victims: Rights
California established the Sexual Assault Victims' Bill of Rights in 2003. In passing that
law, the Legislature found and declared that "[l]aw enforcement agencies have an obligation
to victims of sexual assaults in the proper handling, retention and timely DNA testing of
rape kit evidence or other crime scene evidence and to be responsive to victims concerning
the developments of forensic testing and the investigation of their cases." Upon the request
of the victim, law enforcement agencies investigating the sexual assault may inform the
victim of the status of the DNA testing. Specifically, the California DNA Bill of Rights
provides that subject to sufficient resources to respond to requests, victims have a right to be
informed whether or not the assailant's DNA profile was developed from the rape kit
evidence, whether or not that profile was uploaded to the DNA database and whether or not
a hit resulted from the upload.
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AB 1312 (Gonzalez-Fletcher), Chapter 692, requires law enforcement and medical
professionals to provide victims of sexual assault with written notification of their rights
and provides additional rights to victims of sexual assault. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a law enforcement agency shall not destroy or dispose of rape kit
evidence or other crime scene evidence from an unsolved sexual assault case before at
least 20 years, or if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged
offense, before the victim's 40th birthday.

•

Specifies that if law enforcement intends to dispose of a rape kit evidence from an
unsolved sexual assault case, a victim of specified sexual assault crimes must be given
written notice at least 60 days prior to the disposal.

•

States that where there is an offense of domestic violence, as specified, or sexual
assault, as specified, law enforcement shall immediately provide the victim of the
crime a written card containing victims' rights and resources, as appropriate for
domestic violence or sexual assault.

•

States that prior to any initial medical evidentiary or physical examination arising out
of a sexual assault, the medical provider shall provide written card containing victims'
rights and resources for victims of sexual assault, as specified.

•

Specifies that the medical provider is only required to provide the specified
information card to a victim if law enforcement has provided the card to the medical
provider in a language understood by the victim.

•

States that after conducting the medical evidentiary or physical examination, the
medical provider shall give the victim the opportunity to shower or bathe at no cost to
the victim, unless a showering or bathing facility is not available.

•

Specifies that a sexual assault victim retains the right to have a victim advocates and a
support person present at any interview by law enforcement authorities, district
attorneys, or defense attorneys regardless of whether he or she has waived the right in
a previous medical evidentiary or physical examination or in a previous interview by
law enforcement authorities, district attorneys, or defense attorneys.
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Sex Offenders: Registration
In its 2014 report, the California Sex Offender Management Board (CASOMB) noted there were
nearly 100,000 registrants in California, as a result of California’s “universal lifetime”
registration for persons convicted of most sex offenses. “California is among only four states
which require lifetime registration for every convicted sex offender, no matter the nature of the
crime or the level of risk for reoffending.” (CASOMB, A Better Path to Community Safety – Sex
Offender Registration in California, “Tiering Background Paper” (2014) p. 3.)
According to the CASOMB: “Effective policy must be based on the scientific evidence.
Research on sex offender risk and recidivism now has created a body of evidence which offers
little justification for continuing the current registration system since it does not effectively serve
public safety interests.” (Tiering Background Paper, supra, at p. 4.) The CASOMB also noted
the unintended consequences of lifetime registration. “These consequences include serious
obstacles to finding appropriate housing – or any housing; obstacles to finding employment;
obstacles to developing positive support systems; obstacles to developing close relationships;
and obstacles to reintegrating successfully into communities.” (Ibid.)
The report proposed a new registration system that would take into account several
considerations, including introducing a tiered system of registration so that the length and level
of registration matches the risk level of the offender. (Tiering Background Paper, supra, at p. 7.)
SB 384 (Wiener), Chapter 541, effective January 1, 2021, recasts the California sex
offender registry into a three-tiered registration system for periods of 10 years, 20 years,
or life for a conviction in adult court of specified sex offenses, and five years or 10 years
for an adjudication as a ward of the juvenile court for specified sex offenses.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a person convicted of the most serious sex offenses or whose risk level
is well above average at the time of release is required to register for life (tier three)
under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act).

•

Provides that unless person is subject to registration under tier three, a person
convicted of a serious or violent or other specified felony sex offense must register
for a minimum of 20 years (tier two) under the Act.

•

Provides that unless a person is subject to registration under tier two or tier three, a
person convicted of a misdemeanor or non-violent, non-serious sex offense must
register for a minimum of 10 years (tier one) under the Act.

•

Provides that a person adjudicated as a juvenile of a non-serious, non-violent sex
offense must register for a minimum of five years (tier one) under the Act.

•

Provides that a person adjudicated as a juvenile of a serious or violent felony sex
offense must register for a minimum of ten years (tier two) under the Act.
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•

Provides that out of state registrants, with an offense equivalent to a California
registerable offense, will be placed in the corresponding tier to that offense. If there is
no equivalent California offense, the person will be placed in tier two, except as
specified.

•

Allows DOJ to place a person required to register under the Act in a tier-to-bedetermined category for up to 24 months if his or her appropriate tier designation
cannot be immediately ascertained.

•

Provides that a person ordered to register for an offense committed out of sexual
compulsion or gratification, shall register as a tier one offender for a period of ten
years unless the court states on the record reasons for requiring tier two or tier three
registration.

•

Provides the list of factors that the court must consider in determining whether to
require tier two or tier three registration for an offense committed out of sexual
compulsion or gratification, including: nature of the registerable offense: age and
number of victims; whether the victim was a stranger; criminal and relevant
noncriminal behavior; whether the person has previously been arrested or convicted
of a sexually motivated offense; and the person’s current risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s static, dynamic, and violence risk levels.

•

Provides that effective January 1, 2022, registrants of specified sex offenses and tier
three registrants, excluding juvenile offenders, will be posted on a public Web site
with full address. All other tier two registrants and those convicted of committing or
attempting to commit annoying or molesting a minor, excluding juvenile offenders,
will be posted on the public Web site with the ZIP Code for the registered address
displayed.

•

Provides that information disseminated to the public regarding a registered sex
offender should also include the person’s current risk of sexual or violent re-offense,
including but not limited to their static dynamic violence risk levels on the
SARATSO risk tools.

•

Deletes current provisions allowing people required to register under the Act for
misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child, felony sexual battery by restraint, or
specified child pornography offenses to petition for exclusion from the Web site.

•

Retains the current ability for specified registrants who received probation for an
offense against a family member to apply for exclusion from the Web site.

•

Provides that persons who no longer qualify for exclusion shall receive 30 days notice
from DOJ before being re-posted on the public Web site.
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•

Sets forth a procedure, effective July 1, 2021, for a registrant who is either in tier one
or tier two to petition to be removed from the sex offender registry following the
expiration of his or her minimum registration period.

•

Sets forth a process, effective July 1, 2021, for a person who is tier two to petition for
termination from the registry after 10 years under specified circumstances.

•

Sets forth a process, effective July 1, 2021, for a person who is tier three based only
on their risk assessment level to petition for termination from the registry after 20
years under specified circumstances.

•

Requires the court, in ruling on a petition for early termination of tier two or tier three
registration to determine whether community safety would be significantly enhanced
by requiring continued registration.

•

Specifies that a certificate of rehabilitation issued on or after July 1, 2021, does not
relieve a person of the obligation to register under the Act unless the person is granted
relief under the petition process for removal from the registry.
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SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
Sexually Violent Predators: County Placement
Under existing law, a person who has been judicially determined to be a sexually violent
predator (SVP) who has successfully completed treatment, and is to be conditionally released,
shall be released in the county of domicile unless both of the following conditions are met: (1)
The court finds that extraordinary circumstances require placement outside the county of
residence; and, (2) The designated county of placement was given prior notice and an
opportunity to comment on the proposed placement in the county.
AB 255 (Gallagher), Chapter 39, provides that when designating the county of
placement for an SVP, who is to be conditionally released, the courts must consider
connections to the community, Specifically, if and how long the person has previously
resided or been employed in the county, and if the person has next of kin in the county.
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SUPERVISED RELEASE
Sex Offender Parole: Placement at Release
Under existing law, an inmate who is released on parole shall not be returned to a location within
35 miles of the actual residence of a victim of, or a witness to, specified violent felonies or a
felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person, if the victim or witness
has requested additional distance in the placement of the inmate on parole, and if Board of Parole
Hearings (BPH) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) finds
that there is a need to protect the life, safety, or well-being of a victim or witness.
AB 335 (Kiley), Chapter 523, expand the list of specified crimes which allows a victim
or witness to request that an inmate to be released on parole not be returned to a location
within 35 miles of the residence of the victim or witness if the BPH or the CDCR finds
that the placement is necessary to protect the victim or witness. Specifically this new
law:
•

Adds to the list of offenses where a victim or witness may request that an inmate may
not be returned to a location within 35 miles of the residence of the victim or witness
the following offenses:
o Sexual penetration by force or violence;
o Sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14 where the perpetrator is more
than 10 years older than the child;
o Rape of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a mental
disorder or physical disability;
o Rape where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic
substance, or any controlled substance;
o Rape of an unconscious person;
o Sodomy of an unconscious person;
o Sodomy of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a mental
disorder or physical disability;
o Sodomy where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance;
o Oral copulation of an unconscious person;
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o Oral copulation of a person that is incapable of giving consent because of a
mental disorder or physical disability;
o Oral copulation where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance;
o Sexual penetration of an unconscious person; and,
o Sexual penetration where a person is incapable of resisting by any intoxicating
or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance.
Parole: Youth Offender Parole Hearings
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth
who did not commit homicide to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 540 U.S. 48 [130 S.Ct. 2011] (Graham).) In Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller), the Court further decided that mandatory LWOP
sentences for minors under age 18 at the time of a homicide violate the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. In People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero), the
California Supreme Court ruled that sentencing a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense to
a term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life
expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court in Caballero advised that defendants who were sentenced for crimes they committed
as juveniles could seek to modify life without parole or equivalent de facto sentences already
imposed by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. (People v. Caballero,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 269.) The Court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole eligibility
mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto life term for crimes committed as a juvenile.
SB 260 (Hancock), Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013, established a parole process for inmates who
were sentenced to lengthy prison terms for crimes committed when they were under the age of
18. (Pen. Code, § 3051.) SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471, Statutes of 2015, expanded those
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing to those whose committing offense occurred before
they reached the age of 23. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
However, research shows that cognitive brain development continues into the early 20s or later.
The parts of the brain that are still developing during this process affect judgment and decisionmaking, and are highly relevant to criminal behavior and culpability. (See Johnson, et al.,
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in
Adolescent Health Policy, Journal of Adolescent Health (Sept. 2009); National Institute of
Mental Health, The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction (2011).) “The development and
maturation of the prefrontal cortex occurs primarily during adolescence and is fully
accomplished at the age of 25 years. The development of the prefrontal cortex is very important
for complex behavioral performance, as this region of the brain helps accomplish executive brain
functions.” (Arain, et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain (2013).)
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AB 1308 (Stone), Chapter 675, expands the youth offender parole process, a parole
process for persons sentenced to lengthy prison terms for crimes committed before
attaining 23 years of age, to include those who committed their crimes when they were 25
years of age or younger. Specifically, this new law:
•

Expands those eligible for a youthful parole hearing to those whose committing
offense occurred when they were 25 years of age or younger.

•

Excludes from the youthful offender parole provisions an individual to whom this
section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to attaining 26 years of age,
commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of
the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.

•

Requires the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) to complete, by January 1, 2020, all
youth offender parole hearings for individuals who were sentenced to indeterminate
life terms who become entitled to have their parole suitability considered at a youth
offender parole hearing on the effective date of this law.

•

Requires BPH to complete all youth offender parole hearings for individuals who
were sentenced to determinate terms who become entitled to have their parole
suitability considered at a youth offender parole hearing on the effective date of this
law by January 1, 2022, and requires BPH, for these individuals, to conduct a
specified consultation before January 1, 2019.

Voting Rights: Inmates and Formerly Incarcerated
Civic participation can be a critical aspect of re-entry and has been linked to reducing recidivism.
However, many in California’s criminal justice system are not accurately apprised of their voting
rights and correct voting information is not readily accessible. To add to this confusion, almost
every state handles voting rights for incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals
differently. This results in many individuals being deprived of their fundamental rights to vote
on issues and candidates that directly impact their lives.
AB 1344 (Weber), Chapter 796, requires the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) and county probation departments to provide specified voting
rights information to persons under their jurisdiction upon request of such person.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires CDCR to do all of the following for each parolee under the jurisdiction of
the department upon the completion of his or her parole:
o Establish and maintain on the departments Internet Web site a hyperlink to the
Internet Web site at which information provided by the Secretary of State
regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history may be found;
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o Post in each parole office a notice that contains the Internet Web site address
at which information provided by the Secretary of State regarding voting
rights for persons with a criminal history may be found; and,
o Upon request of the parolee, advise the parolee of information provided by the
Secretary of State regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history.
•

Mandates each county probation department to do all of the following for each person
under the department's jurisdiction:
o Establish and maintain on the departments Internet Web site a hyperlink to the
Internet Web site at which information provided by the Secretary of State
regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal history may be found;
o Post in each parole office a notice that contains the Internet Web site address
at which information provided by the Secretary of State regarding voting
rights for persons with a criminal history may be found; and,
o Upon request of a probationer, advise the probationer of information provided
by the Secretary of State regarding voting rights for persons with a criminal
history, who are under the department's supervision.

Elderly Parole Program
The number of elderly prisoners in California state prisons will continue to increase
exponentially if measures are not implemented and codified to ensure parole hearings.
According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), as of
February 2017, there were over 31,000 inmates 50 years of age or older.
Costs associated with geriatric medical needs begin to accumulate at 50 years of age, given that
there is an overwhelming consensus that the age of 50 constitutes a point when prisoners are
considered elderly. In 2010, the LAO estimated from other state projections that incarcerating
elderly offenders costs two to three times more than for the general prison population. In 2010,
the average cost of incarcerating an inmate was approximately $51,000.
There is a lower risk of recidivism among elderly prisoners, according to CDCR statistics. In
2015, CDCR reported that only 31.1 percent of persons who were 60 years of age and older,
returned to prison after three years from being released from prison compared to the state
average of 44.6 percent for all formerly incarcerated individuals. Recidivism rates for persons 50
to 54, inclusive, years of age and 55 to 59, inclusive, years of age after one year from being
released from prison were 39.4 and 34.6 percent, respectively.
AB 1448 (Weber), Chapter 676, codifies the Elderly Parole Program, to be administered
by the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH). Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires a prisoner to be considered for parole under the Elderly Parole Program if he
or she meets both of the following conditions:
104

o The prisoner is 60 years of age or older; and,
o The prisoner has served a minimum of 25 years of continued incarceration on
his or her current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate
sentence.
•

Provides that when considering the release of a prisoner by the panel or board sitting
en banc, the board shall give special consideration to whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the elderly prisoner's risk of
future violence.

•

States that when scheduling a parole suitability hearing or when considering a request
for an advance hearing, the board shall consider whether the prisoner meets the above
age and continuous incarceration requirement.

•

Provides that if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under the Elderly Parole
Program, the board shall release the individual on parole, as specified.

•

Prohibits a prisoner from being paroled who has been sentenced under the "Three
Strikes" Law, who has been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole or death, and a person who has been convicted of the first degree murder of a
peace officer or a former peace officer.

•

States that this bill does not alter the rights of victims at parole hearings.

•

States that an individual eligible for an elderly parole hearing shall meet with the
parole board as specified by existing law.

•

Specifies that if parole is not granted at an elderly parole hearing, the parole board
shall set the time for a subsequent elderly parole hearing as specified by existing law.

•

Specifies that "elderly eligible parole date" is the date on which an inmate who
qualifies as an elderly offender is eligible for release from prison.

Parole: Youth Offender
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to sentence a youth
who did not commit homicide to a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
(Graham v. Florida (2010) 540 U.S. 48 [130 S.Ct. 2011] (Graham).) In Miller v. Alabama
(2012) 567 U.S. 460 [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller), the Court further held the Eighth Amendment
forbids a state from mandating the imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile homicide
offender. (Id. at p.
[132 S.Ct. at p. 2469].) Consistent with these decisions, in People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 (Caballero), the California Supreme Court ruled that
sentencing a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense to a term of years with a parole
eligibility date that falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy – i.e., the
functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence – constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at p. 268.) While the court in Caballero pointed out that
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juvenile offenders seeking to modify an LWOP or de facto LWOP term may file petitions for
writs of habeas corpus in the trial court, the Court also urged the Legislature to establish a parole
eligibility mechanism for an individual sentenced to a de facto LWOP for non-homicide crimes
committed as a juvenile. (People v. Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 5.)
In accordance with the California Supreme Court’s urging in Caballero, SB 260 (Hancock),
Chapter 312, Statutes of 2013, established a parole eligibility mechanism for individuals
sentenced to lengthy determinate or life terms for crimes committed when they were juveniles.
(Pen. Code, § 3051.) Under the youth offender parole process created by SB 260, the person has
an opportunity for a parole hearing after having served 15, 20, or 25 years of incarceration
depending on their controlling offense. (Pen. Code, § 3051.) SB 261 (Hancock), Chapter 471,
Statutes of 2015, expanded those eligible for a youth offender parole hearing to those whose
controlling offense occurred before they reached the age of 23. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)
The youth offender parole provisions expressly exclude a defendant who has been sentenced to
LWOP. (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049, fn. 4.) SB 9 (Yee), Chapter 828, Statutes of
2012, created a recall and resentencing process for juveniles sentenced to LWOP. (Pen. Code, §
1170, subd. (d)(2).) The recall and resentencing provision of SB 9 has been found to be an
inadequate remedy for a Miller violation. (In re Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1049-1052.)
SB 394 (Lara), Chapter 684, makes a person who was convicted of a controlling offense
that was committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which an
LWOP sentence has been imposed eligible for a youth offender parole hearing during his
or her 25th year of incarceration. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a defendant who was convicted of a controlling offense that was
committed before he or she had attained 18 years of age and for which the sentence is
LWOP shall be eligible for release on parole by the board during his or her 25th year
of incarceration at a youth offender parole hearing unless previously released or
entitled to an earlier parole consideration hearing pursuant to other statutory
provisions.

•

Clarifies that youth offender parole does not apply to those sentenced to LWOP for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.

•

Sets a deadline of July 1, 2020, for the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) to complete
all youth offender parole hearings for individuals who were sentenced to LWOP and
who are or will be entitled to have their parole suitability considered at a youth
offender parole hearing before July 1, 2020.
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VETERANS
Military Fraud: Stolen Valor Act
California currently requires an elected officer forfeit his or her office upon conviction of a crime
pursuant to either the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005 or the California Stolen Valor Act.
However, the United States Supreme Court struck down the Federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005
stating that the action of claiming military service is protected under free speech. (See United
States v. Alvarez (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2556 [183 L.Ed.2d 547].) Therefore, the Federal Stolen
Valor act of 2005 was found to be unconstitutional. Congress then passed the Federal Stolen
Valor Act of 2013 with a focus on intent to make profit, obtain money, property, or obtaining
something with/of tangible benefit or value.
There is now a need to conform state law to the updated federal law.
AB 153 (Chavez), Chapter 576, modifies the language of the California Stolen Valor
Act to conform to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013. Specifically, this new law:
•

Punishes as a misdemeanor offense conduct that is fraudulent, with respect to false
representation as a war veteran or as a veteran or member of the Armed Forces, with
the intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit, as defined.

•

Defines tangible benefit as "financial remuneration, an effect on the outcome of a
criminal or civil court proceeding, or any benefit relating to service in the military
that is provided by a federal, state, or local governmental entity."

•

Expands the crime related to misrepresentation to include a person who fraudulently
represents him or herself as a veteran or member of the California National Guard,
the State Military Reserve, the Naval Militia, the national guard of any other state, or
any other reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States with the intent
to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit.

•

Punishes as a misdemeanor offense a person who misrepresents him or herself as a
member or veteran of specified armed forces in connection with certain acts, such as,
among other things, the forgery or use of falsified military documentation, or for
purposes of employment or promoting a business, charity, or other endeavor, as
prescribed.

•

Requires elected officers, as specified, to forfeit their office upon the conviction of a
crime pursuant to the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2013 or the California Stolen Valor
Act that involves a fraudulent claim, made with the intent to obtain money, property,
or other tangible benefit, as defined, that the person is a veteran or a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States, as prescribed in those acts.
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Veterans: Suicide Reporting
It is estimated by the Veterans Administration that 22 veterans a day commit suicide. Tracking
this information will help determine whether or not existing suicide prevention efforts are having
a positive effect, if more attention to this matter is needed in the future and where to allocate
existing resources for mental health funding. Our brave servicemen and women deserve this
Legislatures much needed attention on this issue.
AB 242 (Arambula), Chapter 222, requires a certificate of death to indicate whether the
deceased person was ever in the Armed Forces of the United States and further requires
the State Department of Public Health to compile data from the electronic death
registration system in order to annually report information to the Legislature and
Department of Veteran Affairs regarding the ages, sexes, nationalities, and methods of
suicide of veterans.
Veteran's Treatment Courts: Assessment and Survey
Veterans’ court is a problem-solving court intended to serve veterans who are involved with the
justice system and whose court cases are affected by issues such as addiction, mental illness, and
co-occurring disorders. These courts promote sobriety, recovery, and stability through a
coordinated response involving cooperation and collaboration with prosecutors, defense lawyers,
probation departments, county veterans service offices, the California Department of Veterans
Affairs, health-care networks, employment and housing agencies and groups, volunteer mentors
who are usually also veterans, and family support organizations. There is a need to provide
greater access to these courts so all Veterans can get the treatment they need.
SB 339 (Roth), Chapter 595, requires the Judicial Council to conduct a study of veterans
and veteran's treatment courts. Specifically, this new law:
•

Requires the Judicial Council, if funding is provided, to conduct a study of veterans
and veteran's treatment courts that includes all of the following:
o A statewide assessment of the veteran's treatment courts currently in operation
that includes the number of veterans participating in the program, services
available, and program outcomes, including successful completion or program
terminations. The assessment shall evaluate the impact of a sample of veterans
treatments courts on participant outcomes, including, not limited to, program
recidivism, mental health, homelessness, employment social stability, and
substance abuse;
o A survey of counties that do not operate veteran's treatment courts that
identifies barriers to program implementation and assesses the need for
veteran's treatment courts in those jurisdictions based on the veterans involved
in the local criminal justice system. The survey shall identify alternative
resources that may be available to veterans, such as community courts or other
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collaborative justice courts; and,
o On or before June 1, 2020, report to the Legislature on the results of the study,
including recommendations regarding the expansion of veteran's treatment
courts or services to counties without veteran's treatment courts and shall
explore the feasibility of designing regional model veterans treatment courts
through the use of service coordination or technological resources.
•

States that the above provisions shall only remain in effect until January 1, 2021, and
as of that date is repealed unless a statute enacted before that date deletes or extends
that date.

Veterans: Pretrial Diversion
SB 1227 (Hancock), Chapter 658, Statutes of 2013, created a military diversion program for
current or former members of the military who are charged with a misdemeanor and who may be
suffering from service-related trauma, substance abuse, or mental health issues. The Vehicle
Code prohibits diversion for anyone charged with a driving under the influence of drugs and/or
alcohol (DUI) offense (Veh. Code, § 23640). The military diversion statute did not mention this
rule (Pen. Code, § 1001.80).
In grappling with these two statutes, the state courts of appeal issued conflicting opinions as to
whether the Vehicle Code prohibits military diversion for defendants charged with DUI. (People
v. VanVleck (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 355, rev. gtd. Nov. 16, 2016, S237219; Hopkins v. Superior
Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1275, rev. gtd. Nov. 16, 2016, S237734.)
SB 725 (Jackson), Chapter 179, specifies that a trial court can grant military pretrial
diversion on a misdemeanor charge of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
(DUI). Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a trial court can grant diversion on a misdemeanor charge of DUI or of
DUI causing injury, to a veteran or current member of the military who is suffering
from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of his or her military service.

•

States that participation in the military diversion program does not limit the
Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV) ability to take administrative sanctions
against the person’s driver’s license.
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VICTIMS
Restraining Orders: Gang Cases and Witnesses
The court can issue a protective order in any criminal proceeding where it finds good cause
belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is
reasonably likely to occur. (Pen. Code, § 136.2.) Protective orders issued under this statute are
valid only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 378, 382.)
When criminal proceedings have concluded, the court has authority to issue post-conviction
protective orders in specified cases, including domestic violence, elder abuse, and sex offenses.
With one exception, these protective orders can be issued only on the victim’s behalf. Currently,
most witnesses to crimes must go through the task of opening a civil case to receive a protective
order.
AB 264 (Low), Chapter 270, requires the court to consider issuing a restraining order for
up to 10 years in gang cases, and expands the court's authority to issue post-conviction
restraining orders to cover witnesses to the qualifying crimes. Specifically, this new law:
•

Extends the court's authority to issue post-conviction no-contact orders lasting up to
10 years in cases involving gang activity.

•

Allows the court to issue post-conviction restraining orders to cover percipient
witnesses to any of the crimes for which the court is authorized to issue such an order
if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been
harassed.

•

Defines harassment as "unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner."

Victims: Support Dogs
An effective tool to help prevent psychological harm to a child victim/witness or vulnerable
person victim/witness is the use of therapy or facility dogs (commonly referred to as comfort
dogs). Having a courthouse dog is another step in the process to assist victims and address the
need for more compassion in the legal system.
In People v. Chenault (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s
authority to permit the use of support dogs for certain witnesses. The court recognized that while
Penal Code section 868.5, expressly allows the presence of one or two support persons for a
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witness in certain circumstances, it does not apply to therapy dogs. (Id. at pp. 1513-1514.)
However, under Evidence Code section 765, the trial court has broad control over the
interrogation of witnesses, which includes the authority to allow the presence of a
therapy/support dog during a witness's testimony. Therefore the court had the authority to permit
use of the support dog under that statute. (Id. at p. 1514.)
Although case law recognizes the court’s authority to permit use of a support dog, this practice is
not codified in statute.
AB 411 (Bloom), Chapter 290, authorizes the use of a support dog during the testimony
of specified victims and child witnesses. Specifically, this new law:
•

Allows the following persons, if requested by either party in a criminal or juvenile
hearing, to be afforded the opportunity to have a therapy or facility dog accompany
him or her while testifying in court, subject to the approval of the court:
o A child witness in a court proceeding involving any serious felony, as
specified; and
o A victim who is entitled to support persons under other penal code provisions.

•

Requires the party seeking to utilize the therapy or facility dog to file a motioning
with the court which includes all of the following:
o The training or credentials of the therapy or facility dog;
o The training of the therapy or facility dog handler; and,
o Facts justifying that the presence of the therapy or facility dog may reduce
anxiety or otherwise be helpful to the witness while testifying.

•

Allows the court to deny a motion to utilize a therapy or facility dog if the court finds
that the use of a therapy or facility dog would cause undue prejudice to the defendant
or would be unduly disruptive to the court proceeding.

•

Requires the court to take appropriate measures to make the presence of the therapy
or facility dog as unobtrusive and non-disruptive as possible, including requiring a
dog to be accompanied by a handler in the courtroom at all times.

•

Requires the court, upon request, to present appropriate jury instructions designed to
prevent prejudice for or against any party.

•

States that nothing in this law shall prevent the court from removing or excluding a
therapy or facility dog from the courtroom to maintain order or to ensure the fair
presentation of evidence.
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•

Declares legislative intent to codify the holding in People v. Chenault (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1503 with respect to allowing an individual witness to have a support
dog accompany him or her when testifying in proceedings.

•

States that nothing in this law limits the use of a service dog, as specified, by a person
with a disability.

•

Defines certain terms for purposes of this law.

Victims and Witnesses: Immigration Violations
Existing law protects victims and witnesses of hate crimes from being detained for immigration
violations or being turned over to federal immigration enforcement.
Since the inauguration of the current presidential administration, the federal government's recent
sentiment on immigration laws have generated the possibility of deportation for suspected
undocumented immigrants. Forthcoming changes in federal law are likely to deter such
individuals who reside in California from assisting peace officers with evidence that is
potentially helpful to an investigation.
It is in the best interest of the state to establish firm connections with those in the community and
to protect the public from crime and violence by encouraging all persons – victims, witnesses or
anyone who provides evidence to assist in a criminal investigation – to cooperate with state and
local law enforcement and not be penalized on account of their immigration status.
AB 493 (Jones-Sawyer), Chapter 194, prohibits law enforcement from detaining a
crime victim or witness solely for an actual or suspected immigration violation.
Specifically, this new law:
•

Declares that it is the public policy of the state to protect the public from crime and
violence by encouraging all victims and witness to crimes, or who could otherwise
give evidence in a criminal investigation, to cooperate with the criminal justice
system and not to penalize those persons for such cooperation or for being crime
victims.

•

Prohibits a peace officer from detaining a person who is a witness or victim to a crime
exclusively for any actual or suspected immigration violation when that person is not
charged with, or convicted of, committing any crime under state law.

•

Allows law enforcement to turn over an individual to immigration authorities
pursuant to a judicial warrant.
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Child Victims: Conditional Examinations
Children who are victims of sexual crimes may be ordered to testify in criminal cases against
their accuser. In taking testimony from a child, the court must take special care to protect the
child from harassment, embarrassment, or further trauma. Children are asked to be able to recall
events accurately, understand the difference between truth and lies, and understand the
importance of testifying truthfully. More psychological harm can be done to a child when the
child is required to testify in a room full of strangers and to recall traumatic events.
AB 993 (Baker), Chapter 320, authorizes the prosecution to apply for an order that the
victims at the preliminary hearing be video recorded and the video recording be
preserved when the defendant is charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child under
the age of 14 years of age, or charged with oral copulation, sexual penetration, rape or
sodomy of a child under 10 years of age.
Sexual Assault Victims: Rights
California established the Sexual Assault Victims' Bill of Rights in 2003. (AB 898 (Chu),
Chapter 537, Statutes of 2003.) In passing that law, the Legislature found and declared that
"[l]aw enforcement agencies have an obligation to victims of sexual assaults in the proper
handling, retention and timely DNA testing of rape kit evidence or other crime scene
evidence and to be responsive to victims concerning the developments of forensic testing
and the investigation of their cases." Upon the request of the victim, law enforcement
agencies investigating the sexual assault may inform the victim of the status of the DNA
testing. Specifically, the California DNA Bill of Rights provides that subject to sufficient
resources to respond to requests, victims have a right to be informed whether or not the
assailant's DNA profile was developed from the rape kit evidence, whether or not that
profile was uploaded to the DNA database and whether or not a hit resulted from the upload.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, most sexual assault victims do not receive
treatment for their injuries or report them to the police. The lack of reporting may often be
due to the trauma of the actual reporting process, including the difficulty and costs related to
participating in the legal process. Creating additional rights for victims and clear
distribution of relevant information can make the legal process easier for them.
AB 1312 (Gonzalez), Chapter 692, requires law enforcement and medical professionals
to provide victims of sexual assault with written notification of their rights and provides
additional rights to victims of sexual assault. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that a law enforcement agency shall not destroy or dispose of rape kit
evidence or other crime scene evidence from an unsolved sexual assault case before at
least 20 years, or if the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged
offense, before the victim's 40th birthday.

•

Specifies that if law enforcement intends to dispose of a rape kit evidence from an
unsolved sexual assault case, a victim of specified sexual assault crimes must be given
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written notice at least 60 days prior to the disposal.
•

States that where there is an offense of domestic violence, as specified, or sexual
assault, as specified, law enforcement shall immediately provide the victim of the
crime a written card containing victims' rights and resources, as appropriate for
domestic violence or sexual assault.

•

States that prior to any initial medical evidentiary or physical examination arising out
of a sexual assault, the medical provider shall provide written card containing victims'
rights and resources for victims of sexual assault, as specified.

•

Specifies that the medical provider is only required to provide the specified
information card to a victim if law enforcement has provided the card to the medical
provider in a language understood by the victim.

•

States that after conducting the medical evidentiary or physical examination, the
medical provider shall give the victim the opportunity to shower or bathe at no cost to
the victim, unless a showering or bathing facility is not available.

•

Specifies that a sexual assault victim retains the right to have a victim advocates and a
support person present at any interview by law enforcement authorities, district
attorneys, or defense attorneys regardless of whether he or she has waived the right in
a previous medical evidentiary or physical examination or in a previous interview by
law enforcement authorities, district attorneys, or defense attorneys.

Victims of Violent Crimes: Recovery Centers
The Trauma Recovery Center (TRC) at San Francisco General Hospital was originally
established pursuant to legislation passed in 2000. AB 2491 (Jackson), Chapter 1016, Statutes of
2000), among other provisions, required the California Victims Compensation Board (board) to
enter into an interagency agreement with the University of California, San Francisco, to establish
a victims of crime recovery center at San Francisco General Hospital as a four year pilot project
to demonstrate the effectiveness of providing comprehensive and integrated services to victims
of crime, as an alternative to fee-for-service care reimbursed by the Victim Restitution funds.
The goals of the TRC included improving the process of care for victims of crime by enhancing
medical services for acute victims of sexual assault, linking victims to other services to facilitate
recovery, and improving access to victim compensation funds.
In May 2004, the board published its required report to the Legislature on the effectiveness of the
victims of crime recovery center, and concluded that the TRC model provides a wider, more
effective, range of services at a lower cost for trauma victims that the traditional fee-for-service
mental health treatment programs. According to the report, the data demonstrated that this
model of care is effective in engaging victims of crime with needed services, improving
cooperation with law enforcement, reducing homelessness, facilitating return to work, reducing
alcohol and drug abuse, and improving quality of life among victims of interpersonal violence.
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AB 1384 (Weber), Chapter 587, recognizes the Trauma Recovery Center at San
Francisco General Hospital as the State Pilot Trauma Recovery Center (State Pilot TRC),
and requires the board to use the model developed by this center when it awards grants to
establish additional trauma recovery centers. Specifically, this new law:
•

Provides that the Trauma Recovery Center at the San Francisco General Hospital,
University of California, San Francisco is recognized as the State Pilot Trauma
Recovery Center (State Pilot TRC).

•

States that the board shall use the evidence-based Integrated Trauma Recovery
Services (ITRS) model developed by the State Pilot TRC when it selects, establishes,
and implements trauma recovery centers pursuant to specified law.

•

Specifies that in replicating programs funded by the board, the ITRS can be modified
to adapt to different populations, but it shall include specified elements.
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MISCELLANEOUS
CURES Database: Health Information Technology System
According to recent reports by the Center for Disease Control regarding America’s opioid
epidemic, almost 2 million Americans abused or were dependent on prescription opioids in 2014.
In 2015, more than 15,000 people died from overdoses involving prescription opioids. Today,
nearly half of all U.S. opioid overdose deaths involve a prescription opioid and, due to the large
population that abuses prescription opioids, over 1,000 people are treated in emergency
departments for misusing prescription opioids every day.
In order to address the prevalence of prescribed opioid abuses, the California Department of
Justice (DOJ) implemented and maintains the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and
Evaluation System Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (CURES PDMP) searchable database
so that practitioners have increased access to information regarding a patient’s prescription
history. However, because current law does not provide authority for the CURES PDMP to
integrate with health information technology systems, health care practitioners face several
additional burdens including, but not limited to, a delay in accessing potentially vital information
for rapid treatment, increased opportunities for patients to abuse practitioner services, and
decreased peer-to-peer benefits between health information technology providers. During the
process of decommissioning the original CURES database and transitioning to CURES 2.0, the
current operating system, the DOJ expressed the need to address these concerns through
integration.
AB 40 (Santiago), Chapter 607, requires the DOJ to make electronic prescription drug
records contained in its CURES PDMP accessible through integration with a health
information technology (IT) system no later than October 1, 2018, if that system meets
certain information security and patient privacy requirements. Specifically, this new law:
•

Authorizes a health care practitioner, pharmacist, and any person acting on behalf of a
health care practitioner or pharmacist to submit a query to the CURES database
through a Health IT system if the entity operating the system has entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the Department of Justice (DOJ) addressing the
technical specifications of the system to ensure the security of the data and certifies
that:
o The entity will not use or disclose CURES data for any purpose other than
delivering the data to an approved health care practitioner or pharmacist or
performing data processing activities that may be necessary to enable the
delivery unless authorized by, and pursuant to, state and federal privacy and
security laws and regulations;
o The Health IT system will authenticate the identity of an authorized health
care practitioner or pharmacist initiating CURES queries and submit the date,
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time, first and last name of the patient, date of birth of the patient, and
identification of the CURES user at the time of a query to CURES;
o The Health IT system meets applicable patient privacy and information
security requirements of state and federal law.
•

Requires DOJ, by October 1, 2018, to develop a programming interface or other
method of system integration to allow Health IT systems to retrieve information in
CURES on behalf of an authorized health care practitioner or pharmacist.

•

Prohibits DOJ from accessing patient-identifiable information in an entity’s Health IT
system.

•

Requires and entity operating a Health IT system that is attempting to establish an
integration with CURES to pay a reasonable system maintenance fee.

•

States that this bill is urgent, and necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, or safety in order to enable the DOJ to ensure that information in
the CURES database will be made available to prescribing physicians, so they may
prevent the dangerous abuse of prescription drugs and to safeguard the health and
safety of the people of this state.

•

Authorizes DOJ to prohibit integration or terminate a Health IT system’s ability to
retrieve information from CURES if the Health IT system or the entity operating it
does not comply with specified requirements.

Vessels: Operation and Equipment
Under existing law, law enforcement may use blue lights on vessels while engaged in law
enforcement activities – e.g., while patrolling lakes and inland waterways for the purpose of
maintaining public safety and responding to emergencies. Despite the fact that fire agencies have
a wide range of public safety responsibilities on the water, existing law does not allow them to
use blue lights on their vessels.
AB 78 (Cooper), Chapter 103, expands the definition of vessels that are eligible to use
distinctive blue lights to include vessels from a fire department or a fire protection district
while engaged in public safety actives. Specifically, this new law:
•

Reserves the use of a distinctive blue light for public safety vessels whenever the
vessel is engaged in direct law enforcement activities, as specified, or public safety
activities conducted by a fire department or fire protection district, as specified.

•

Defines “public safety vessel” as “a law enforcement, a fire department, or a fire
protection district vessel.”
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Human Remains: Disposition
Existing law authorizes the disposal of human remains, without a death certificate or a permit, to
the nearest out-of-state funeral establishment as long as the funeral home is within 20 miles of
the border in the adjacent state. The initial purpose of allowing disposition without a certificate
or permit was to create “time and cost savings for families and counties [and to] aid out-of-state
investigations by allowing California coroners to release bodies to the investigative agency
without the issuance of a death certificate or permit when California has no interest in the case.”
(Sen. Rules Com., Off of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analyses of Assem. Bill No. 2105
(2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 08, 2006, p. 5.)
The current 20-mile limit is too restrictive given the geographical realities of some counties in
California. For example, for Alpine County, the nearest out-of-state licensed funeral homes are
22 and 24 miles from the California state line, which does not comply with the current 20-mile
restriction.
AB 356 (Bigelow), Chapter 187, expands the distance for which human remains may be
transported for disposition in an adjacent state. Specifically, this new law authorizes
human remains to be transported from California to an adjacent state for disposition in
that state without a death certificate or a permit for disposition if the remains are found
within 50 miles of the California border and are being released to a licensed funeral
establishment within 30 miles of the border in the adjacent state.
Transit District (BART): Prohibition Orders
AB 716 (Dickinson) Chapter 534, Statutes of 2011, authorized the creation of a three-year pilot
program under which the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) could issue
prohibition orders denying passengers committing certain illegal behaviors entry onto transit
vehicles and facilities. In 2013, BART initiated its AB 716 program, which also required BART
to provide the Legislature with annual reports on the program. (Pub. Util. Code, § 99172.)
SB1154 (Hancock) Chapter 559, Statutes of 2014, permitted BART to continue issuing these
prohibition orders until January 1, 2018. SB 1154 also clarified that BART Police Officers have
the authority to issue emergency protective orders for individuals in a stalking situation within
the transit system, and that they have the authority to take custody of weapons while
investigating domestic violence situations.
AB 730 (Quirk), Chapter 46, repeals the sunset on the law that allows BART to issue
prohibition orders to passengers committing certain illegal behaviors, making BART’s
authority to do so permanent.
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Vehicle Impoundment: Prostitution Offenses
In 1993, Vehicle Code Section 22659.5 established a five-year pilot program which allowed a
local government to declare a vehicle used in the commission of a prostitution offense to be
declared a public nuisance if there was a criminal conviction for the conduct. AB 1332 (Gotch),
Chapter 485, Statutes of 1993, declared legislative intent as follows:
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares that under the Red Light Abatement Law every
building or place used for, among other unlawful purposes, prostitution is a nuisance which shall
be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered. It is recognized
that in many instances vehicles are used in the commission of acts of prostitution and that if
these vehicles were subject to the same procedures currently applicable to buildings and places,
the commission of prostitution in vehicles would be vastly curtailed. The Legislature, therefore,
intends to enact a five-year pilot program in order to ascertain whether declaring motor vehicles
a public nuisance when used in the commission of acts of prostitution would have a substantial
effect upon the reduction of prostitution in neighborhoods, thereby serving the local business
owners and citizens of our urban communities."
AB 14 (Fuentes), Chapter 210, Statutes of 2009, authorized a city or county to adopt an
ordinance declaring a vehicle to be a nuisance subject to an impoundment period of up to 30
days when the vehicle is involved in the commission of specified crimes related to prostitution, if
the owner or operator of the vehicle had a prior conviction for the same offense within the past
three years.
AB 1206 (Bocanegra), Chapter 531, authorizes a two-year pilot program in the cities of
Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento to permit law enforcement to tow vehicles used
in the commission, or attempted commission of specified offenses related to prostitution,
without the requirement of a prior conviction with the past three years. Specifically, this
new law:
•

Authorizes the cities of Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento to conduct a 24month pilot program in which law enforcement may tow a vehicle, upon first-time
arrest if it is used in the commission, or attempted commission, of pimping,
pandering, or solicitation of prostitution.

•

Requires the city, if it elects to implement the pilot program, to take specified actions,
including, among others, offering a diversion program to prostitutes cited or arrested
in the course of the pilot program.

•

Authorizes impoundment only if the arrestee is the sole owner of the vehicle.

•

Requires that at the time of the arrest, that the person be notified that his or her
vehicle will be towed and given information on how the vehicle may be retrieved.

•

Allows the registered owner or his or her agent to retrieve the vehicle at any time.
119

•

Specifies that the registered owner or his or her agent is responsible for all towing and
storage fees related to the seizure of a vehicle.

•

Repeals these provisions on January 1, 2022.

Trauma Recovery Centers
The Trauma Recovery Center (TRC) at San Francisco General Hospital was originally
established pursuant to legislation passed in 2000. AB 2491 (Jackson), Chapter 1016, Statutes of
2000), among other provisions, required the California Victims Compensation Board (board) to
enter into an interagency agreement with the University of California, San Francisco, to establish
a victims of crime recovery center at San Francisco General Hospital as a four year pilot project
to demonstrate the effectiveness of providing comprehensive and integrated services to victims
of crime, as an alternative to fee-for-service care reimbursed by the Victim Restitution funds.
The goals of the TRC included improving the process of care for victims of crime by enhancing
medical services for acute victims of sexual assault, linking victims to other services to facilitate
recovery, and improving access to victim compensation funds.
In May 2004, the board published its required report to the Legislature on the effectiveness of the
victims of crime recovery center, and concluded that the TRC model provides a wider, more
effective, range of services at a lower cost for trauma victims that the traditional fee-for-service
mental health treatment programs. According to the report, the data demonstrated that this
model of care is effective in engaging victims of crime with needed services, improving
cooperation with law enforcement, reducing homelessness, facilitating return to work, reducing
alcohol and drug abuse, and improving quality of life among victims of interpersonal violence.
AB 1384 (Weber), Chapter 587, recognizes the Trauma Recovery Center at San
Francisco General Hospital as the State Pilot Trauma Recovery Center (State Pilot TRC),
and requires the board to use the model developed by this center when it awards grants to
establish additional trauma recovery centers. Specifically, this new law:
•
•

•

Provides that the Trauma Recovery Center at the San Francisco General Hospital,
University of California, San Francisco is recognized as the State Pilot Trauma
Recovery Center (State Pilot TRC).
States that the board shall use the evidence-based Integrated Trauma Recovery
Services (ITRS) model developed by the State Pilot TRC when it selects, establishes,
and implements trauma recovery centers pursuant to specified law.
Specifies that in replicating programs funded by the board, the ITRS can be modified
to adapt to different populations, but it shall include specified elements.

City Prosecutors: Authority
In most of California’s 58 counties, the district attorney prosecutes both felony and misdemeanor
cases. However, state law allows cities to prosecute misdemeanors on their own. Cities may use
their city attorneys or city prosecutors provided that they have called that in their city charter or
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received consent from their county’s district attorney.
Despite the dependence of several cities on city prosecutors, California law has several
inconsistencies when it comes to statutes affecting city attorneys and city prosecutors. For city
prosecutors to effectively ensure public safety, their interactions with other government agencies
must be efficient and timely. Confusion over the authority of city prosecutors can lead to
significant delay in conducting basic prosecutorial functions.
AB 1418 (O’Donnell), Chapter 299, clarifies that city prosecutors have the same
authority, privileges, and protections as prosecuting city attorneys. Specifically, this new
law:
•

Authorizes a city prosecutor to prosecute a person for maintaining, permitting, or
allowing a public nuisance to existing upon his or her property, or on property or
premises he or she is occupying or leasing, after they have received reasonable notice
in writing from specified persons, including city prosecutors.

•

Authorizes a defendant to file a motion to disqualify a city prosecutor from
performing an authorized duty involving a criminal matter and authorizes a city
prosecutor to appeal an order recusing him or her from a proceeding.

•

Requires the Attorney General to furnish state summary criminal history information,
if needed in the course of their duties, to city prosecutors.

•

Requires the DMV to make information relating to specified convictions to be
available to city prosecutors on a date five years on or after the date of the conviction.

•

Requires the home address that appears in DMV records of city prosecutors to be
confidential if a city prosecutor requests the confidentiality of that information.

•

Allows city prosecutors, for the purpose of prosecuting misdemeanors, to have access
to specified records of the DMV.

Law Enforcement: Racial Profiling
AB 953 (Weber), Chapter 466, Statutes of 2015, established the Racial Identity and Profiling Act
(RIPA) which required local law enforcement agencies to report specified information on stops
conducted by peace officers to the Attorney General's (AG) Office, and established the RIPA
Advisory Board.
AB 1518 (Weber), Chapter 328, delays for one year until January 1, 2018 the collection
of data and the implementation of regulations related to RIPA.

121

Public Safety Omnibus Bill
Existing law often contains technical and non-substantive errors due to newly enacted
legislation. These provisions need to be updated in order to correct those deficiencies.
SB 811 (Committee on Public Safety), Chapter 269, makes technical and corrective
changes, as well as non-controversial substantive changes, to various code sections
relating generally to criminal justice laws. Specifically, this new law:
•

Corrects a misstatement to the definition of "human trafficking victim" in the statute
pertaining to expert testimony in human trafficking cases.

•

Clarifies that the application of the felony penalties in the End of Life Option Act
does not preclude the application of any other criminal penalties for conduct
inconsistent with the act.

•

Reorganizes provisions of the Health and Safety Code by incorporating all of these
non-conflicting provisions into the section as amended by Proposition 47 and repeals
the other section as obsolete.

•

Makes technical, non-substantive changes to provisions related to various penalty
provisions related to sex offenders.

•

Strikes the word "sexual" in the section that authorizes specified procedures for a
minor's testimony that apply in a criminal proceeding in which a defendant is charged
with a violation of human trafficking in order to apply the section to all forms of
human trafficking.

•

Clarifies that a government entity is not required to provide notice of obtaining
electronic communication under circumstances in which the government entity has
accessed electronic information under the emergency 911 authority.

•

Adds the Department of Justice to the enumerated list of persons or entities allowed
to inspect juvenile case files to carry out specified duties related to sex offender
registrations.

•

Renames the Council on Mentally Ill Offenders to the Council on Criminal Justice
and Behavioral Health and makes conforming cross references.
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